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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the development of a theoretical model 
which captures the main firm, sector and location characteristics of multinational firm 
activity. The knowledge capital model (Markusen and Venables, 1995, 1996) is extended 
by intra and inter-industry supply linkages to allow multinational firms to be attracted to 
a country to exploit the agglomeration externalities created by pooling of national or 
other multinational firms. The main finding through computational general equilibrium 
(CGE) simulations is that firms show a preference to locate their affiliates in countries 
with strong supply linkages, as long as the competition among sectors for limited 
endowments do not increase the factor prices to a level that makes the country 
disadvantageous. Multinational firms (MNFs) particularly in sectors with high total scale 
economies, low trade costs and high plant versus firm level scale economies prefer to 
locate in close proximity to industrial clusters. The propositions obtained from CGE 
simulations are also tested empirically for manufacturing sector affiliates. The empirical 
findings provides evidence on the importance of supply linkages in a host economy for 
attracting MNFs in technology-intensive sectors and that the sub-sectors may vary on the 
importance they set on finding locations with industrial clusters. In addition to these, the 
determinants of location decisions of MNFs in Europe and the impact of the European 
integration policies on multinational production are investigated. The empirical analysis 
for the potential effects of a regional integration policy reveals that central and peripheral 
countries may benefit from different aspects of an integration process. Moreover, the 
intra-region and extra-region foreign direct investment may display different motives for 
choosing a location for their affiliates. The findings provide support on the hypothesis 
that intra-EU FDI has become more efficiency seeking, hence, leading to a redistribution 
of multinational activity within the region. 
Keywords: multinational production, foreign direct investment, agglomeration 
economies, knowledge capital model. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
1. Background 
The last two decades have witnessed a surge in the magnitude of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) flows and the importance of multinational firms' (MNFs) output in the 
composition of world production. Global foreign direct investment inward stock 
increased by nearly eight-fold in twenty years from $692 billion in 1980 to $6,089 billion 
in 2000. According to the recent estimates of UNCTAD (2004), there are more than 
60,000 MNFs with approximately 900,000 foreign affiliates operating throughout the 
world. In 2003, MNFs achieved $17.5 trillion worth of affiliate sales including one-third 
of total world exports. The scale of the growth in FDI flows and stocks could be better 
established by comparing with some other macroeconomic growth indicators. Table 1.1 
presents some comparative statistics on the actual value and growth levels of FDI and 
multinational production with GDP, capital stock and international trade in the world. 
The differences in the growth rates ofthese indicators are quite striking. The expansion in 
current GDP and capital stock (approximately by two-fold) and exports (approximately 
by three-fold) between 1982 and 2003 have been much slower than the FDI inward stock 
upsurge (approximately by nine-fold) and the growth of affiliate production 
(approximately by five-fold) during the same period. 
The major reason behind the upsurge in multinational production has been the greater 
ease of the international flows of goods, services and ideas due to liberalization policies 
and advances in transport and communication technologies, which have resulted in lower 
costs of cross border business coordination. Despite the original trend of separating only 
the production plants from headquarters, in recent years there has been increased 
fragmentation even in headquarter activities, such as research and development (R&D), 
software development, call centres/service centres and regional headquarters. All these 
developments in the production structure in favour of multinationals raised research 
interest into why firms choose to fragment activities internationally, why they prefer 
affiliate production to other modes of international production such as licensing, and 
finally, where do firms locate each stage of production. As multinational firms can shift 
location of production globally, their location decisions have important implications for 
host countries which may suffer from job losses and unemployment due to this shift. 
Foreign affiliates are estimated to have produced about one-tenth of world GDP in 2002, 
and to have employed over 54 million employees. 
TABLE Ll. Selected Indicators of FDI and International Production, 1982-2003 
Value at current prices Annual growth rate (%) 
($ billion) 
Item 1982 1990 2003 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 
FDI inflows 59 209 560 22.9 21.5 39.7 
FDI outflows 28 242 612 25.6 16.6 35.1 
FDI inward stock 796 1950 8245 14.7 9.3 16.9 
FDI outward stock 590 1758 8197 18.1 10.7 17.1 
Cross border M&A 151 297 25.9 24 51.5 
Sales of foreign affiliates 2717 5660 17580* 16 10.2 9.7 
Gross product of foreign affiliates 636 1454 3706* 17.4 6.8 8.2 
Total assets offoreign affiliates 2076 5883 30362 18.2 13.9 20 
Exports offoreign affiliates 717 1194 3077 13.5 7.6 9.9 
Employment of affiliates-thousands 19232 24197 54170* 5.6 3.9 10.8 
GDP in current prices 11737 22588 36163 10.1 5.1 1.3 
Gross fixed capital formation 2285 4815 7294 13.4 4.2 2.4 
Royalties and license fee receipts 9 30 77* 21.3 14.3 7.7 
Exp.of goods & non-factor services 2246 4260 9228 12.7 8.7 3.6 
* UNCT AD estimations 
Source: UNCTAD, based on its FDIffNC database ~www.unctad.or~fdistatistics2 and UNCTAD estimates. 
Table 1.2 presents statistics on the significance of manufacturing foreign affiliates in 
employment, production and R&D expenditure for selected host countries. The table 
confirms that multinational firm production constitutes a significant share of the national 
total in many developed and developing countries. For example in Ireland, 48% of labour 
force is employed by multinational firms, and 86% of value added is produced by MNFs. 
In other OECD host countries such as Canada, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, 
Luxembourg, Poland, Sweden and UK the contribution of multinational firms to national 
turnover levels is over 30%. MNFs also play a significant role in research and 
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development activities of many countries. In Ireland, MNFs are accounted for 
approximately 72% of R&D expenditure of the national total. There is a growing 
empirical literature on the contribution of multinational firms to host economies through 
employment and positive spillovers, which can promote production efficiency, export 
competitiveness and technological and managerial capabilities in the host country. 
Spillovers can take place as a result of transferring assets to their affiliates or non-equity 
partners through training, or indirectly through increased competition and mobility of 
trained labour between firms and generate long term and wide spread benefits for the host 
country (For reviews of relevant literature, see, Griliches (1992) and Blomstrom and 
Kokko (1998». 
TABLEL2. Significance of Foreign Affiliates in Selected Host Economies, 
2000: Manufacturing Sector 
Share in national total (%) 
Country Number of employees Turnover Value added R&D expenditure 
Australia 22.7 34.5 45.4* 
Canada 49.9** 31.0 
Czech Republic 25.3 392 37.9 50.1 
Denmark 10.2* 12* 11.5* 
Finland 15.9* 14.4 14.2 11.9 
France 30.1 35.0 34.6 
Germany 6.0 9.4 
Hungary 44.5 64.7 54.9 
Ireland 48.1 78.2** 85.9 71.9* 
Italy 13.5 22.4* 22.4* 
Japan 2.5 2.5* 3.9 
Luxembourg 41.4* 52.9* 52.9* 
Mexico 
Netherlands 18.3 24.4 24.8 24.9 
Norway 21.4 28.1 30.4 
Poland 20.9 34.7 33.8* 17.4 
Portugal 10.1 17.4 15.5 27* 
Spain 16.8 29.7 25.6 39.5* 
Sweden 29.1 33.4 35.5 35.8 
Turkey 6.4 15.0 16.2 12.7 
UK 20.4* 36.1* 26.8* 31.5* 
* 1999 data. ** Gross output data. 
Source: OECD Measuring Globalisation database. 
Throughout the last decades, the majority of countries reduced or removed barriers in 
trade and investment flows and introduced various national regulations to support FDI 
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flows into the country. However, as a result of the fierce competition among host 
countries, liberalisation policies or fiscal incentives alone are not adequate to attract 
multinational firms. Moreover, the issue is not only attracting 'any' multinational firm, 
but attracting the right MNFs in the right sector, which will both complement the existing 
production structure and supply linkages within the country, and contribute to the 
dynamic comparative advantage of the country by generating positive spillovers and 
augmenting industrial clusters. In order for the governments to employ the right policies 
to make the country more attractive, and be able to target the suitable sector 
multinationals which will benefit the country at best, there is need for better 
understanding the motives of multinational firms and characteristics of the sectors in 
which they operate, as well as countries' own comparative advantages which may comply 
with these motives. This provides the main motivation for this thesis. 
TABLEL3. Distribution of FDI Stocks by Sector 
1990 2002 
Primary 
(billion $) 182 448 
Share in primary sector (%) 
agriculture 4 6 
mining 95 94 
Source: UNCT AD 
Manufacturing 
(billion $) 
1990 
807 
2002 
2,442 
Share in manufacturing sector (%) 
food 10 8 
chemicals 22 17 
metal 8 6 
machinery 7 5 
electrical 11 12 
motor vehicles 7 10 
Service 
(billion $) 
1990 2002 
948 4,343 
Share in service sector (%) 
electricity 1 3 
trade 25 18 
transport 3 11 
finance 40 29 
business 13 26 
health 3 
The aim of this thesis IS, therefore, to contribute to the development of a relevant 
theoretical model which captures the main firm, sector and location characteristics of 
multinational activity and fits well with empirical observations. The theoretical and 
empirical research in the literature (such as Dunning, 1977; Markusen, 2002) suggest that 
multinational corporations tend to have more sophisticated production technologies and 
management techniques, and produce differentiated products. Simple data analysis can 
help to demonstrate some of these characteristics of MNFs mentioned in the literature. 
First of all, the distribution of foreign direct investment shows large differences across 
sectors (Table I.3). For example, the capital and technology intensive sectors,such as 
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chemicals, electrical and electronic equipment and motor vehicles attract a significant 
share of FDI stock, while low technology sectors such as textile, publishing, rubber and 
plastic products receive a small share of total FDI. The ascendancy of the service sector 
in the last decade has also been reflected in the growing share of service sector FDI. 
Although services typically need to be produced when and where they are consumed, the 
recent advances in information and communication technologies have made it possible 
for more services, such as accounting, billing, software development, architectural design 
and testing, to become tradable. In particular, foreign investment in service sectors such 
as electricity, water, telecommunications and business services are becoming more 
prominent. These developments generate new opportunities for a new international 
division of labour. 
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Figure 1.1. Compensation per employee of foreign affiliates in the 
manufacturing sector: (1): 1989-99, (2): 1989-97, (3):1989-96. 
Source: OEeD Measuring Globalisation statistics 
Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 provide some further statistical observations on the general 
MNF characteristics. In order to obtain their ownership advantages (Le. knowledge 
capital) and to implement this technology in a foreign country, multinational firms 
employ more skilled labour and pay higher average wages. Figure 1.1 compares relative 
compensation/employee statistics for domestic firms and foreign affiliates. In all the 
OEeD countries illustrated in the figure, foreign affiliates pay relatively more than their 
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domestic counterparts. Multinational firms also tend to have higher productivity levels 
than domestic firms (Figure 1.2), the difference sometimes being quite significant 
especially in developing countries (i.e. Ireland, Turkey, Hungary and Czech Republic 
among OEeD countries). Another stylized fact on MNFs is that they tend to be large 
firms and hence international production is fairly concentrated at the firm level. In 2002, 
100 largest multinational firms representing less than 0.2% of the total accounted for ]4% 
of sales by foreign affiliates worldwide, 12 % of their assets and 13% of their 
employment (UNCTAD, 2004). 
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France 
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National firm; = 100 
150 200 250 300 350 400 
Figure 1.2. Gross output per employee of foreign affiliates in the manufacturing 
sector in 2000: (1):1999, * Turnover per employee data 
Source: OEeD Measuring GlobaIisation statistics 
Early theories of multinational production based on industrial organisation and firm 
theories (i.e. market imperfections hypothesis (Hymer, 1960) and internalisation 
(Dunning, 1977)} have mainly focused on the reasons for the preference towards 
multinational production, and successfully linked this phenomenon to the presence of 
market imperfections and the ownership of a firm-specific advantage (knowledge 
capital). The main attributes of multinational activity, hence, are the existence of 
internationally separable and tradable stages of production with different factor intensity 
requirements in each stage, and the joint input characteristic of the firm-specific 
advantage. Knowledge capital acts as an offsetting advantage for multinational firms and 
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enables them to compete in foreign markets against national firms which have better 
knowledge of the market. The presence of market imperfections, on the other hand, leads 
to a preference towards internalizing the knowledge capital within the firm rather than 
licensing. These market imperfections may be as a result of concentrated market 
structures or high transaction costs such as problems in defining property rights in 
knowledge or negotiating and enforcing contracts. The extent and pattern of multinational 
activity is determined by the interaction between the competitive advantages embedded in 
firms and those embedded in countries, and the way in which firms choose to combine 
and coordinate these two sets of advantages across national borders. Of the various 
theories of MNF activity, the 'eclectic paradigm' (Dunning, 1977) is the most 
comprehensive one within which various country, sector and firm specific determinants 
of multinational activity can be accommodated. Different country characteristics, hence, 
may be attractive to multinational firms depending on the firm specific factors, the type 
and range of products produced, and the characteristics of the country of origin. For 
example, multinational firms may separate headquarter and plant activities to be able to 
produce in close proximity to consumers abroad and also avoid trade costs involved, or to 
benefit from international cost differentials. Market-related and efficiency-related factors 
have been widely discussed in literature, although market-related factors were found to 
have statistically more significant effects in the empirical studies. 
The statistical data on the regional distribution of outward and inward FDl stock provides 
support on the importance of potential market size considerations of multinationals. For 
example, in 2000, developed countries made 86% of the direct investment abroad, and 
received 68% of the total FDl stock (Table 1.4). Hence only 32% of FDl has been 
invested in developing countries, despite their low factor costs. Besides, out of this 
amount, most have been received by the relatively rich South-East Asian countries, and 
Latin America rather than poorer nations. These statistics support the role of high income 
levels, as well as similarities in endowments on international location of production. The 
amount of FDI flows among developed nations indicate that that intra-industry FDI is 
stronger than the North to South flows which mainly depend on the differences in factor 
costs. Least developed countries, for example, do not even account for 1 % of all FDI 
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inward investment, despite the low levels of wages. However, a combination of potential 
market size with cheap labour seems to attract MNFs to developing countries which also 
have an adequate level of skilled labour force. Moreover, in recent years there seem to be 
an increase in the significance given to the efficiency related factors as a result of trade 
costs. 
TABLEI.4. Regional distribution of FDI stocks (% share in total) 
inward outward 
1980 1990 1995 2000 1980 1990 1995 2000 
Developed countries 56.4 71.8 68.0 65.9 89.1 92.7 89.1 86.3 
EU 31.2 38.4 38.0 37.1 38.6 45.3 44.8 49.7 
France 3.8 4.5 6.4 4.3 4.3 6.3 7.0 7.4 
Germany 5.3 6.2 6.5 7.7 7.7 8.4 8.9 8.1 
Netherlands 2.7 3.5 3.9 4.0 7.5 6.1 6.0 5.0 
UK 9.1 10.5 6.7 7.2 14.3 13.0 10.5 15.0 
Other Western Europe 2.2 2.5 2.6 2.0 3.9 4.4 5.7 4.5 
North America 19.8 26.1 22.0 23.4 42.7 29.3 28.2 25.6 
Canada 7.8 5.8 4.1 3.5 4.3 4.8 4.1 4.0 
US 12.0 20.3 17.9 19.9 38.4 24.5 24.1 21.6 
Other 3.2 4.9 5.5 3.4 4.1 13.7 10.4 6.6 
Developing countries 43.6 28.1 30.6 31.9 10.7 7.3 10.7 13.3 
Africa 4.6 2.6 2.6 2.3 1.3 1.2 1.1 0.8 
Latin America &Carib. 7.2 6.0 6.7 8.4 8.4 3.4 3.0 2.6 
Brazil 2.5 1.9 1.4 1.7 7.0 2.3 1.5 0.9 
Mexico 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.6 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Asia and the Pacific 31.7 19.5 21.4 21.1 1.1 2.8 6.5 9.9 
China 0.1 1.1 4.5 5.7 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.4 
Hong Kong 25.5 10.4 7.6 7.5 0.0 0.7 2.7 6.5 
Singapore 0.9 1.5 2.2 1.9 0.7 0.5 1.2 1.0 
C&E Europe 1.4 2.0 1.7 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
World FDI stock, $ billion 693 1,950 2,992 6,090 560 1,758 2,898 5,983 
Source: UNCT AD 
Table 1.5 shows a significant increase in exports to affiliate sales ratio of US 
multinationals in total manufacturing sector between 1985 and 2000. This indicates that 
US MNFs have become more likely to produce in a location to benefit from its resources 
and lower costs rather than only target its market. Despite the general increase in the 
share of exports in affiliate sales, the manufacturing sub-sectors show great variation. 
Sectors such as food, cleaning compounds and toiletries have very Iow shares of export to 
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affiliate sales ratios, since productions in these sectors are targeted at domestic customers. 
On the other hand, sectors such as audio, video, communications equipment, electronic 
components, appliances and transportation equipment have above average export to 
affiliate sales ratios. These sectors show more vertically integrated structures and 
efficiency-seeking tendencies in their affiliate location choices. The common 
characteristics of these sectors are that they employ high technologies and have 
significant differences in the factor intensities used at each stage of production. Electronic 
components and audio, video, communication equipment sectors, which show the highest 
export to affiliate sales ratios, also benefit from low shipment costs based on the weight 
of products. Appliances and transportation equipment sectors, on the other hand, are also 
technology-intensive but have higher shipment costs. 
TABLEL5. Share of Exports in US Manufacturing Sector Affiliate Sales 
Export/total sales (%) US Exports/total sales (%) 
2000 1995 1990 1985 2000 1995 1990 1985 
Total Manufacturing 45 43 40 38 16 14 12 14 
Food 27 23 22 20 4 3 2 2 
Textile 43 36 47 39 17 9 22 11 
Chemicals 41 37 35 32 07 4 4 
Cleaning comp, toiletries 14 16 15 12 2 1 0.2 2 
Prim .. & fabricated metals 35 38 33 29 11 11 8 7 
Machinery 44 46 13 
.udio, video, comm.equip. 68 48 35 23 19 16 
lectronic components 64 52 58 65 34 30 38 
Appliances 50 56 23 15 9 
Transportation equip. 51 49 30 27 24 33 
Source: US Department of Commerce 
Vertical and horizontal natures ofMNFs also have links to their concentration tendencies. 
Food and beverages sector, which mainly target domestic markets and prefers a 
horizontally integrated production structure, is the most evenly spread amongst host 
countries, while foreign affiliates in high technology sectors tend to agglomerate in 
selected locations in the world (Table 1.6). For example, approximately 60% of affiliate 
production in bio-technology sector is located in only three host countries. Owing to the 
technological advances and competitive pressures of recent years, large MNFs show an 
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increasing tendency towards disaggregating activities that do not directly contribute to 
their core ownership-specific activities. This reflects the growing preference for 
innovation-led flexible production systems, as opposed to cost-reducing mass production 
systems. Moreover, high overhead costs of production from headquarter activities are 
threatening firms to limit their product range and innovatory activities. In order to 
increase their specialization and flexibility, MNFs prefer to outsource some of their 
production or headquarter activities. Therefore, they pay a special attention to the 
availability and quality of complementary activities in a host country and are increasingly 
attracted to industrial clusters which bring benefits through proximity to specialized 
skills, innovatory capabilities, competitors, suppliers of specialized inputs and 
institutions. For foreign affiliates local procurement can lower production costs in the 
host economy. Supply linkages also help with better adaptation of technologies and 
products to local conditions. The presence of technologically advanced suppliers can 
provide affiliates with access to external technological and skill resources, and better 
marketing techniques and distribution channels. These clusters attract efficiency seeking 
FDI as well as asset seeking FDI preferring the location due to a cluster of skilled labour. 
Since the formation of industrial clusters may have positive dynamic effects on the 
competitive advantage of the country, and may even initiate the host country becoming a 
brand name for a certain sector, these networking tendencies of MNFs have important 
policy implications. Moreover, the existence of linkages of MNFs with domestic 
suppliers may prevent MNFs moving to other locations. 
TABLEL6. Geographical Concentration of Affiliates * 
High technology Medium technology Low technology 
Share of industry total Semi- Bio- Automobile TV & radio Food & Textile 
conductors technology receivers Beverages 
Top 3 host countries 0.496 0.627 0.294 0.356 0.237 0.287 
Top 5 host countries 0.629 0.71 0.44 0.502 0.353 0.401 
Top 10 host countries 0.787 0.852 0.71 0.696 0.561 0.601 
Top 20 host countries 0.945 0.953 0.884 0.893 0.747 0.795 
# affiliates ** 272 169 1296 253 2250 1445 
# host countries 31 28 55 36 101 77 
* Calculated as the share of the number of foreign affiliates in total foreign affiliates in the world in each sector. 
** Majority owned affiliates only. 
Source: UNCTAD, FDIffNC database. 
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As concentration is more likely in technology-intensive sectors, industrial clusters may be 
expected to form more in developed countries or in developing countries which achieve 
to attract high technology FDI through their cheap skilled labour force. Table 1.7 
compares the concentration of US multinational activity in European countries. As large 
countries should be expected to attract more multinational production, the values are 
adjusted by comparing the share of each country in US affiliate sales in Europe and the 
share of country GDP in total European GDP. Countries which have a share greater than 
one indicate that the country has more affiliate sales relative to its size. US multinationals 
tend to concentrate their European activities in Belgium, Ireland, Sweden and UK. 
Country 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Turkey 
TABLEL7. 
United Kingdom 
CEE 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Poland 
Scale Adjusted Distribution of US Affiliate Sales 
Share of US affiliate sales in Europe/Share ofGDP in Europe 
1985 1990 1995 2000 
0.32 0.30 0.37 0.42 
2.15 1.96 1.80 1.75 
0.24 0.22 0.21 0.29 
0.72 0.77 
1.11 1.09 
0.15 0.15 
4.19 4.72 
0.54 0.56 
2.94 2.37 
0.53 0.44 
0.90 0.85 
0.44 0.35 
0.37 0.39 
0.03 0.08 
1.76 1.88 
0.19 0.29 
0.77 
0.94 
0.22 
5.34 
0.58 
1.87 
0.46 
0.86 
0.60 
0.43 
0.25 
1.88 
0.39 
0.76 
0.84 
0.18 
6.65 
0.55 
0.87 
0.38 
0.76 
1.34 
0.64 
0.22 
1.41 
0.65 
0.71 
1.58 
0.47 
Source: US Department of Commerce and World Bank. 
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2. Contributions 
The theoretical literature of multinational production has focused on the location choices 
of multinational firms based on international factor cost differentials and market access 
motives of MNFs. The potential attractiveness of the presence of industrial clusters in a 
region has not been introduced into the theoretical models of multinational production, - - -
although there has been some support in the empirical literature. The principal 
contribution of this thesis in the literature is to bridge this gap by examining the effects of 
introducing agglomeration economies into the decision process of multinational firms. 
Incorporating agglomeration economies into production models facilitates important 
policy analysis, since a spatial concentration of production, once established, may tend to 
persist, and small differences in the initial economic conditions of countries may grow 
over time. The principal contribution has three main elements. First, this thesis introduces 
agglomeration economies as a location decision factor for multinational firm production 
in a general equilibrium framework (Chapter IV and Chapter V). The knowledge capital 
model (Markusen and Venables, 1995) is extended by intra and inter-industry supply 
linkages to allow multinational firms to be attracted to a country to exploit the 
agglomeration externalities created by pooling of national or other multinational firms. 
The model is expected to capture the stylized observation that the sectors with higher 
scale economies and lower trade costs may expect higher agglomeration. The general 
equilibrium framework allows for all variables to be determined endogenously in a 
simulation environment. Hence, the results are expected to reflect the non-linear and non-
monotonic structure in real data. Second, an empirical model, which incorporates 
endowment and sector characteristics of host countries that may potentially affect the 
choice and level of multinational production, is specified and statistically tested (Chapter 
VI). The propositions derived from the CGE simulations on the market size, relative 
factor costs, trade costs and agglomeration economies are incorporated into the 
specification of this empirical model, and tested empirically for the manufacturing sector 
using a large bilateral country data set constructed to represent a range of developed and 
developing home and host country partners. Third, this study also investigates the 
determinants of location decisions of MNFs in Europe and the impact of the European 
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integration policies on multinational production (Chapter 7). The propositions from CGE 
simulations are combined with three components of integration (Le. membership to EU, 
the Single Market Programme and currency union) to test the effects of each stage of 
integration on multinational production in different country groups. The changes in the 
significance of absolute and relative endowment factors in location decisions and any 
potential sectoral differences in the investment patterns of multinational firms and 
whether the integration process had different effects on each sector have also been 
examined. 
The main finding is that when supply linkages are introduced into multinational 
production models, firms show a preference to locate their affiliates in countries with 
strong supply linkages, as long as the competition among sectors for limited endowments 
do not increase the factor prices to a level that makes the country disadvantageous. The 
CGE simulations mimic a stylized fact of production that industrial clusters tend to occur 
in sectors with high total scale economies, low trade costs and high plant versus firm 
level scale economies. Hence, the country and sector characteristics that make vertical 
multinational firms dominant also support industrial clusters. This finding is in line with 
the propositions that horizontal multinationals lead to a more dispersed structure in 
production. The empirical findings of Chapter 6 provides evidence on the importance of 
supply linkages in a host economy for attracting MNFs in technology-intensive sectors, 
and Chapter 7 finds further support on that the sub-sectors may not find industrial clusters 
equally important for their location decisions. The empirical analysis of Chapter 7 for the 
potential effects of a regional integration policy reveal that central and peripheral 
countries may benefit from different aspects of an integration process. Moreover, the 
intra-region (Le. FDI originating from countries within the integrated region) and extra-
region FDI (Le. FDI originating from countries outside the integrated region) may display 
different motives for choosing a location for their affiliates. The findings provide support 
on the hypothesis that intra-EU FDI has become more efficiency seeking, hence, leading 
to a reallocation of multinational activity within the region. 
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The plan of this thesis is as follows: The content of the research is set out in Chapter 11 
and Chapter Ill, which survey the existing literature on the theoretical and recent 
developments on location of multinational production. These chapters help justify the 
need for the theoretical and empirical contributions that this research study makes. 
Chapter IV develops an algebraic general equilibrium model with oligopolistic 
multinational firms and sectoral linkages. Chapter V presents the findings from the CGE 
simulations and provides testable propositions. Chapter VI estimates and tests the 
propositions from the CGE simulations using manufacturing data and a large set of 
countries. Chapter VII investigates the impact of European integration on the location of 
multinational production in the region both on sectoral and aggregate levels. 
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11. THEORIES ON THE GEOGRAPHY OF MULTINATIONAL 
PRODUCTION: A SURVEY 
1. Introduction 
The growth in national markets, the willingness of governments to permit foreign 
ownership and decline in transport costs has led to a surge in foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and multinational firm activity in the last decades. The purpose of this chapter is to 
look into the developments in the theoretical literature on multinational production and to 
identify the potential gaps which need more attention. One question of interest is whether 
the theoretical propositions currently in the literature already capture the recent 
developments and changes, and if not whether do they have the potential for further 
expansion. 
A multinational firm (MNF) is a parent company that engages in foreign production 
through its affiliates located in several countries, exercises direct control over the poJicies 
of its affiliates, implements business strategies in production, marketing, finance and 
staffing that transcend national boundaries. Foreign direct investment (FDI) may be 
financed through parent company transfer of funds to the new affiliate, borrowing from 
home-country lenders, borrowing in the host country by the parent company, or any 
combination of these strategies. Until the 1960s the primary explanation for the 
international movement of capital has focused on portfolio theory which suggests that 
capital moves in response to changes in interest rate differentials. There was no separate 
explanation for foreign direct investment or any other mode of foreign involvement. The 
main distinctions between FDI and portfolio investment are that FDI is intended to be a 
longer term investment and is less sensitive to short term fluctuations in an economy, and 
it involves issues of direct control as resources are transferred internally within firms 
rather than externally between independent firms. Moreover, in the case of FDI (but not 
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portfolio investment) it is not simply capital that is transferred but potentially a range of 
resources (technology, management, marketing skills). Indeed, it is the return on these 
resources that is of primary concern to FDI, while it is the rate of return on capital that 
motivates the supply of portfolio investment. 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 summarizes the early theories of 
multinational production in neo-classical theory. Section 3 focuses on the industrial 
organisation and firm theories, which have provided the basis for further developments in 
the literature. Section 4 investigates the developments in international trade and general 
equilibrium approaches, which focus on more mathematical and technical explanations. 
This section is of importance to this study as the following chapters build on the existing 
theories of this section. 
2. Neo-c1assical Economic Theories and Multinational Production 
Both the classical and neo-c1assical trade theories are based on perfect factor and product 
markets and have ruled out foreign direct investment from their models with an explicit 
assumption of international factor immobility. These two theories, however, show 
different prospects for incorporation of multinational production into the models, if the 
factor immobility assumption were relaxed. 
The classical trade theory, which focuses on the advantages of the division of labour for 
countries (or regions) producing and trading according to their comparative advantages, 
suggests that the main source of comparative advantage is the differentiation between the 
labour productivity of countries. The theory does not consider the effects of demand 
differences and relative factor endowments on trade patterns. However, if the assumption 
of international factor immobility were relaxed, some possible links between trade and 
investment could be established, since the model assumes differences in technology and 
production functions, hence leaving room for the presence of ownership advantages. On 
the other hand, the neo-c1assical trade theory, which attempted to explain comparative 
advantages of countries with their factor endowments, assumed that production functions 
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were the same everywhere with information about technology being freely and instantly 
available to all countries. The relaxation of immobility of capital would not be sufficient 
this time for FDI to take place, since none of the countries possess a proprietary 
knowledge advantage over the other in a world of perfect information availability. When 
international capital mobility is considered under the neo-classical H-O-S (Hecksher-
Ohlin-Samuelson) model, there is no reason to suppose that this transfer would be in the 
shape of direct investment instead of portfolio investment. Besides, internationally 
mobile capital and knowledge leads to factor price equalisation and hence cost 
equalisation between countries. This should leave MNFs indifferent as to where to locate 
their headquarters or plants. 
By relaxing the H-O-S model assumptions, Corden (1985) incorporated the location 
decisions of MNF into a neo-classical international trade framework. He suggests that 
when the presence of two immobile factors (i.e. skilled and unskilled labour, or land and 
labour) are assumed instead of only one (labour), then factor costs will no longer be 
equalised in all countries under the assumption of internationally mobile capital and 
knowledge. In this case, MNFs will locate the production of goods that are intensive in 
skilled labour (unskilled labour) in the countries where skilled labour (unskilled labour) is 
cheap. When technology is allowed to differ among countries (i.e. due to better 
infrastructure, political stability etc.), the country with better technology will attract 
mobile factors, and hence MNFs will tend to locate production of capital and knowledge 
intensive industries in these countries. The introduction of transport costs or tariffs will 
encourage MNFs to produce close to the market, while the introduction of increasing 
returns to scale will encourage firms to locate all production at a single location and 
supply other markets through exports. When the production function and factor 
endowments are allowed to change over time (Le. due to educational system and effort, 
learning by doing) the corporation will have to reallocate its resources over time. 
Although Corden's contribution is helpful in showing how to incorporate location 
decisions ofMNFs into neo-c1assical framework, it relates the existence ofMNFs neither 
to internalisation nor to existence of imperfect markets and firm-specific advantages. 
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3. Industrial Organisation and Firm Theories 
a. Market Imperfections Hypothesis 
The first attempt to distinguish the motivating factors of FDI from traditional trade and 
finance theory came from Hymer in his doctoral dissertation, which was completed in 
1960 (supervised by Kindleberger), but not published until 1976. At the time of his 
writing the main FDI flow was from US to Western Europe and Canada and was of the 
horizontal type. Hymer provided an explanation for FDI based on the analysis of the firm 
and market imperfections. He argued that for firms to produce in a foreign country, where 
they have to incur additional costs of acclimatising, they must possess some offsetting 
advantages, which are not shared by local producers. These advantages may be in the 
form of 'superior knowledge' or economies of scale originating from monopolistic or 
monopsonistic power of the multinational firm. Hymer supported his argument by 
empirical evidence, especially by reference to Dunning (1958), which showed that US 
firms possessed superior technology and management skills with regard to US investment 
in Britain. 
The market structure is an assumption of Hymer's model, and he did not provide any 
explanation for the origin of monopoly in the first place. On the other hand, he tried to 
clarify why a monopolistic firm with a firm-specific advantage would choose foreign 
production rather than licensing the technology to an indigenous firm and hence avoid 
disadvantages of foreign production. He suggested that market imperfections for 
knowledge would make licensing unfavourable for the firm. Yet he did not distinguish 
between different types of market imperfection which may lead to this as concentrated 
market structure or transaction costs, the latter being due to problems in defining property 
rights, negotiating, monitoring and enforcing contracts. Even though he mentioned 
uncertainty and some other factors affecting transaction costs, he failed to relate his 
discussion explicitly to Coase (1937). Casson (1987) suggests that due to this failure, 
Hymer could not explain why in certain industries and at certain times, a MNF prevails, 
while in other industries and at other times an international cartel. For example, cartels 
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tend to exist in strategic industries which governments oppose to foreign control. MNFs 
are preferred to cartels when the international political climate is tense (uncertainty, 
problems in negotiating and enforcing contracts), and when products are heterogeneous 
(monitoring costs). Enforcing the contracts in cartels is also difficult when the industry 
has economies of scale, because this will mean closing down of operations in some 
countries. Kindleberger (1969) also explained FDI by imperfections in goods and factor 
markets, scale economies and government disruptions. 
Another contribution in an industrial organisation framework came from Knickerbocker 
(1973) who argued that the optimal strategy for firms in an oligopolistic market is to 
match their rivals move for move. Knickerbocker tested the 'follow the leader' theory on 
the data of 187 large US based MNFs and found support. The flaw in Knickerbocker's 
theory is that he did not state clearly the objectives of the firms and why a chosen 
strategy (follow the leader) is optimal given this objective. Besides, no explanation of the 
investment behaviour of the initiating firm is provided. 
Theories focusing on market imperfections provide a necessary condition (possession of 
firm-specific advantage) for multinational production, but they do not account adequately 
for industry patterns or choice of location. Vernon (1966, 1974) was the first to link 
location patterns of MNFs and international trade within a monopolistic/oligopolistic 
market structure. In industries where product innovation is important, products have a 
limited market life, which depends on the time that it takes for producers to develop a 
new and superior substitute. During their life span, products pass through various phases, 
and the characteristics of these phases determine the location decision of their production. 
During the first phase of the product (new product stage), the manufacturer wants to be 
closer to the consumer. Since the patent laws protect the innovator and the demand for 
the product is price inelastic, the innovator faces little or no competition. As the product 
becomes more recognised, demand from abroad starts and is met by exports. In the next 
stage (maturing product), as patents expire competition both at home and abroad 
increases. Demand becomes more price elastic meaning that the producer should cut 
costs. As both competition from abroad, and the amount demanded by foreign developed 
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countries rises, the producer prefers to establish a plant abroad where the market is 
largest and labour costs are relatively lower, in order to reduce tariff, transport and 
production costs. The last stage of production is the standardisation stage during which 
price competition is intense and the decisions about where to locate production become 
more influenced by cost considerations. According to Vernon's 'product life cycle 
theory' the post-war acceleration of US FDI was a response to either a shorter lag 
between innovation and standardisation, or to a shift in consumer preferences for 
standardised products. On the other hand, the theory could not justify the foreign 
investment which is not export substituting like in food processing industries. Also, it 
failed to account for the tendency of non-standard products to be produced abroad, and 
for products to be carefully differentiated to suit the local market. Vernon argued that 
characteristics specific to certain markets cause firms to become more innovative than 
rivals outside those markets. However, he does not specify why some firms should be 
more innovative within a given market. Buckley and Casson (1991) criticise the product 
life cycle theory for being programmatic rather than dynamic, since the model predicts 
the sequence in which events occur, but not the rate at which they occur, or the time lag 
which separates them. 
One of the stylised facts for foreign direct investment is the existence of intra-industry 
FDI. The models based on industrial organisation theory do not rule out the possibility of 
intra-industry flows, even though the emphasis does not lie on it. Under industrial 
organisation theory the motivation of both MNFs of different countries is the same which 
is to exploit the firm-specific advantage they hold due to some market imperfection. 
Observing the fact that the spread of activities of US based MNFs into Europe had 
generally preceded the entry of European firms into the US, Graham (1978) proposed that 
intra-industry FDI may be due to a retaliatory defensive move by the domestic 
(European) firm. Foreign firms operating unilaterally in a host country enjoy two general 
advantages over their rivals, which are possession of proprietary intangible asset and the 
ability to reduce prices without having to do so in their home country. In order to offset 
these advantages the host country firm enters the foreign firm's market, and hence 
threatens the intruder in her home market with the same advantages. Thus the foreign 
20 
firm might cease its rivalrous strategy in the domestic market. Although Graham found 
evidence of a lagged relationship between US FDI in Europe and European FDI in US in 
industries especially with oligopolistic structures, his regression results do not necessarily 
indicate causality for 'exchange of threats' hypothesis being the reason for intra-industry 
FDI. His findings might have suffered from omitted variable bias as he did not use any 
other variables that might affect the flow of European FDI to US like similar income and 
development levels. 
Other strategic motives for becoming a multinational have also been proposed in the 
literature. The main strategic motives include increasing market share in the foreign 
country and entry deterrence. According to Smith (1987) even if cost related motives 
support concentration of production, a firm may choose to serve the foreign market via 
affiliates in order to increase its market share in the foreign market. Since the firm avoids 
transport costs by establishing a plant abroad, it may choose to supply a higher level of 
output in the affiliate as a result of this advantage and hence increase its market share. 
Smith also mentions entry deterrence strategy may act as a motive in becoming a 
multinational production firm. If a firm enters the foreign market before its competitor in 
the foreign market enters to his, then it may hurt the competitor in its home market and 
prevent its entry into his home market. 
Krugman (1983) examines the existence of vertically integrated multinational in the case 
of a factor market imperfection: monopsony. Using Perry's (1978) model, he argues that 
a monopsonistic downstream firm tends to keep the price of its raw material low, which 
in turn leads to overseas suppliers (e.g. mining) to produce too little. Hence by integrating 
backwards, the firm can eliminate the distortion and appropriate the efficiency gain. In 
this model FOI encourages trade. Although it is sometimes argued that vertically 
integrated MNFs are essentially created to reduce uncertainty, Krugman's model shows 
that it is the monopsony power rather than the uncertainty which lead to vertically 
integrated multinational firms (Caves, 1996). 
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The focus in the industrial organisational approach to MNFs has been on firm and 
industry specific factors, such as economies of scale, product differentiation and better 
marketing, organisational or management skills to the firm. The existence of market 
imperfections provides an important basis for MNFs to internalise foreign markets, 
however this does not mean that MNFs would cease to exist in their absence. Many other 
explanations are suggested in the literature for the decision of multinational production 
and investment such as government incentives for foreign firms, belonging to a stronger 
currency area, maintaining production flexibility, excess managerial capacity etc. Kogut 
(1983) suggests that characteristics of multinationality, itself, brings the firm a unique 
ability (firm-specific advantage) to reduce costs of operating in an uncertain world and 
enable the firm to exploit international distortions in markets or production. Some of the 
characteristics unique to multinationals are their ability to arbitrage institutional 
restrictions (i.e. differences in tax system of countries or antitrust provisions, to avoid 
financial limitations of host countries with their ability to borrow at international 
markets), the informational externalities captured by the firm in the conduct of 
international business and the reduction in costs due to joint-input characteristics of some 
costs. 
b. Internalisation and Eclectic Approach 
During the 1970s explanations of FDI focused primarily on the firm as a way of 
understanding the MNF. As early as 1937, Coase, had linked the origins ofthe firm to the 
idea that the market is costly and inefficient for undertaking certain transactions. Finding 
a relevant price, defining obligations of both parties to a contract, the risk involved in 
accepting such contracts etc. create transaction costs to the firm. The existence of these 
various costs mean that whenever transactions can be organised and carried on at a lower 
cost within the firm than through the market, they will be internalised and undertaken 
within the firm itself. Although the Coase theorem was originally developed to apply to 
multi-plant indigenous firm, it is equally applied to MNFs. Buckley and Casson (1976) 
were the first to incorporate these ideas systematically into a theory ofMNF. They stated 
that imperfect markets do not exist only in final product markets, but also for 
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intermediate products such as semi-processed materials, knowledge incorporated in 
patents, human capital, managerial and technical skills and so on, which are often specific 
to firms, but easily transferable between countries. Profit maximising firms facing such 
imperfections will attempt to internalise the intermediate products within its own 
organisation. Buckley and Casson noted that these imperfections might arise due to 
government intervention in the form of tariffs, taxation, exchange rate policies or 
informational inequalities between buyer and seller of the product. Whilst internalisation 
brings enhanced market power and a greater ability to control and co-ordinate input and 
production flows, costs will be incurred from carrying out this co-ordination process. 
Therefore, a MNF will arise when these benefits exceed the costs of internalisation. 
Taking into account the previous contributions, Dunning (1977) proposed an eclectic 
approach for summarising determinants ofFDI, where he tried to encompass every form 
of FDI and all the modes of foreign involvement as well as the location target which is 
likely to be preferred. In the eclectic framework FDI is explained with the existence of 
three advantages, namely, ownership-specific (0), location specific (L), and 
internalisation (I). The greater the competitive advantage and profits from exploiting 
these advantages in a foreign location, the more likely the firm would undertake overseas 
production in preference to alternative modes. Various propositions followed this study 
discussing the relative importance of owner-specific advantages, location specific 
advantages and the internalisation concept. Rugman (1980) claimed that internalisation 
itself is a synthesising explanation of the motives for FDI, therefore the existing theories 
of FDI, including the eclectic one, were basically sub-sets of a general internalisation 
theory. He demonstrated his view by examining various important versions of FDI 
models in the light of internalisation theory. For example oligopolistic markets, which 
encourage product differentiation, scale economies or other types of firm-specific assets, 
is one type of market failure that generates externalities, which the firm may internalise. 
The MNF can save transport costs by setting up a plant overseas rather than relying on 
exports from the home nation. This spatial cost saving is another firm-specific advantage 
internalised by the firm, and shows that location approaches to FDI are also a subset of 
internalisation theory. Casson (1987) argued that the ownership advantage concept in an 
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O-L-I framework is not necessary for an FDI theory, since a combination of 
internalisation and location advantage are sufficient to explain multinational activities. 
This argument may be supported, since ownership advantage is a requirement for 
internalisation to take place. Hence, the internalisation concept actually encompasses the 
concept of ownership advantage. 
c. Markets and Hierarchies 
Williamson (1975) developed an 'organisational failures' framework, which provides 
advantages to hierarchies over markets. Human factors, such as bounded rationality (the 
limitations of humans to understand complex phenomena) and opportunism (incentive to 
cheat), interact with environmental factors, such as uncertainty (due to complexity) and 
the problem of small numbers (which requires discrete rather than continuous solutions), 
to produce 'information impactedness' which is a situation where market signals fail to 
function. Such limitations of human nature cause market transactions to be inefficient 
when environmental factors like uncertainty are also present. The main transaction costs 
are information costs, bargaining costs and enforcement costs. Although Williamson 
(1975) did not make any serious efforts to extend his analysis to the MNF, except some 
hints in Williamson (1981), Teece (1981) and Hennart (1982) filled this gap. 
Teece (1983) used the internalisation concept to relate both governance (transaction) 
costs and production costs to the key characteristics of technological complexity and 
asset specifity. He concluded that the importance of these characteristics within a firm 
affects the savings from internalisation. Teece (1985) demonstrated a clearer application 
... of transaction costs to the theory of the MNF. In this model, the transaction costs of 
licensing are increased by many types of contracting costs including opportunism, asset 
specifity, asymmetries in information and other contingencies. As these costs rise, the 
MNF will tend to substitute internal market transactions for licensing agreements. 
Rugman (1986) indicates that internalisation theorists have also discussed the majority of 
cases examined by Teece, such as the public good nature of knowledge, buyer 
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uncertainty problems, problems of contracting under licensing option, risk of dissipation, 
discrete nature of asset deployment, problems of recontracting, management skills 
embodied in the firm's human capital etc. Only they have not phrased these discussions 
in terms of Williamson's concepts of opportunism, asset specifity, governance and so on. 
Casson (1987) also notes that Williamson's presentation lacks any formal modelling, 
which specifies precisely the technical structure of the production process and the nature 
of market environment, which is assumed. However, this theory complements the 
location and internalisation theory synthesises, therefore putting these together may 
provide new insights for the theory ofFDI. 
d. Further Developments 
In the literature, there have been a number of attempts to integrate international trade and 
investment theories to explain location decisions of MNFs. The first systematic attempt 
to integrate international trade and investment theories under imperfect market structure 
was Vernon's product cycle theory (1966, 1974), where market characteristics are the 
motivating force behind innovations and the international growth of firm. Dunning's 
eclectic approach (1977), provided possible links between the decision on the mode of 
supply to foreign markets, ownership advantages, internalisation and country specific 
factors. 
In addition to Vernon's product cycle theory and Dunning's eclectic paradigm, Hirsch 
(1976) also tried to bring various factors of international trade and investment together. 
He related the decision between exporting or overseas production to production costs 
(including physical capital and inputs like labour and raw materials), firm-specific know---
how, cost differential between exporting and domestic marketing (including 
communication costs with foreign customers, transportation and financial transactions 
cost and tariffs), cost differential between controlling and co-ordinating foreign and 
domestic operations (including costs due to foreign languages, laws, taxation systems, 
labour codes etc. and co-ordinating production, transportation, preparing and maintaining 
control procedures). Hirsch argues that a firm will choose serving a market via exports or 
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affiliate production depending on the relevant importance of these factors. For example, 
when production costs are equal between two countries, a firm will choose to export to 
the other country market if cost differential between exporting and domestic marketing is 
less than cost differential between controlling and co-ordinating foreign and domestic 
operations, otherwise it would prefer to produce in the foreign country. The study 
emphasizes the importance of existence of a firm-specific asset and the level of trade 
costs in firm decisions. If the multinational firm does not have any firm-specific 
advantage then a domestic firm would be more advantageous in production. Ifthere were 
no trade costs, it would be more profitable to concentrate all production in a single plant 
in the country with the most favourable production conditions. Although this model 
underlines the importance of the existence of a firm-specific asset and trade costs, it does 
not adequately explain the nature of the advantages possessed by the MNFs. 
Porter (1996) proposes a new paradigm on international trade and production based on 
the determinants of national competitive advantage. He broadens the concept of 
competitive advantage of a nation to be related to not only factor conditions (Le. labour, 
skilled labour, infrastructure), but also to market demand factors (Le. size, growth and 
composition of market demand), presence or absence of related industries and the 
structure of firms within the economy. Hence the national competitive advantage of a 
country emerges from the interaction of these factors with each other. The framework he 
develops is a dynamic one, as the nature of this interaction tends to change over time. 
Different factors may play a more essential role in different stages in the development of 
an industry. The relative importance of these factors may also change within different 
industries. 
Although all these studies linked various firm, sector and country characteristics to 
explain international trade and production patterns, they need to be put into a formal 
theoretical framework to facilitate policy analyses. 
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4. International Trade and General Equilibrium Approaches 
The early 1980s witnessed a shift in international trade theories from competitive general 
equilibrium theories towards an industrial organisation approach. As a result, market 
structures gained importance in modelling practices. Increasing returns to scale and 
imperfect competition are incorporated into the models successfully. 
a. Factor Proportions Approach 
From the industrial organisation standpoint that firm-specific assets associated with 
marketing, management and R&D can serve product lines without being located in the 
production plants. Helpman (1984) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) proposed a 
general equilibrium model of international trade in which multinational production may 
exist due to the separation of production stages. The model was based of the fact that 
each stage of production (headquarters, intermediary product, assembly) process required 
different factor intensities, so that firms could minimise their costs by allocating the 
location of each stage according to the factor reward differentials of countries. In the 
absence of transport costs, tariffs and other government distortions such as tax incentives, 
factor rewards could differ only due to differences in relative factor endowments. 
Although this assumption of zero transport costs and tariffs simplified the derivation of 
the model, it also narrowed the scope of the model to include only vertically integrated 
multinationals, thus excluding demand-pull factors ofFDI. 
The model consisted of two countries, two internationally immobile factors of 
prodllction, labour_and a general purpose input (Le. capital) and two sectors. The-
homogenous good, which required all inputs to be employed in the same location, is 
produced under constant returns to scale in a competitive market. The differentiated 
goods are produced under monopolistic competition and increasing returns to scale. A 
producer of the differentiated product faces plant-specific fixed and variable costs and 
corporate-specific fixed costs arising from the adoption of the general purpose input into 
a firm-specific asset. It is assumed that arms length trade of this asset would be an 
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inferior organisational form to an integrated firm, so that the firm chooses to internalise 
this advantage. In this model tastes are homothetic and identical and intra-industry trade 
in the differentiated product is motivated by a taste for variety. There is one-way trade in 
the homogenous product and the net factor content of trade reflects the relative factor 
endowments of the countries. When factor endowments are sufficiently similar, factor 
price equalisation occurs as a result of trade, hence there are no incentives for the 
formation of MNFs and intra-firm trade. When the difference in factor compositions is 
extremely large factor prices do not equalise. However in the case of a sufficiently large, 
but not too large difference, some of the firms in the differentiated sector locate their 
headquarters in the relatively capital-abundant economy and production in the relatively 
labour-abundant economy. In a production process with more than two stages, final 
goods are separated from the headquarters before intermediate products, which are more 
capital intensive. In the general equilibrium, the ability to geographically separate firms' 
activities in the differentiated sector leads to an enlargement of the factor price 
equalisation set (FPE). When factor price equalisation occurs as a result of the activities 
of MNFs, the capital-rich country imports the homogenous good and may be a net 
importer or exporter of finished manufacturing goods, and intermediate goods depending 
on the difference in relative factor endowments and sizes of countries. This country 
serves as a base for headquarters activities. In the model inter-industry, intra-industry and 
intra-firm trade can coexist, although the relation between relative factor endowments 
and trade are not monotonic. 
In the FPE set by trade, there is a negative association between differences in relative 
factor endowments and the share of intra-industry trade. However, when the difference in 
f,!ctor composition becomes large. enough so as to bring about the emergence of MNFs,·· 
this relation becomes positive as long as the capital rich country is a net exporter of 
manufactures. When the difference in relative factor endowments becomes larger so that 
the capital rich country becomes a net importer of manufactures, the relation turns out to 
be negative again. Keeping the relative size of countries constant for two stage 
production, an increase in the difference in factor composition raises the number of 
MNFs and the number of varieties produced in the home country. Hence larger 
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differences are associated with a larger share of intra-firm trade. However, this 
monotonic link is broken when a higher number of production stages are relocated. 
The Helpman and the Helpman & Krugman model provide an explanation for one-way 
direct investment flows between economies with sufficiently large factor composition 
differences. However, the result of the model, that MNFs do not emerge between 
countries with similar endowment ratios, is not supported by the evidence of intra-
industry FDI among developed countries. By assuming away transport costs and tariffs, 
the model neglects the importance of demand-pull effects of FDI. Brainard (l993a) 
points to the differences in the real data and the pure factor proportions model results on 
relocation decisions and trade patterns. She notes that the total volume of affiliate sales 
strongly increases with similarities in relative income shares and finds that this variable 
together with transport costs explains over 40% of the variations in affiliate sales. Also, 
she illustrates that factor proportions and relative income similarity, rather than 
differences, better explain variations in intra-industry ratios of multinational sales. 
Furthermore, the Helpman-Krugman model considers only one-plant multinationals, 
although many multinationals are multi-plant firms and operate in both countries. More 
importantly, lack of trade and tariff cost variables limits the usefulness of the model for 
trade policy analysis. 
Factor proportions theory may find some supportive results for individual industries 
where vertical integration is the main trend. The semi-conductor industry of the US is a 
good example, where blue prints and key components are designed and produced in the 
US, and assembly is done by cheap labour in South East Asia and finished goods are 
shipped back to-sales destinations in the US and elsewhere (Y offie, 1993). Yet, why is 
South East Asia or particular countries in South East Asia preferred to other cheap labour 
locations, is not clear according to the model. Moreover, this model does not provide an 
adequate explanation for the very low levels of FDI from developed countries to the least 
developed countries, between which the factor endowment ratio differential is 
significantly high. These results indicate that a pure factor proportions theory is not 
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sufficient alone to explain the location of multinationals, although it throws light upon 
vertical multinational activities and trade patterns as a consequence. 
Markusen and Zhang (1997) extended the factor proportions model to explain the low 
levels of direct investment into small and skilled labour scarce countries. The model 
relies on two major changes to the original approach. The first is that multinational firms 
actually have minimal skilled labour (i.e. local engineers, technicians, managers, 
accountants etc) and social infrastructure (i.e. electrical and water supplies, 
telecommunication, transport links and legal institutions) requirements in the foreign 
country where they locate their assembly lines. Poor countries lack these requirements 
and this makes them less attractive for multinational firms, despite their advantage in the 
form of cheap labour. A second extension of the model is the inclusion oftransport costs. 
Multinationals incur transport costs for the shipment of intermediate products from the 
home country to the foreign country and the shipment of part (or all) of the final product 
to sales destinations in the home country. On the other hand, domestic firms face 
transport costs only for their exports to the foreign country. These changes to the model 
yield several results that fit the stylised facts and provide links between FDI, endowment 
ratios and country sizes. The simulation results indicate an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between the FDI a country receives and its endowment ratio (i.e. labour/skilled labour). 
The production is only by multinational firms if the foreign country is both large and the 
relative endowment differences are large. All production is by domestic firms if the 
foreign country is small and the relative endowment differences are small. Between these 
cases, there are mixed regimes of multinational and domestic firms operating together. 
The simulations illustrate that when the foreign country is very scarce in skilled labour 
__ and very small, it is not profitable to produce any final goods in that country. When the---
home country is very small that skilled labour requirements for producing the 
intermediate good drives skilled labour wages sufficiently high, all production takes place 
in the foreign country. 
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h. Proximity versus Concentration 
Another group of papers explains the expansion of multinational production in the 
absence of factor proportion differences and focus on the motivation of multinational 
firms to access the destination market at the expense of production scale economies at 
home. In these models, the firms in the differentiated products sector have the option of 
becoming MNFs by operating plants in both countries or exporting from a single plant in 
one country. The existence of horizontal MNFs rests on the assumption that they have 
multi-plant economies of scale. Hence although they incur higher fixed costs per plant 
(technology transfer costs etc.) than national firms, total fixed costs for a two plant firm 
are less than double the fixed costs for a single plant firm. Since production occurs in 
both countries, MNFs are assumed to use local factor markets for the supply of factors of 
production. MNFs benefit from serving a larger total market without incurring transport 
costs. Hence, the magnitude of variable transport costs and the size of scale economies at 
the plant level relative to the firm level determine the locational configuration of 
production chosen by firms. The predictions of the model are consistent with the 
observations for intra-industry FDI flow between similar countries and horizontally 
integrated multinational activities. 
Krugman (1983) made an initial proposal of this type of model by allowing for an 
imperfectly competitive market into trade theory (following the model of Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977» and including the possibility of FDI in addition to trade. The motivation 
for the existence of MNFs is the presence of high fixed costs in the creation of an 
advantage, and the joint-input property ofthis asset, which enables it to be used in many 
- plants without incurring the same cost again. Krugman suggests that higher_ transport 
costs encourage FDI, while costs of multinational production due to the difficulty of 
controlling with a distance or unfamiliarity with language, culture, legal system etc. 
promote trade. Markusen (1984) provides a simple algebraic proof for economies of 
multi-plant operation in the presence of a joint input. Horstmann and Markusen (1987) 
demonstrate that higher competition in the host economy make the relative sizes of firm-
specific, plant-specific and transport costs more important for deciding whether to 
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become multinational or remain as a national firm and export. They conclude that when 
firm-specific costs and transport costs are large relative to plant-specific cost, it is 
beneficial to become a MNF. 
Other extensions of the model are provided in Horstmann and Markusen (1992) and 
Brainard (1993a). These models focus on the decision between exporting and producing 
abroad motivated by market access considerations in the context of two symmetrical 
countries in their sizes, factor supplies, technologies and demand structures. They explain 
the existence of multinationals by the trade-off between proximity advantages and scale 
economies from concentrating production in a single location. Brainard's general 
equilibrium framework explains conditions for pure production regimes as well as mixed 
regimes where national firms coexist with multinational ones in the same industry. The 
model allows both for the possibility of single and multi-plant configurations for 
multinationals, as well as multi-level production stages. Multinational production and 
multi-plant configurations are more likely the higher are returns to scale at the corporate 
level relative to plant level, the higher are transport costs across markets, the greater is 
the expenditure on the differentiated products in the foreign market, and the higher is the 
elasticity of substitution between product varieties. Nevertheless, Brainard (1993b) notes 
that the equilibrium regime may be different, if multinationals face higher marginal costs 
in the host economies due to communication and co-ordination costs, and different 
operating conditions. In addition to this, taxes may distort the location decisions of 
multinationals by attracting headquarter activities with lower profit taxes and production 
activities with lower output taxes. Markusen and Venables (1995, 1996) contributes by 
including the possibility of asymmetries among countries to answer the question of why 
. direct investment is more important among similar countries· rather than. between. 
countries with endowment composition and size dissimilarities. The general result of 
their model is the "convergence hypothesis" which means that multinational activities 
become more important relative to national firms as countries become more similar in 
size, endowments and technologies. Hence, the equilibrium regime depends not only on 
trade costs and the relative importance of firm level scale economies over plant level 
economies, but also to country characteristics (Le. relative endowments and size). When 
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there are asymmetries in costs, national firms in the low cost country has an advantage, 
and their entry reduces the demand for a MNF's output. Conversely, when costs are 
similar in the two countries, the demand for multinational production is maximised. The 
Helpman-Krugman model of zero trade costs and 'no' horizontal multinationals emerge 
as a special case of the general treatment in the model they provide. In this special case of 
'only national firms', the location of production between countries is determined solely 
by factor market considerations, as output could be transported without additional cost to 
supply either market. With positive costs, product market considerations gain importance. 
They present that a necessary condition for MNFs to exist to be that their savings from 
trade costs should be sufficiently high relative to the fixed cost disadvantage of operating 
two plants. In addition to this endowment similarities of countries are important for 
location decisions, since they provide advantages to horizontal multinationals over 
national firms. 
Further extensions to the proximity-concentration model have enabled the model to 
capture more of the stylized facts in line with trade and investment trends. The original 
prediction of this hypothesis on trade is that MNF activity will in part or totally substitute 
for intra-industry trade. In the extreme case of zero fixed costs or corporate costs 
approaching to infinity, there will be trade only in 'invisible' corporate services and intra-
industry multinational production will prevail. For the intermediate range of parameter 
values, both intra-industry trade in final goods and FDI will exist, the share of exports 
(multinational production) rising with lower (higher) transport costs and trade barriers, 
higher (lower) production fixed costs, lower (larger) incremental R&D investments and 
smaller (larger) world market (Brainard, 1993b). However, as the volume of trade 
declines as a higher share of world production is undertaken by MNFs,they claim that _ 
convergence of country size may not be associated with growing volumes of intra-
industry trade as many studies in the literature suggest. Brainard (1993b) argued that with 
multiple stages of production instead of two, all of which are characterised by different 
proximity-concentration trade-offs, different results may emerge. If concentration 
advantages dominate in upstream production activities, while proximity advantage 
dominate in downstream activities, the intra-industry and intra-firm flows of intermediate 
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goods replace the intra-industry flows of final goods. Hence, multinational activity 
becomes complementary to trade in goods as the empirical evidences suggest. Finally, 
Breuss et al. (2001) incorporates fiscal incentives into the model to identify the effects of 
structural and cohesion expenditures on horizontal multinational activity. In the model, 
the structural subsidies are used as a determinant for both trade costs and plant set-up 
costs. These payments can be used to improve infrastructure facilities and thereby reduce 
trade costs, or to directly subsidize investments in a specific region. Multinational 
production is expected to increase, if the host country directs the structural expenditures 
towards reducing plant set-up costs. If the structural expenditures are used as direct 
incentives, the results are not monotonic, and the impact of the subsidies depends on the 
level oftransport costs. 
c. Unified Treatment of Vertical and Horizontal MNFs 
The factor proportions and proximity hypothesis have integrated MNFs into general 
equilibrium trade models by highlighting different stylised facts of these types of firms. 
Markusen et al. (1996) attempt incorporating both hypotheses in a unified model by 
employing the joint-input characteristic of knowledge capital and factor intensity 
differentials of production stages. In the model, headquarter activities are assumed to 
incur firm level fixed costs and use only skilled labour. Plant level activities, on the other 
hand, incur fixed (Le. for the establishment of a plant) and variable costs (Le. for the final 
production stage). While plant level fixed cost is composed of both skilled and unskilled 
labour, plant level variable cost only uses unskilled labour. All of the factors of 
production are assumed to be obtained from the sources of the country, where the activity 
is undertaken. Although both verticaL multinational and domestic firms need the same 
amount of skilled labour in total for their fixed costs, vertical multinationals have the 
advantage of obtaining the skilled labour required for headquarters activities in the skilled 
labour abundant country and the unskilled labour required at the plant level in the 
unskilled labour abundant country. However, they have to pay a penalty for separating 
the activities, which also prevents the existence of two vertical multinationals 
head quartered in different countries in the model. A horizontal multinational firm 
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requires more skilled labour then a single plant domestic or a vertical multinational firm, 
but less than double the amount of domestic firms because of the joint input nature of 
knowledge capital. In addition to these, due to technology transfer and other costs, 
multinational firms require more skilled labour in the home country than both types of 
firms. The assumption that skilled labour requirement at the plant is to be obtained from 
the host country sources, brings the importance of the development level of host country 
into the picture. This generates results as in the real world, where the least developed 
countries do not receive much foreign direct investment due to their low development 
levels. Another assumption in the model is that domestic firms and vertical multinational 
firms incur transport costs for exporting their products, measured in unskilled labour 
terms. 
The model captures the characteristics of both horizontally and vertically integrated 
multinationals. Horizontal multinationals exist when the countries are relatively similar in 
size and in relative factor endowments. When countries are very similar, the production is 
done only by horizontal multinationals, and the two other types of firms do not exist. 
When country sizes or relative endowments slightly differ national and horizontal 
multinationals coexist. Further differences in relative endowments generate appropriate 
conditions for vertical multinationals to enter into the market. The simulation results 
exhibit both non-linear relations and possible interactions between FDI, country sizes, 
relative endowments and trade costs. For example, when one of the countries is small but 
skilled labour abundant, headquarters locate in this country, while all production occurs 
in the large, unskilled labour abundant country. When the unskilled labour abundant 
country is very small, and the relative endowment difference is very high, then all 
production and_headquarter activities_locate in the large and skilled labour abundant 
country, and hence no multinational activity exist between these countries. 
Although the unified knowledge capital model provides non-linear relations between the 
existence of multinationals and country-specific factors, further simulations with different 
values for factor intensities of headquarters and plant level activities may be useful to 
observe the effects of firm level and plant scale economies. Hence, further hypotheses 
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could be established to test the relationship between R&D, technology transfer cost and 
FDI. Also, on the theoretical side, endogenising a firm's technology level (firm-specific 
asset) may provide useful results. Norback (2001) draws attention to the importance of 
technology transfer costs and argues that the level of technology transfer costs abroad 
may lead to contradictory results to those in the literature. In the literature firm-specific 
assets are generally associated with multinational firms, but he reasons and provides 
evidence to the effect that high-tech firms are more inclined to export. In his model when 
transfer costs are small, high-tech firms choose foreign direct investment. At higher 
transfer costs, on the other hand, high-tech firms choose to export. Therefore, high-tech 
or R&D intensive firms may gain more by avoiding transport costs of technology rather 
than avoiding trade costs, since more complex technology demands larger resources for 
technology transfer. In addition to endogenising firm's technology, extending the unified 
model to multi-product stages with the inclusion of an intermediate good sector may 
affect the results of trade regime as in Brainard (1993b). Moreover, the inclusion of an 
intermediate sector may help to incorporate agglomeration effect as a determinant of 
location choice. This type of a model has been offered by Venables (1996) for national 
firms, where firms prefer to locate close to intermediate products sector, which they use 
as input for their production. Empirical results on knowledge capital type of general 
equilibrium models tend to support horizontal models against vertical or unified models. 
Further empirical analysis with different data sets and variables are required in the 
literature. 
Markusen (1997) has extended the analysis of knowledge capital model to compare the 
individual and joint effects of trade and investment liberalisation policies. Although the 
results are not as straightforward as one would prefer this extension is importanLto-
analyse the potential effects of recent integration trend at policy level. Four cases are 
compared by simulations in this study. First one is the case of 'no liberalisation' where 
trade costs are high and multinational production is prohibited. The second case is 'trade 
liberalisation' where trade costs are low and multinationals are prohibited. Third case is 
'investment liberalisation' where multinationals are allowed for but trade costs are high, 
and the last case is 'full liberalisation' where multinationals are allowed and trade costs 
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are low. When there is investment liberalisation, a fall in trade costs lead to 
disappearance of horizontal multinationals, and hence a fall in affiliate production 
between similar countries. On the other hand this fall in trade costs lead to an increase in 
affiliate production between countries with significant endowment differences. Thus 
whether affiliate sales and trade are substitutes or complements is influenced by country 
characteristics. However, the results on the potential outcome of full liberalisation are 
indefinite, as they are not the same for high and low trade cost cases. Still, trade and 
affiliate production tend to be substitutes for similar countries, and potentially are 
complements for dissimilar countries. 
d. Internalisation in General Equilibrium Models 
International trade theory works quite well in explaining the location of international 
production by the MNFs. However, these theories generally focus on the decision of FDI 
versus exports from the home nation rather than exploring the reasons why internalisation 
is profitable compared to joint ventures, licensing or other non-equity forms of foreign 
involvement such as franchising. In fact the switchover from FDI to this second group of 
foreign involvement is more difficult to handle, since they involve the treatment of often 
intangible market imperfections, like information asymmetries, contracting and re-
contracting costs under bounded rationality, opportunism and so on. For example selling 
the special knowledge to a foreign firm at its full value will require exposing the 
knowledge which will cause the parent firm to lose some of its monopoly power. 
Foreigners eventually learn to produce a good on their own, and learn it faster if the good 
is produced in their country than if it is imported. Therefore, exporting, licensing and 
acquiring a subsidiary all generate different incentives for parties during loriger periods 
affecting the choice of production mode. 
In trade models, licensing generally is assumed to be a costly modality and is ruled out at 
the beginning. Ethier (1986) criticises both Markusen (1984) and Helpman (1984) by 
being primarily concerned to link their treatments of direct investment to the theory of 
international trade, rather than the O-L-I framework. Therefore, Ethier, instead of taking 
37 
internalisation for granted, attempts to incorporate the internalisation decision into a 
general equilibrium framework and hence endogenises it. The model is based on specific 
factor endowments with a differentiated manufacturing sector, which is composed of 
three stages: research, upstream production and downstream production. Research effort 
is linked to the public good nature of information and helps to determine the 
technological parameter, which in turn determines the level of quality. The public good 
nature of information produces an informational asymmetry between the home and 
foreign firms, preventing the latter from directly verifying the success or the extent of 
home firm's research effort. This asymmetry brings an intrinsic source of uncertainty 
(dispersion for the agents) into the model. According to Ethier, it will be possible to 
design an incentive compatible contract, ifat least one of the parties is risk neutral, and if 
it is feasible for the contract to call for a payment schedule for the foreign firm which 
varies across all conceivable states of nature. However, both of these requirements are 
demanding, and the latter requires extremely detailed and complex contracts. The 
multivariate nature of quality involving the diverse facets of the good's preparation, 
design, delivery and use makes an enforceable contract very difficult. Ethier (1986) 
concentrates on the difficulties associated with writing of state-contingent contracts and 
concludes that the presence ofMNFs is positively related to the size of the dispersion. In 
addition to this, similarity in relative factor endowments makes direct investment more 
likely and provides a basis for intra-industry trade. 
Horstmann and Markusen (1987) construct a model where multinational firms decide 
internalisation depending on the concentration in the market. They conclude that the 
home country firm will choose to become a multinational when it can credibly pre-empt 
all future entry in the hostmarket and become a monopolist. On the other hand, when 
more than one plant can operate profitably in the host country, home country firms 
cannot pre-empt all future entry and appropriate all of the rents from reduced costs and 
competition. Therefore, in this case, the relative sizes of firm, plant-specific costs and 
transport costs will be important in the decision as to whether to become multinational or 
remain national and export. Horstmann and Markusen show that when firm-specific cost 
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(R&D) and transport costs are large relative to plant-specific cost, it is better to become a 
multinational enterprise. 
An important contribution to this strand of literature comes from Ethier and Markusen 
(1996) following the previous study of Ethier (1986), where difficulties in writing 
complete contracts and informational asymmetry problem involved in knowledge capital 
causes MNFs emerge instead of licensing. Ethier and Markusen (1996), on the other 
hand, concentrate on the inability to enforce such contracts, and compare choices of 
different supply modes to a foreign market (Le. exporting, licensing, acquiring an 
affiliate) for more than one period. Using more than one period enables different 
incentives and outcomes of parties in different periods to be observed. The main 
assumption of the model is the fact that knowledge of how to produce a new product 
disseminates gradually. While in the first period only the inventor firm knows how, in the 
second period any other firms involved in production of the product during the first 
period (Le. franchisees, subsidiary employees, licensees) can also produce. As a result, if 
any of these supply modes is chosen in the first period, some disincentives are required to 
prevent them from defecting in the second period, otherwise the inventor has to compete 
with its former partner in the following period. A possible threat to the host firm against 
defection is that the source firm may have a new partner or export on its own in the 
second period. After the second period, anyone can produce the good as the knowledge it 
holds is no longer new. Therefore, a licence agreement only during the second period 
does not have the risk of defection as the knowledge will be common at the end of the 
period. Ethier and Markusen (1996) compare the expected earnings of both parties 
(source and host countries) in both periods under different modes of supply and 
parameter values, derived in- a general equilibrium framework with an endogenous-·· 
market structure. Supporting the previous literature results, they conclude that the 
existence of MNFs is more likely when knowledge capital is of medium to high 
importance to physical capital. The results for the effects of transfer cost, on the other 
hand, contradict the main findings in the literature. Although high transfer costs make 
exporting unattractive, they also make two period agreements difficult to sustain. With 
high trade costs it is easier for the host firm to defect as the threat by the source firm to 
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export on its own is less credible. Lower wages in the host country than the source 
country encourage production in the foreign country, as long as wages are not so Iow to 
leave no disincentive to subsidiary employees to defect. Higher production costs in the 
host country makes exporting from the source country a more potent second period threat 
and reduces the possibility of defecting in the second period. 
e. New Economic Geography Approach 
The New Trade Theories have explained location choices of multinationals based on cost 
reduction and market access motives of multinational firms. Differences in factor 
compositions, sizes of countries and trade costs are the main suggested determinants of 
FDI inflows into a foreign country. In these models higher plant-level scale economies 
relative to firm level scale economies promote concentration of production within one 
plant, while the reverse supports multi-plant multinational firms. The New Trade Theory, 
which made great advances in putting the O-L-I paradigm into a general equilibrium 
framework, however, lacks an explanation for one important characteristic observed 
industrial production patterns. Firms, especially in particular sectors, tend to locate close 
to each other, sometimes even leading to regional specialisation. Hence, regions or 
countries with identical initial relative endowment and market potential may attract 
investment at different levels and sectors. This localisation effect has been a major issue 
in New Economic Geography, although mainly under national considerations. The 
agglomeration concept has a good potential to be an explanatory variable for location 
decisions of multinationals. Multinational firms could be attracted to a country to exploit 
the agglomeration externalities created by pooling of national or other multinational 
firms. 
The idea of agglomeration economies originates from Marshall (1920). He identified 
three main resources of agglomeration to be a pooled market for workers with specialised 
skills, facilitating the development of specialised inputs and services and enabling 
clustered firms to benefit from localised information spilIovers. Weber (1929) puts 
forward the first explicit definition of agglomeration as "an advantage or cheapening of 
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production or marketing which results from the fact that production is carried out to some 
considerable extent at one place". Hence if location of firms in one region attracts other 
firms to locate in the same region agglomeration takes place. One point to keep in mind is 
that although the endowment level and market size attract firms to a certain area, only in 
the presence of agglomeration externalities does the clustering of firms add to the further 
attractiveness of the location. Without pecuniary and information externalities, the 
location will become less attractive due to competition in product and factor markets. 
Agglomeration economies may accrue from economies of scale from firm's production, 
proximity to suppliers, pooled labour market, diffusion of localised knowledge, or 
urbanisation economies such as highly developed infrastructures or low costs of energy. 
The new economic geography literature has introduced endogenous core-periphery 
patterns into general equilibrium models through mobility of workers (Krugman, 1991 a, 
1991 b) or mobility of firms which prefer proximity to producers of intermediate goods 
(Venables, 1996). Mobility of some factors between countries may generate differences 
among regions and hence an industrialised core and a de-industrialised periphery between 
two initially identical regions. When factors are immobile, as in Krugman (1990), an 
additional firm in one of the identical regions will increase competition in product and 
factor markets, and lower profitability. However, when labour migration is allowed 
among regions, the rise in local varieties and the rise in labour demand due to the 
additional firm set up will attract more workers into the region. As the labour supply 
increases local expenditure rises, and factor market competition decreases. This increases 
the profitability of firms and hence attracts more firms and workers into the region. For 
this self perpetuating process to start a fall in trade costs may be enough. The stronger the 
love of variety and the larger the share of manufactures in expenditure, the earlier will 
agglomeration take place. In the case of immobile labour, a higher elasticity of labour 
supply from agriculture to manufacturing in a region may also result in agglomeration 
(Puga 1998). In addition to the linkages through the supply of labour and demand for 
goods from each other's workers, firms may also be attracted to a region due to proximity 
to input suppliers. In these types of models, a country with a large manufacturing sector 
offers a large market for intermediates, which leads to concentration of intermediates in 
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that country. This creates a cost advantage for downstream production and attracts 
manufacturing sector firms further. Agglomeration via input-output linkages without 
labour mobility is modelled by Krugman and Venables (1995, 1996) and Venables 
(1996). Agglomeration forces increasingly influence a firm's location decisions as 
knowledge spiIIovers and pecuniary externalities gain importance in firm's 
competitiveness. 
While demand linkages, input-output linkages between firms and information 
externalities promote geographical concentration of production, immobile factors (Le. 
land, natural resources), prices of non-tradable goods (e.g. housing) and congestion 
effects (e.g. traffic, crime) work against agglomeration tendencies (Puga, 1999). Factor 
accumulation (Baldwin, 1998; Martin and Ottaviano, 1999), historical accidents and 
expectations (Matsuyama, 1991; Krugman, 1991c) also affect clustering of firms and 
population in a region. The relative strength of centripetal and centrifugal forces 
determines the start of this self-perpetuating process. Bringing in this dynamic structure, 
the new economic geography fills the gap in new trade theory, which assumes the 
existence of large and small markets without explaining their formation. Hence countries 
with identical relative factor endowments and market potential may attract investment at 
different levels and sectors. Models of new economic geography typically exhibit a 
pattern in which the quantitative behaviour of the model changes abruptly when the 
quantitative balance of forces passes some threshold level. Therefore, discontinuous 
changes (Le. jumps) and multiple equiIibria are possible in this framework. The inclusion 
of agglomeration tendencies brings non-linearity into the model. The self-perpetuating 
process of agglomeration may start due to a change in the initial conditions of trade costs, 
expectations, government policies or some historical accident. 
Contrary to potential significant effects of agglomeration process, there has been little 
formal analysis on the effects of agglomeration on location decisions of multinational 
firms. The theoretical studies which have incorporated multinational firms into new 
economic geography models have concentrated on the effects of the existence of 
multinationals on the agglomeration process. For example, Markusen and Venables 
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(1996) investigate the effects of factor mobility in response to factor price differences 
with· or without the existence of horizontal multinational firms. They find that the 
international mobility of the factor used intensively in the imperfectly competitive sector 
may cause a divergence between the production structures of the two economies, whereas 
full factor mobility may lead to all activity to be agglomerated in one of the locations 
depending on the initial values of endowments. The presence of multinationals does not 
eliminate, but reduces the agglomeration tendencies. Ekholm and Forslid (2001) find in a 
national context that horizontal multi-region firms tend to weaken agglomeration 
tendencies by narrowing the range of trade costs, which lead to core-periphery outcome. 
This effect becomes stronger as the degree of multi-plant economies of scale rise. They 
suggest that the present trend with rapid technological progress may therefore be a force 
to give rise to a dispersed production structure despite regional integration. However, 
with vertically integrated firms agglomeration occurs eventually with lower trade costs, 
although at a more gradual level than the abrupt change of core-periphery model. 
There is, however, a growmg interest in explaining internationalization of R&D in 
theoretical and empirical studies. Overseas R&O may be conducted to adapt home-
developed technologies to foreign markets or more strategically in order to access local 
technological expertise abroad and to create new technologies that can be used in all the 
MNFs' markets. Siotis (1999) develops a symmetric two-firm, two country model where 
a MNF when serving the foreign market through FOI generates spillovers to local 
competitors, but will also be able to learn from local rivals. If the technology gap 
between the firms is large, then advanced firm prefers exports over FOI, while 
technology laggard firm engages in FOI which allows for technology sourcing. Cadot and 
Desruelle (1998) suggest a pattern of international specialization in R&D activities 
according to which firms located in smaller countries do more research, while firms 
located in larger countries devote more resources to development stage. Ekholm and 
Hakkala (2003) develop a two country general equilibrium model where firms decide on 
the locations of R&D and production in a high-tech sector under the assumption that 
knowledge spillovers and backward linkages act as agglomeration forces. These two 
agglomeration forces affect the choice of locating R&O and production. Knowledge 
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spillovers, which may arise as a result of firms learning from each other through 
cooperation, reverse engineering and turnover of highly specialized labour, are 
geographically limited in scope. This technological externality creates incentives for 
firms to locate R&D labs in close proximity to other R&D labs. In the model, a firm 
deciding to conduct its R&D in a country with a higher number of R&D labs needs to use 
a smaller amount of skilled labour in order to produce its blueprint. The backward 
linkages arise from the combination of increasing returns to scale in production and 
transaction costs, thereby making it beneficial for firms to locate in the larger market. The 
model is solved for two asymmetric sized countries, the small country being the home 
country. Although agglomeration economies favour the large country, concentration of 
both activities in one country increases the price of skilled labour in this country because 
both production and R&D activities employ skilled labour intensively. The simulations 
find no specialization at high trade costs, when there are no R&D externalities and 
countries differ in size but have identical relative endowments. At intermediate trade 
costs; on the other hand, the home market effect is relatively strong and attracts firms to 
locate production in the large country. This leads to an increase in the price of skilled 
labour in this country creating a factor market reason for high-tech firms to locate their 
R&D activities in the small country. Beyond a certain threshold of R&D externalities, 
R&D activities tend to become concentrated in one of the countries. 
Belderbos, et al. (2005) incorporates location decision of R&D. abroad with strategic 
interactions among competing MNFs and market structure. In equilibrium, the shares of 
R&D performed abroad depend on the importance of spillovers, the strength of product 
market competition, the efficiency of intra-firm transfers and whether the firm is a 
technology leader or a technology laggard (defined in terms of the size of R&D. 
investments). Their results show that greater efficiency of intra-firm transfers leads to a 
greater reliance on home market R&D by technology leaders if the gap with laggard is 
sufficiently large. The outcome confirms the results of earlier work on R&D localization 
in the context of a single MNF's R&D localization decision (Norback, 200]). Laggards, 
in contrast, perform more R&D abroad in this case, because their home market operations 
can benefit more from overseas technology sourcing. Greater R&D spillovers have a 
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similar impact, reducing overseas R&D by leaders due to appropriability concerns, but 
increasing overseas R&D by laggards due to technology sourcing motive. Overseas 
R&D, however, does not only provide sourcing opportunities, it may also increase risk of 
dissipation of R&D results to foreign rivals, in particular when there are fewer 
possibilities to protect know how and intellectual property. The model suggests that R&D 
by both leader and laggard tends to agglomerate in the country with the stronger 
intellectual property rights. On the other hand, greater intensity of product market 
competition encourages the leading firm to engage in foreign R&D to make use of its 
technology advantage and to capture a larger share of local market. Laggards, in contrast, 
are more likely to concentrate R&D at home, to defend their home market position. 
More research into the effects of agglomeration economies on location decisions of MNF 
is needed. The effects of sector linkages, knowledge spillovers and migration need to be 
integrated with MNF location decisions as well as with current literature of 
internalisation and industrial economics. In a recent study, Piga and Theotoky (2005) 
integrate spillovers, location and market structure literatures in a two firm setting by 
endogenising location-related spillover externality and allowing firms to decide on price, 
R&D expenditures and location. Their model indicates that the more differentiated the 
products are the further the firms will locate from each other and the more they will 
spend on R&D. Their results indicate for a need to re-examination of many previous 
results obtained in the literature in the absence of location concerns, spill over 
endogeneity or product differentiation. Extending new economic geography literature to 
involve both domestic and multinational firms and through endogenising firm and market 
structures, technology and knowledge spillovers may provide further answers to explain 
non-monotonic relations observed within actual data. 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter summarized the developments in the trade and investment literature on the 
factors motivating multinational activity and their location choices. The recent advances 
in economic modelling techniques have enabled multinational production to be examined 
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in a mathematical environment. The main advantages of general equilibrium models are 
that they allow for extensions and the results can be analysed through simulation 
exercises. These features make them very important tools for policy analysis. 
A number of studies integrated various country, sector and firm characteristics into the 
general equilibrium models. However, there is still scope for further advances to reflect 
the comprehensive nature of Dunning's eclectic paradigm and Porter's dynamic 
comparative advantage concept within these models. One potential area for further 
progress involves incorporating further sectoral characteristics into these models to 
capture more of the stylizeo facts of data on multinational production activity. In recent 
years, the trend of falling trade costs had an impact on the relative importance of various 
factors and the way the way variables interact with each other. Falling trade costs and 
intensified competition makes locations with industrial clusters more attractive to MNFs 
which want to benefit from lower intermediate input costs, as well as proximity to 
specialized skills, innovatory capacity and a pool of skilled labour. 
46 
Ill. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE LOCATION OF 
AFFILIATE PRODUCTION 
1. Introduction 
The major challenge facing the empirical studies on the location of multinational 
activity involves the non-linear and non-monotonic nature of outcomes from the joint 
effects of country, sector and firm characteristics. The lack of detailed and extensive 
data for the related variables also makes econometric modelling of multinational 
activity quite difficult. 
The size of MNF activities could be measured in a variety of ways, although each 
emphasizes different aspects of these activities and provides different results. As a result 
of more commonly available data, FDI flows or stocks have been more commonly used 
to proxy multinational operations. Out of these variables, the stock of FDI is more 
closely linked to the economic activities of multinational firms than foreign investment 
flows data. Yet, both of them include only funds transferred from the parent company, 
and as a result overlooks to the fact that the MNFs may finance their operations by 
taking up loans in the host economy to fund future expenditures. Therefore, effective 
FDI flows into the host economy may be low or zero, despite the continuing activities 
of MNFs in the economy. Some studies have overcome this problem by employing the 
data on capital expenditures of countries abroad regardless of source of financing of the 
funds invested instead of FDI data. Potentially better measures of multinational activity 
are the affiliate related data, such as sales and gross product or value added product 
levels of affiliates of MNFs in foreign host countries. Although data is scarcer, they are 
more meaningful indicators in economic terms. Even these measures have their own 
failures for empirical purposes. For example, capital stock measures rely on historical 
book values, which can be misleading in inflationary periods. Sales data include the 
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value of imported inputs which overstates the amount of activity in the host country. 
Value added production is the best measure of the allocation of production, but is less 
commonly available. Other potential proxies that may be employed for empirical 
studies include the number of affiliates, the amount of total and fixed assets of affiliates 
or employment levels of affiliates. 
All of these measures contain information about the country, industry and the firm and 
hence provide valuable comparisons for the characteristics of MNFs which have chosen 
a certain location. The important point to remember is that the empirical results will be 
affected with the choice of measure, since each measure embodies and stresses different 
aspects of country and firm characteristics. For example, the number of affiliates, the 
levels of total assets, sales and gross product data in 1998 will reveal Hong Kong and 
Singapore as the most preferred foreign hosts out of all Asian economies for US 
multinational investors. On the other hand, the data on the amount of foreign fixed 
assets a country receives, will register Indonesia as the most favourable affiliate location 
for US firms, due to its oil resources. Having large populations, China and Malaysia 
account for the highest affiliate employment levels out of all Asian economies. 
Table IIL1, presents a summary of recent empirical studies (1990-2004) on the location 
determinants of the foreign production decision. The table is comprised of studies only 
which have employed FDI stocks or affiliate related data as their dependent variable. 
The details of data coverage and methodologies used are illustrated for each study. For 
direct comparisons from the table the differences in dependent variables should be taken 
into account. The table also shows the details of significant factors found as 
determinants of FDI with the proxies used to measure them and coefficient signs. The 
factors perceived as affecting the firm's decision to set production abroad are divided 
into seven main groups. The first two, which are relative factor endowments (or relative 
factor cost) and market size (or market potential), have been incorporated into 
theoretical models within a general equilibrium framework, and have received 
significant amount of empirical attention. The third group is related to the effects of 
government policies such as corporate tax, fiscal incentives, privatisation, trade 
liberalization and regional integration policies. Economic growth, development level of 
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country, cost of borrowing and exchange rates are illustrated under the fourth section as 
macroeconomic variables. The variables capturing the effects of agglomeration 
economies, firm (internalisation effect) and industry level factors (plant level scale 
economies, profitability, competition in the sector etc.) are provided in the following 
groups. The articles presented in the table are ordered from the most recent study to the 
least recent one. 
2. Empirical Tests on General Equilibrium Models 
Among the empirical studies, a recent group tests the general equilibrium models of 
multinationals incorporated into trade theories following the theoretical developments. 
Brainard (1993b) and Ekholm (1997, 1998b) compare factor proportions and proximity 
hypothesis. Ekholm (1997) finds that the income levels of the host and home countries 
have positive effects individually, while income dissimilarity has a negative effect on 
the level of affiliate employment of Swedish and US multinationals. Affiliate 
employment also increases when the home country is relatively more skilled labour 
intensive and less physical capital intensive. Ekholm (1998b) tests proximity-
concentration hypothesis for Swedish multinationals. The dependent variable employed 
is the share of affiliate sales in total foreign sales. Total foreign sales are defined as the 
sum of affiliate sales and exports. Because the dependent variable is bounded between 
zero and one, a logistic specification and non-linear least squares estimation method are 
used. The results support the proximity versus concentration hypothesis. Firms choose 
to serve foreign markets via affiliate production if the host market (GDP) is large and 
concentration advantages (plant-level scale economies) are not significant. A 
geographical distance between Sweden and the host country reduces the share of 
affiliate sales in total sales. The model is also estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) 
with a correction variable to test for the marginal effects. The results are mainly the 
same except that distance has a positive and significant effect. This suggests that the 
negative relation found in the logistic estimation is driven by the effect on the 
probability of finding any affiliate sales at all. The relative importance of affiliate sales, 
given that there are such sales, increases with geographical distance instead. This result 
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is consistent with the view that FDI is more costly for distant and hence different 
countries, but once the decision to invest is made, this effect is reversed. 
Carr, Markusen and Maskus (1998), Markusen and Maskus (1999) and Blonigen et al. 
(2002) test the fitness of vertical, horizontal and knowledge capital models of 
multinationals and provide a good opportunity to compare the strength of various 
specifications. The use of non-linear and interactive terms in these econometric models 
is an important contribution and the results support their importance for improving the 
empirical analysis. These non-linear terms also imply that the results are not necessarily 
the same for all countries, leading to a rich menu of conclusions. Besides, it is always 
possible to include variables such as fiscal and macroeconomic policies, agglomeration 
economies into the econometric model to check whether these might capture further 
relationships among the variables, which are not mentioned in the theoretical model. 
Such results may be helpful to determine future directions to extend the theory. 
Carr, et al. (1998) provides the first attempt to estimate the knowledge capital model. 
They use the real volume of affiliate sales of US multinationals as their dependent 
variable and employ both weighted least squares (Le. to correct for heteroscedasticity on 
levels), and Tobit procedures (Le. to account for zero observations in sales). They found 
for their data that as long as the difference in skilled labour proportions between two 
countries is low, an increase in the host country's trade costs raise production by 
affiliates of parent country firms. The model captures the favourable conditions for 
horizontal firms through a squared Gnp difference variable and trade cost variable. The 
negative sign and significance of the squared Gnp difference term indicate that affiliate 
sales increase when there is a convergence in country sizes, as long as the initial 
difference is not too large. Positive trade costs also indicate horizontal multinational 
activity. Total economic activity (Le. sum of Gnp) also stimulates total affiliate sales. 
The regression model also captures the activities of vertically integrated multinational 
firms which take advantage of factor cost differentials between countries through 
fragmentation of activities. The coefficient of difference in skilled labour variable is 
positive and significant, indicating that an increase in the parent country's relative skill 
labour abundance increases affiliate sales. These results have been interpreted as 
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support for knowledge capital models, where horizontal and vertical multinationals 
existed in different country conditions. 
However, in a later study Markusen and Maskus (1999) found conflicting results, where 
the performance of the horizontal model outweighed both vertical and knowledge 
capital models. Despite the utilisation of the same data set with Carr et al. (1998), they 
did not find a strong positive role for divergence in relative skilled labour within a 
slightly different specification. On the contrary, skilled labour difference seems to have 
negative effect when interacted with effect of total market size. Markusen and Maskus 
(1999) suggest two possible reasons for these different findings. First, there is some 
conflict between the assumptions of fixed total endowments in a world of changing 
level of endowments. Second, using bilateral observations where US is one of the 
countries in each observation may have generated skewed results by restricting them 
into a certain range of parameter space, as US is substantially larger than every country 
in the data set. 
In fact, both studies suffered due to misspecification of the endowment difference term 
as suggested by Blonigen et al. (2002). Using a difference term which may take both 
positive and negative values in the sample may lead to sign reversals in the pooled 
coefficient. Blonigen et al. (2002) specified the skill difference and GDP difference 
terms as absolute values, where variables increase in dissimilarity. The results gave a 
better overall fit, but did not support the knowledge capital model, since the divergence 
in relative skilled labour between countries was found to be negatively related with US 
affiliate sales. Blonigen et al. (2002) also note that the negative effect of endowment 
divergence is even higher when parent country is already relatively less endowed in 
skilled labour. The study also revealed some asymmetric results with regards to inbound 
and outbound data, where relative endowments seemed more important for inbound 
investment activity. In order to alleviate the problems caused by using a sample where 
one of the country is in every bilateral pair observation is the US, Blonigen et al. (2002) 
also tried an alternative sample of FDI activity involving outward investment stock of 
OECD countries, nevertheless finding similar results confirming the negative 
relationship between the divergence in relative endowments and FDI activity. 
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Following the findings of general equilibrium literature, Matha (2001) included factors 
affecting horizontal and vertical multinationals into his empirical specification. He 
employed the share of affiliate sales to total foreign sales as the dependent variable for 
Swedish multinationals. Horizontal and vertical MNFs are distinguished by employing 
interaction variables which take into account of the extent of vertical integration 
between parent and its affiliates. Sweden corresponds to the case of a small country 
which is well endowed with the production factor intensively used in headquarters 
services, and has a disproportionate share of the largest multinationals in the world in 
relation to its country size. As a result of home country endowment characteristics, 
Swedish multinationals are to a significant extent vertically integrated with their 
affiliates. The results indicate that affiliate production of horizontally integrated MNFs 
are primarily explained by low-plant level scale economies relative to firm size, large 
trade costs, large host country size, similarities in per capita income, labour 
productivity, wages and unit labour costs. Only the coefficient on the R&D intensity did 
not have the expected sign, and revealed a significant and negative relation with the 
share of affiliate sales for horizontal multinationals. Norback (2001) points out that this 
may be related to the fact that the technology transfer from parents to affiliates is not 
independent of the magnitude of the R&D intensity as commonly assumed in the 
empirical and theoretical literature and suggests endogenising R&D intensity at firm 
level. The results provide support for the hypotheses that vertical multinationals 
geographically fragment production stages in order to exploit differences in factor 
endowments and that vertically integrated multinationals are promoted by low trade 
costs. The host country size seems of greater importance for horizontal multinationals. 
With the deepening of European integration horizontally integrated multinationals seem 
to be increasingly deterred by large plant-level economies of scale. Also, supply side 
considerations have become increasingly important in determining the location of 
multinational production. These results are consistent with the anticipated effects of 
increased efficiency and competition inside the EU. Horizontal multinationals are 
increasingly associated with large trade costs and similarities between countries in 
technology and human capital levels. Vertically integrated multinationals, on the other 
hand, are increasingly explained by relative factor endowment differences during the 
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integration period, while market size effect which was stronger during pre-integration 
period has lost its importance relatively. These changes indicate that foreign production 
was taking place in less efficient locations to avoid non-tariff barriers and gain access to 
individual markets prior to integration. 
The sensitivity of results to empirical specifications specifies a need for further 
empirical studies in the field. Data sets including not only more diversified countries but 
also industries should be employed, as investment responses may vary considerably by 
sector. An interesting hypothesis to empirically analyse could be whether there is any 
sequential entry of vertical and horizontal multinationals into developing countries as is 
claimed by Zhang (1996). He suggests that as developing countries catch up developed 
ones in both size and relative endowments, they first attract vertical foreign direct 
investment and later horizontal foreign direct investment as their markets grow. In 
addition to this, including variables into empirical specifications which have not been 
included in theories may also help to determine the direction of future research. 
3. Market Demand 
A large or a growing market is a signal of the likelihood of profitable investment 
projects. In empirical studies market size effect is generally proxied by GDP, GDP per 
capita or value added production. Most studies report robust and supportive results for 
the importance of market size effect in explaining multinational activity. In some 
studies a lack of significance (or weak significance) of market variable is explained by 
the regional integration process where investors target whole integrated region (e.g. EU 
market) rather than only host country market. However, there is lack of available data to 
make any distinction between investments destined to serve a host country or other 
countries via exports, or in other words, a distinction between horizontally and 
vertically integrated MNFs. While absolute market size variables provide strong support 
for absolute FDI activity, these variables do not show the same strength in explaining 
relative investment measures such as FDI per capita, or FDI as a share ofGDP. 
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Blair (1987) and Milner and Pentecost (1996) suggest that for the UK and other 
countries within the EU, the potential market may be perceived as the whole EU market, 
rather than just that of the member state in question. Market potential proxied by EU 
GDP growth, EU (or EC) output level for the industry (Milner and Pentecost, 1996; 
Barrell and Pain, 1999; Hubert and Pain, 2002) is found to affect outward investment 
stock of countries positively. 
Distance is a commonly employed variable in empirical studies, although the expected 
sign for this variable is ambiguous. It may capture the effects of dissimilarities in 
culture and institutions and hence have a negative effect on horizontal multinationals. 
On the other hand, it may capture the effects of shipping costs, and have a positive 
effect on horizontal multinationals and a negative effect on vertical multinationals. 
Similarities between countries have also been proxied by various other variables. 
Ekholm (1997) reports negative effects of absolute income differences of countries. 
Holland and Pain (1998) report that FDI inflows into Central Eastern European 
countries are positively affected by having contiguous borders with the EU countries. 
Grubert and Mutti (2004) provide evidence on the favourable effects of speaking the 
same language and having adjacent borders for US multinational activity. 
4. Relative Endowment Costs 
While most of the empirical studies provide support for the positive effects of a large 
market, the results on the effects of relative factor costs are ambiguous. Lower labour 
costs and high unemployment found support for attracting FDI in many studies (Hubert 
and Pain, 2002; Billington, 1999; Barrell and Pain, 1997, Wheeler and Mody, 1992). 
Unit factor costs do not seem to have a significant effect on US finns choosing to invest 
between Gennany, France and UK (Devereux and Griffith, 2004). There is also 
evidence that Swedish multinationals are attracted by the abundance of skilled labour in 
the countries they invest (Brunerhjelm and Svensson, 1996). 
In addition to labour costs, the labour and employer relations also have a significant 
effect on location decisions. For example, for Gennan companies strikes in the host 
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country seem to be a repelling force, while same variable is not taken into account by 
UK multinationals. The labour market reforms of the UK to obtain more flexible labour 
market institutions increased FDI flows in more labour intensive sectors as well as non-
manufacturing sectors (Barrell and Pain, 1997). Pain and Lansbury (1997) also noted 
that UK has performed poorly in attracting FDI from those sectors where innovations 
are growing most rapidly. 
5. Fiscal policies 
National governments try to affect the location of international production activities 
through the use of fiscal policies or incentives in order to increase externalities in the 
country which may benefit host country firms. These temporary fiscal policies and 
incentives may act as strategic instruments benefiting the country for the long term, if 
there are self reinforcing agglomeration economies in the economy. The main tools 
employed by governments are tax policies, investment incentives, privatisation, trade 
liberalization and regional integration policies. However, the final implications of these 
policies on foreign investment will also depend on the offsetting effects of different 
factors such as level of infrastructure and agglomeration economies in the country. 
Empirical estimations need to take all factors into account otherwise sensitivity to 
certain factors may be misjudged. 
Various studies find significant effects of tax levels in a country on the level of foreign 
investment or activity. Main measures investigated are profit taxes, effective average 
taxes, and marginal tax rates. Devereux and Griffith (1998) use a nested multinomial 
logit model to examine the potential effects of effective average tax rate on US 
multinationals investing in Germany, France or UK. The model is estimated 
sequentially, first obtaining the estimates of the coefficients from the conditional 
probability at the lowest level of the decision tree. The sequence is deciding to serve the 
foreign market, deciding to produce in Europe as against exporting -conditional on 
having decided to serve the foreign market, choosing of location in Europe (UK, France, 
Germany) -conditional on having decided to be a multinational. The effective average 
tax rate plays an important role in the choice of location conditional on the firm having 
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decided to produce in Europe. However, the effective average tax rate does not play a 
significant role in the choices between producing abroad in Europe as opposed to either 
exporting to Europe or not serving the European market at all. Young (1999) provide 
evidence on that the tax competitiveness of the UK has a significant effect on the total 
fixed investment expenditure in the UK. Grubert and Mutti (1991, 2004), Hubert and 
Pain (2002) report a positive effect from tax competitiveness, implying that a rise in the 
relative effective corporate tax rate in the host location will act to deter inward 
investment. A similar finding is reported in Billington (1999) for investment flows data. 
There is empirical evidence that the degree of openness (lower tariffs) of a country has a 
negative effect on the location of foreign investment or affiliate activity (Wheeler and 
Mody, 1992; Grubert and Mutti; 1991; Moden, 1998). This is consistent with the 
hypothesis related to horizontal multinationals. On the contrary, Grubert and Mutti 
(2004) report negative effects of tariff levels on US affiliates. Higher tariffs may 
increase the cost of exported intermediate inputs and discourage multinational activity. 
Grubert and Mutti (2004) also examine the sensitivity of firms to taxes in different 
countries. Through the use of various interactive variables they find that less open 
economies and higher income countries are less sensitive to corporate tax reductions. 
This may be as a result of the fact that higher income countries provide better 
infrastructure and agglomeration economies which offsets the negative effects of higher 
corporate taxes. 
Investment incentives given by host governments could be divided into three broad 
categories such as tax incentives (Le. preferential tax rates, capital allowances), 
financial incentives (Le. government grants, subsidies, loan guarantees, preferential 
loans, government equity participation in high risk investments), non-financial measures 
(Le. provision of subsidised infrastructure such as industrial sites, free trade zones). 
Based on OECD (1989) and UNCTAD (1998) studies Hubert and Pain (2002) note that 
there is little evidence that investment incentives are an important determinant of either 
the scale or the form of foreign investment. However, there is stronger evidence that 
fiscal incentives and public infrastructure can affect the choice of location within a 
given country. Breuss et al (2001) analyse the effects ofEU structural policy reform on 
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FDI stocks in EU. The expected impact of structural expenditures depend on whether 
structural policy is trade cost reducing or fixed investment cost reducing. They find 
positive effects of structural funds on foreign investment locating in Europe. Except for 
the ratio of skilled to unskilled labour, all coefficients have the expected signs. Using 
the empirical results, Breuss et al. simulate the impact of the structural policy reform on 
real FDI stocks in the EU countries under the assumption that the change occurs within 
the estimation period and all other influences held constant. With the enlargement ofEU 
and new members, the previous members are expected to receive less structural funds to 
provide momentum for the integration of new members to the community. The 
simulations reveal that a reduction in structural funds causes the largest fall in real FDI 
stocks in Ireland, followed by considerable reductions in Denmark, Belgium-
Luxemburg, Austria, Finland and the UK. The least reduction occurs in Germany and 
Greece. They suggest that the countries may need to take compensating measures to 
mitigate these negative effects. 
Hubert and Pain (2002) report that host government investment share (in GDP) has a 
small but positive and significant effect in attracting multinational investments. On the 
contrary, the ratio of ERDF structural funds to GDP seems to have a negative effect on 
the location decisions of German multinationals (Hubert and Pain, 2002) and French 
multinationals (Ferrer, 1998). Higher investment in poorer regions assisted by structural 
fund grants may be necessary to catch-up with more advanced regions but may not be 
sufficient to offset all the inherent locational disadvantages. Various studies have also 
suggested that privatisation in the economy may create favourable conditions for 
multinational investment. The studies which investigate this effect have generally used 
FDI flows data. Holland and Pain (1998) and Carstensen and Toubal (2004) find 
transition specific factors such as the level and method of privatisation play an 
important role in determining the flows of FDI into the Central and Eastern European 
countries. 
There is a growing literature on the effects of EU integration on international production 
patterns in the region. Many studies provide empirical support for the significance of 
the Single Market Programme (SMP) effect, where the anticipation of a larger market 
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size attracts investment into the EU (for US and Japan direct investment in the EU: 
Aristotelous and Fountas, 1996). Dunning (1997b) provides a review on studies testing 
the effects of internal market integration on FDI. Studies discussed in detail are 
UNCT AD (1993), Buigues and Jacquemin (1994), Srinivasan and Mody (1998), Clegg 
(1995) and Pain and Lansbury (1996). Agarwal (1995) and Pain and Lansbury (1996) 
refute the hypothesis that intra-EC FDI will fall as a result of deeper economic 
integration. Most studies in the literature analysing the effects of the EU integration, 
however, rely on FDI flows data. 
One of the main areas of interest have been whether integration has led to investment 
diversion in the other economies (such as the economies of the European Free Trade 
Association (EFT A)) and investment creation in EU economies (Baldwin et al., 1995). 
Brenton et al (1999) investigate whether an increase in the attractiveness of the CEECs 
to foreign investors has affected the magnitude of FDI going to other European 
countries. In particular they investigate whether increasing EU integration in the late 
1980s, adjustment to the Single Market and the accession of Portugal and Spain had a 
negative impact upon FDI flows from EU countries going to the three European 
countries which subsequently joined the EU in 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden. 
They found no evidence that integration and FDI in new EU countries significantly 
reduced FDI flows going to other European countries. 
Another area of interest has been on the potential changes in the relative importance of 
determinants of FDI. Krugman (1997) notes that for many industries, especially high 
technology ones, transportation costs appear to be increasingly less important. This 
suggests that US MNFs in these low transport cost industries may well choose to locate 
in peripheral countries in the EU in order to exploit other locational advantages. Mold 
(2003) finds no evidence that firms have become more sensitive to factor based 
differences (e.g. factor costs) between member states and less sensitive to market based 
changes in the host country. This may be due to the fact that differences between EU 
countries in terms of income, tastes, culture, and technology continue to be pronounced; 
hence MNFs may be reluctant to treat the EU as a truly integrated market. Moreover, 
aggregated data may prevent firm specific tendencies to show up in more concentrated 
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patterns of affiliate production or FDI. Also, as suggested by Dunning (1997b) the main 
impact of the SMP may be taking place through its effects on other variables 
influencing FDI. 
6. Other Macroeconomic Variables 
Various studies have also investigated the effects of other macroeconomic variables 
such as economic growth, exchange rate volatility, cost of borrowing, development 
level and riskiness of host country. Higher economic growth reflects improvement in 
productivity and development indicators such as education, transport and infrastructure 
and hence has been employed by many studies to proxy market dynamism, expected 
future sales and ability to recover investment costs quickly. Lower economic and 
political risks are associated with a more attractive climate for foreign investors. The 
significance of economic risk in deterring investment highlights the importance of 
macroeconomic stability for sustained capital investment. The deterrent effect of 
political risk underlines the role of host country institutions in providing transparent and 
predictable investment policies (Lehmann, 1999; Carstensen and Toubal, 2004). 
Volatility in the exchange rate may contribute to uncertainty over timing of returns from 
investment. Countries may prefer to produce in countries whose nominal exchange rates 
are linked to their own currency. Hence, volatility in exchange rates may be associated 
with lack of similarity between countries. In addition to this, multinationals may 
perceive exchange rate volatility as an indication of macroeconomic instability in the 
host country. The effect of exchange rate volatility may also depend on the relative 
importance of intermediate inputs to be imported from the parent country, or final 
products to be exported back to the parent country. All these aspects of exchange rate 
volatility will have a negative impact on multinational activity. However, MNFs may 
also perceive exchange rate volatility part of trade cost, and choose to produce abroad 
instead of exporting, if exchange rate volatility is high. The evidence in the literature on 
the potential effects of exchange rate volatility is generally weak and contradictory 
(Cushman, 1985; Aristotelous and Fountas, 1996; Barrel and Pain, 1997; Hubert and 
Pain, 2002). 
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Theoretically there is no exact relationship with cost of borrowing in host country and 
FDI, since multinationals can finance their activities from international capital markets. 
High interest rates may, however, be an indicator of macroeconomic instability, and 
hence reduce FDI. The empirical findings on this factor are also ambiguous and weak 
(Culem, 1988; Mody and Srinivasan, 1998; Devereux and Griffith, 1998; Barrell and 
Pain, 1999). 
7. Agglomeration Economies 
Multinational firms could be attracted to a country to exploit the agglomeration 
externalities created by pooling of national or other multinational firms. Empirical 
studies have used different proxies to catch this effect, such as quality of infrastructure, 
the degree of industrialisation, the level of inward FDI (Wheeler and Mody, 1992) the 
number of national firms in the same sector (Head et aI., 1995), and the number of 
multinationals from the same country in the same sector (Head et aI., 1995). Moreover, 
proximity to other firms producing in the same industry, proximity to final demand, 
proximity to other firms in the same industry with relatively high R&D are considered 
to capture agglomeration economies. The relative strength of centrifugal and centripetal 
forces plays an important role for the level of agglomeration economies in a region. 
Higher cost of endowments restricts the self reinforcing process of agglomeration 
economIes. 
Braunerhjelm and Svensson (1996) find that the existence of local support systems and 
networks within industries and intra-industry R&D spillovers increases the sales of 
affiliates. Hubert and Pain (2002) report that German foreign companies prefer 
relatively large national markets to exploit demand and supply linkages. Additionally 
they are attracted by high research and development which enables them to benefit from 
knowledge spillovers from other firms (proxied by the ratio of stock of patents granted 
to firms resident in the host country to EU stock). The US FDI in Europe (Barrell and 
Pain, 1999b), seems to be even more driven by agglomeration factors, than German 
firms, while German multinational companies are primarily driven by their own 
technological advantages. Devereux and Griffith (1998), Barrell and Pain (1999), 
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Ferrer (1998) find that agglomeration effects help to determine the location of US, 
Japanese and French multinationals in Europe. 
There is a growing interest in understanding location choices for research and 
development stages of production. A number of studies have examined attractiveness of 
potential host countries in attracting foreign R&D based on R&D expenditures data by 
foreign affiliates of MNFs to (Zejan, 1990; Kumar, 1996, 2000; Odagiri & Yasuda 
1996; Belderbos, 2001). The studies mainly focus on two major motives for overseas 
R&D expenditure to be technology exploiting and technology sourcing motives. Firms 
with own-technology exploiting motives locate their R&D facilities in larger local 
markets with high per capita income in order to adapt to consumer demands and local 
tastes better and hence capture a larger market share. On the other hand, MNFs with 
technology sourcing motives choose countries with an abundance of scientists and 
engineers and a technologica1lead in the industry of the investing firm. Technology 
laggards, in particular, display stronger technology sourcing motives. However, 
overseas R&D does not only provide sourcing opportunities, it may also increase risk of 
dissipation of R&D results to foreign rivals, in particular when there are fewer 
possibilities to protect know how and intellectual property. Lee and Mansfield (1996), 
and Smarzynska (2004) provide evidence on that MNFs adapt the type of activities 
located abroad in response to intellectual property rights (lPR) concerns and locate 
knowledge intensive and higher value added activities in countries with stronger IPR 
regImes. 
8. Firm and Industry Factors 
Many studies have found empirical support for the internalisation hypothesis, and hence 
R&D intensity of firms is associated with multinational production in the literature. For 
example, the findings of Devereux and Griffith (1998) in a multinomial logit model 
where firms decide whether to produce abroad or export, support that firms with high 
plant level fixed costs are less likely to produce abroad, while firms with high intangible 
assets and relatively high skilled workers are more likely to produce abroad. Grubert 
and Mutti (2004) also find higher R&D, advertising and labour costs (i.e. more skilled 
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labour requirement) makes firms more likely to invest abroad, while plant level scale 
economies (Le. the ratio of capital expenditure to sales) has a negative impact. 
Norback (2001), on the contrary, argues that R&D intensity may be negatively related 
to multinational production due to cost of technology transfer abroad. R&D firms may 
prefer to avoid technology transfer costs rather than physical transport costs. Employing 
the share of foreign sales accounted for by the affiliates as dependent variable, he 
estimates various specifications by Probit, OLS and 2SLS methods. In these 
specifications more experience of production abroad is expected to lower technology 
transfer costs, and hence age of affiliates is used to proxy costs of technology transfer. 
Irrespective of the specification both the probability and marginal effects show 
significant and negative effects of R&D intensity of a firm in becoming a multinational. 
The larger the R&D intensity, the smaller the probability that a firm locates production 
abroad, and given the production is already established, the smaller is the share of 
foreign affiliate sales accounted for by the affiliates. Experience (lower technology 
transfer costs) increases both the probability of investing and production level. The size 
of a country is also of importance for a firm's decision to invest abroad, and the level of 
production afterwards. Differences in relative endowments are not a significant factor 
for deciding on serving market by local production or exports, but have a significant and 
positive effect once the affiliates are established. 
Planned foreign investments tend to be reduced prior to domestic ones at times of 
distress. Barrell and Pain (1997) provide evidence for financial factors (Le. fluctuations 
in domestic profitability) having an important influence on the timing and scale of 
foreign direct investment of German companies. 
9. Conclusion 
The empirical literature on the factors affecting affiliate production is growing. There 
are three major issues that may benefit from further attention. First is the issue of 
ambiguous results on cost related factors. Although the market-seeking motives of 
MNFs are successfully captured in empirical studies, the models fail to provide 
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consistent results on efficiency-related factors, such as relative factor costs, availability 
of sufficient skilled labour or agglomeration economies. Hence, the literature may 
benefit from sector level analysis as data coverage and availability increase. The second 
issue is the influence of regional integration policies on multinational firm location 
choices. The gradual changes which took place in Europe from the formation of a 
Common Market to the adoption of a Single Currency create a suitable background to 
analyse the effects of various stages of regional integration on multinational investment. 
The third issue which requires further attention is building empirical specifications more 
closely linked with general equilibrium theories. There is scope for expanding the 
general equilibrium theories and testing the proposed results empirically. 
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TABLE IlL 1 A Summary of Recent Empirical Studies 
Statistically Significant FDI Variables and Coefficient Signs 
StudylHost Dept variable/ Data! Factor cost Market Government Macroeconomy Agglomeration Internalisation Industry 
country and Estimation Technique potential policy variables 
period/sector variables 
la Grubert and a) US affiliate GDP(+), Reduction in Language (+) 
Mutti (2004) productionlPanel GDP/capita (+) corporate tax 
/47 countries, !Random effects (+), Tariff(-), 
1982,1989, instrumental variable. taritr"reduction 
1994IManuf. in tax (-), 
GDP*reduction 
in tax (-) 
lb b) Micro data: 728 US GDP (+) Reduction in R&D/sales (+), Language (+), 
parent firms corporate tax Advertising! Adjacency (+), 
production/panel (+), Tariff(-), sales (+), Capital/sales 
!Random effects tariff*reduction Labour cost (-) 
instrumental variable. in tax (-), /sales (+), 
GDP*reduction Age (+) 
in tax (-) 
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TABLE IlL] continued ... 
Statistically Significant FDI Variables and Coefficient Signs 
StudylHost country Dept variablel Data! Factor cost Market Government Macroeconomy Agglomeration Internalisation Industry 
and period/sector Estimation Technique potential policy variables 
variables 
2 Blonigen et aI. (a)Real volume of Absolute skill GDPsum(+), Trade cost * Investment 
(2002) a) US and sales by affiliates difference (-), SquaredGDP squared skill cost (-) 
other, 1986-94 Ipanel, 509 obs. Absolute skill difference (-), difference (+) 
!Manuf IOLS, Tobit difference * Distance (-) 
(b) OECD and non- (b) OECD outward absolute GDP 
OECD, 1982-921 All inv. stock Ipanel, difference (+) 
2460 obs., OLS 
3 Hubert and Pain Stock of German Relative unit EUGDP Effective LaggedFDI R&D stock of 
(2002) /Europe, outward investment labour cost (-) growth (+), corporate tax (+), home country 
1981-96 Ipanel, 880 obs.! Fixed EU industry (+), GDP/EUGDP (+) 
!Manufacturing and effects dynamic panel output(+) Government (+), 
non-manufacturing with instrumental investment! ReI. stock of 
variables GDP(+), host country 
Structural EU patent (+) 
funds IGDP (-) 
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TABLE IlL 1 continued ... 
Statistically Significant FDI Variables and Coefficient Signs 
StudylHost Dept variablel Data! Factor cost Market potential Government Macroeconomy Agglomeration Internalisation Industry 
country and Estimation Technique policy variables 
period! sector variables 
4a Norback (2001)/ a) Share of affiliate GDP (+), Specialization R&D/sales (-) Age of 
Various countries, sales in total foreign Distance (-) index (Ratio of affiliates (+), 
1965-94/ sales by Swedish employment Plant size/firm 
Manufacturing MNFsI Pooled, 3811 share of size (-) 
obs. / Probit industry in 
host country to 
all potential 
hosts) (+) 
4b b) Pooled, 1343 obs. Relative factor GDP(+), Specialization R&D/sales (-) Age of 
IOLS endowment Distance (+) index (same as affiliates (+) 
difference (+) above) (+) 
5a Matha (2001)/ Ratio of Swedish Wage GDP(+) Trade cost (+) R&D/sales (-) Plant size/firm 
EU countries, affiliate production to difference (-) size (-) 
1986-94/ sales /pooled, 
Manufacturing 1255 obsl Tobit 
a)Horizontal 
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TABLEIILl continued •.• 
Statistically Significant FDI Variables and Coefficient Signs 
StudylHost Dept variable/ Data! Factor cost Market Government Macroeconomy Agglomeration Internalisation Industry 
country and Estimation Technique potential policy variables 
period/sector variables 
5b b)Vertical Wage R&D/sales (+) Plant size/firm 
difference (+) size (+) 
6 Breuss et al. Outward FDI stock of Physical Relative GDP Structural EU 
(2001)/ OECD capital! (+) funds (+) 
EU countries, countries/Panel, unskilled Transport cost 
1986-97/All 574 obs./Dynamic labour (+), (+) 
panel, GMM. Skilled labour/ 
unskilled 
labour (-) 
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TABLE IlL 1 continued •.• 
Statistically Significant FDI Variables and Coefficient Signs 
Studynfostcountry Dept variablel Datal Factor cost Market potential Government Macroeconomy Agglomeration Internalisation Industry 
and period/sector Estimation Technique policy variables 
variables 
7 Barrell and Pain Outward stock of US Unit labour EU Growth in EU Ratio of host R&D stock of 
(1999)1 FDII Panel/Sl0 obs. cost relative to manufacturing output (+) country output home country 
EU countries, other EU hosts output (+) to EU(+), (+) 
1978-941 (+), RatioofR&D 
Manufacturing World unit stock of host 
labour cost country in total 
relative to EU EU stock (+) 
(+) 
8 Lipsey (1999)1 Outward stock of US NominalGDP 
Asian countries, FDII Cross section (+), 
19941 All Real GDPper 
capita (+), 
Distance (-) 
9a Ekholm (1998)1 Share of affiliate sales GDP (+), Plant sizeltotal 
various countries, in total sales by Distance (-) frrm size (-) 
19941 Swedish MNEs 
Manufacturing 12680bsl 
Non-linear LS 
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TABLE IlL 1 continued ... 
Statistically Significant FDI Variables and Coefficient Signs 
StudylHost Dept variablel Datal Factor cost Market Government Macroeconomy Agglomeration Internalisation Industry 
country and Estimation Technique potential policy variables 
period/sector variables 
9b 1180 obsl OLS Distance (+) Trade cost (+) 
10 Devereux& Binary data on US Effective Agglomeration FirmR&D 
Griffith (1998)1 frrmsINested average tax economies (+) market share Capital/output 
UK,France, multinomial-Iogit rate (-) (+) ratio (-) 
Germany, 
1980-941 
Manufacturing 
11 Moden (1998) Share of foreign frrms Factor intensity Tariff R&D intensity 
ISweden, in total employment ratio (K/L) + revenuelT otal (+) 
various years by sector Ipooled cross sales (+) 
!Manufacturing section data 
70 
TABLE IlL 1 continued ..• 
Statistically Significant FDI Variables and Coefficient Signs 
StudylHost Dept variable/ Datal Factor cost Market Government Macroeconomy Agglomeration Internalisation Industry 
country and Estimation Technique potential policy variables 
period/sector variables 
12 Maskus (1998) Sales of US foreign GDP(+) Incentives (+) Affiliate R&D 
/various affiliates /panel Distance (-) Disincentives (+), Patent 
countries, datalSUR (-) protection in 
1989-92/All dev.ing c (+) 
l3a BarreIl and Pain (a) German outward Relative unit Value added SMPdummies Exchange rate LaggedFDI Patent stock of Profitability in 
(1997) FDI stock by sector labour cost (-), output (+) formanuf& (+) (+) home country business (+), 
IEUandUS, /panel data, 728 obs/ Strikes (-) service sect. (+) Growth in real 
1980-92 Dynamic panel with (+) equity prices 
lManuf and non- N (+) 
manuf 
13b (b) UK outward FDI Relative unit Value added SMPdummies Patent stock of Interest in 
stock by sector /panel labour cost ( -) output (+) formanuf& home country corporate 
data service sect. (+) sector (-) 
(+) 
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TABLE IlL 1 continued ... 
Statistically Significant FDI Variables and Coefficient Signs 
StudylHost Dept variablel Datal Factor cost Market Government Macroeconomy Agglomeration Internalisation Industry 
country and Estimation Technique potential policy variables 
period/sector variables 
14 Blonigen (1997) Number of Japanese Japanese Japanese real Domestic 
IUS, 1975-92 acquisitions into US industry value GDP growth acquisitions 
!Manufacturing !Panel data, added share (+) (+), Real ER (+), Japanese 
and non- 64980bs/ML (+) stock market 
manufacturing (+) 
15 Ekholm (1997)1 Employment in the ReI. human GDPhomec. R&D intensity Absolute 
OECD C., 19901 affiliatesl capital of home (+) of industry (+ ) difference in 
Manuf. 394obs/OLS country (+), GDP host c(+) income (-) 
ReI. physical 
capital of home 
(-) 
16 Braunerhjelm & Ratio of net affiliate SKLper GDP (+) Ratio of empI. Ratio of 
Svensson (1996) sales to total affiliate thousand of Distance (-) share of exports of 
Narious sales for Swedish population (+) industry in host affiliates to 
countries, MNFsI panel data, country to all their total sales 
various years 1 All 1330 obs, Tobit, potential hosts (+) 
SBCRmethod (+) 
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TABLE IlL 1 continued ••. 
Statistically Significant FDI Variables and Coefficient Signs 
StudylHost Dept variable/ Datal Factor cost Market Government Macroeconomy Agglomeration Internalisation Industry 
country and Estimation Technique potential policy variables 
period/sector variables 
17 Milnerand Stock of US outward EC production Export/sales Sales 
Pentecost (1996) investment by product (+) (+) concentration'/i 
IUK, 1990 group /cross section! mport 
!Manufacturing OLS penetration ( + ) 
18 Brainard (1993a)/ Share of foreign sales GDP (+) Appreciation R&D intensity Plant level 
Various of US MNFs/ Cross Distance (-) ofER(-) (+) scale 
countries, 1989/ section, 1046 obs/ Openness to economies (-) 
Manufacturing Generalized Tobit FDI(+) 
19a Wheeler and (a) US MN capital GDP (+) Degree of Current 
Mody(1992) expend. Ratio to a openness (-) FDI(+), 
Narious numerie count/panel Infrastructure 
countries, data, 255 obs,! OLS quality (+) 
1982-88 Manuf/GDP(+) 
(a )Manufacturing 
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TABLE III 1 continued .•.. --- - .. -- .. ----. ----
-- -
----
----
Statistically Significant FDI Variables and Coefficient Signs 
StudylHost Dept variablel Datal Factor cost Market Government Macroeconomy Agglomeration Internalisation Industry 
country and Estimation Teclmique potential policy variables 
period/sector variables 
19b b) Electronics (b) US MNF capital Average hourly GDP(+) Economic and Current 
expenditure 1 wage (+) & political FDI(+), 
panel data, relations with Infrastructure 
232obs/OLS West (+) quality (+) 
Manufi'GDP(+) 
20 Grubert and Stock of net plant & GDP(+) Tariff on 
Mutti (1991)1 equipment in majority GDP/capita (+) manufacturing 
various countries, owned foreign (+), 
1982/All affiliates of US Effective tax 
1 Cross section rate (+) 
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IV. AGGLOMERATION ECONOMIES AND MULTINATIONAL 
FIRMS IN A GENERAL EQUILmRIUM OLIGOPOLY MODEL 
1. Introduction 
The general equilibrium models of multinational firms have demonstrated varIOUS 
important relationships between country characteristics and the level of affiliate 
production taking place in that country. Major attributes of these firms and the sectors in 
which they prevail, have been successfully incorporated into general equilibrium models 
explaining the reasons behind their existence and some of the conditions they prefer to 
make investments in. The predominant focus on country characteristics has been on the 
traditional factors attracting multinationals such as a large domestic market and the 
presence of natural resources and labour endowments. However, one factor of growing 
importance, the presence of geographical clusters in economic activity, has been 
neglected. As distance matters less for many transactions, multinational firms can 
relocate more functions to obtain an optimal configuration for their production. The 
intensified competition among multinational companies pushes them towards searching 
for more efficient international production systems and increases their reliance on 
external partners such as specialized suppliers and even competitors, in addition to 
buyers. Hence, multinational firms increasingly try to benefit by locating in countries 
with good supplier networks, a pool of skilled labour and knowledge producing 
institutions. Agglomeration economies are important because a spatial concentration of 
production, once established, may tend to persist, and a small difference in the initial 
economic size of otherwise equivalent locations may grow over time. This makes the 
timing of policies as wells as the choice of sectors to promote crucial for policy makers. 
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Agglomeration economies can be described as an advantage of cheapening of production 
(or R&D, marketing etc) as a result of a considerable amount of production (or 
headquarter activity) taking place in one region. This means that the location of firms in a 
region attracts other firms to locate in the same region leading to industrial clusters. The 
important distinction between agglomeration economies and other factors, which attract 
firms into a region such as relative endowment levels and market size, is that only in the 
presence of agglomeration externalities does the clustering of firms adds to the 
attractiveness of the location. Agglomeration economies only accrue in imperfectly 
competitive market structures. Otherwise a firm would not have an advantage in 
concentrating production (or headquarters) activities in a single location, but rather 
establish a separate facility to serve each market. 
Mobility of some production factors is a key factor in the self-perpetuating process of 
agglomeration. Therefore migration of population according to real wage differentials 
between regions is a common way incorporating these externalities in a national context. 
However, there are various restrictions (legal restrictions, language and cultural 
differences) on immigration of people internationally. Even where the immigration 
regime is relatively open and there are no language barriers, international migration is far 
smaller than migration within countries. Without labour mobility one cannot have 
agglomeration and the cumulative process of geographical concentration in the same 
way. However a similar process of international specialization can emerge through 
supply linkages. These linkages create industrial concentration because of self-
reinforcing backward and forward linkages (see Fujita et aI, 1999). Producers want to 
choose locations that have good access to large markets and the supplies of goods they 
require. In addition to the presence of strong supply linkages and/or a pooled labour 
market, agglomeration economies may also accrue as a result of spillovers from localised 
knowledge or urbanization economies such as good infrastructure. 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce agglomeration economies as a location 
decision factor for multinational firm production in a general eqUilibrium framework. For 
this purpose the knowledge capital model (Markusen and Venables, 1995, 1996; 
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Markusen et al., 1996) is expanded by intra and inter-industry supply linkages. Hence, in 
addition to all other factors multinational firms would be attracted to a country to exploit 
the agglomeration externalities created by pooling of national or other multinational 
firms. An oligopolistic market structure is preferred for the sector in which multinational 
firms are active, since Markusen's (2002) findings indicate that using a monopolistic 
competition market structure will abolish total market size effect, a result which is not 
supported by empirical findings. The end result of agglomeration tendencies of firms 
depends on the relative strength of forces supporting and limiting concentration. When 
factors of production are immobile or have restricted mobility, endowment levels will 
constitute a constraint against agglomeration tendencies of firms. Sectors with more 
imperfect competition or, in other words, with higher scale economies may expect higher 
agglomeration. Higher trade costs and hence horizontal structure of firms are expected to 
discourage concentration, while lower trade costs encourage more concentrated activities. 
The plan of the chapter is as follows: Section two provides information on the 
methodological issues on general equilibrium modelling. Section three presents the 
assumptions and the derivation of the model and equilibrium effects, while section four 
gives an insight into the expected outcome using partial equilibrium analysis. Section five 
discusses the issue of choosing a suitable solver and algorithm for the model. 
2. Methodology 
A general equilibrium modelling approach will be used through out the chapter. These 
models provide an abstraction of the economy which is complex enough to capture a 
large number of the essential features of it, but simple enough to be tractable. The most 
valuable properties of these types of models are their transparency in providing a 
coherent and complete description of the objectives of the agents and of the constraints 
they face, and their flexibility to represent a wide variety of situations by changing the 
assumptions about the objectives and constraints of these agents. Using the characteristics 
of the real economy, this theoretical structure may also be converted into numerical 
analysis through simulations. For analytical purposes both a partial approach, focusing on 
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a limited set of factors, and a general equilibrium approach which allows for all 
endogenous variables to be determined within the model may be utilized. The 
advancement in computer technologies and modelling techniques has increased the 
suitability of these models for policy oriented work. The main drawback of 
computational general equilibrium (CGE) models is the fact that they are rich In 
economic structure, but deterministic in statistical structure and do not allow for random 
effects. Econometric studies, on the other hand, are based on simplified economic 
structure while allowing for richness in statistical specification. The outcomes of CGE 
analysis could be described as the systematic, not the random, responses of economic 
variables to exogenous changes. 
The steps in building an applied general equilibrium model includes the decision on the 
number and types of agents in the model, choosing the suitable functional forms to 
represent the behaviour of each agent, deriving the theoretical model and choosing the 
parameters and exogenous variables. Some of the important points related with each of 
these steps will be looked at respectively in the rest of this section. 
a. Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) 
The first step in generating the model involves deciding the type and number of agents in 
the model and relating these agents in an economic general equilibrium. The main idea 
behind the economics of general equilibrium is that demand equals market supplies for 
all commodities and inputs. This implies that each agent has incomes and expenditures 
consistent with their budget constraints. Since each agent can only spend what they earn, 
the value of excess demand (pricexvolume of excess demand) is identically zero in the 
economy (Walras Law). Therefore, the fundamental principle of economic accounting is 
that for every income or receipt there is a corresponding expenditure or outlay. A social 
accounting matrix (SAM) embodies this fundamental principle recording transactions 
between accounts in a matrix format. By convention incomes (or receipts) are shown in 
the rows ofthe SAM, while expenditures (outlays) are shown in the columns. The benefit 
of preparing a SAM is that it provides a comprehensive and consistent record of the 
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interrelationships of an economy at the level of individual production sectors, production 
factors and public and foreign institutions. 
TABLE IV. 1 : Social Accounting Matrix 
in values Payments 
Receipts Activities Commodity Factor market Entrepreneur Household ROW TOTAL 
Activities Domestic sales Exports Gross output 
sales 
Commodity Intermediate Consumption Absorption 
market demand 
Factor market Value added Value of fixed Factor income 
cost 
Entrepreneur Markup Markup 
revenue revenue 
Household Factor income Household income 
ROW Imports FX 
expenditure 
TOTAL Total Supply of Factor income Fixed cost Household FX earnings 
expenditure goods paymens outlays 
Table IV.! provides the structure of SAM used in this chapter. The economy is open to 
international trade but there is no government, savings or investment in the economy for 
simplicity. The market clearing conditions could easily be observed from the SAM table. 
In equilibrium foreign exchange earnings of the country must equal foreign exchange 
spending of the country; consumption of households must equal their total factor 
incomes; total supply of goods (domestic sales plus imports) must equal total demand in 
the economy (intermediate product demand by other sectors plus consumer demand). 
Total expenditure of producers, which is composed of expenditures on intermediate 
product, variable inputs and fixed inputs must equal their total income earned from 
domestic and foreign market sales (exports). For the markets to clear fixed costs must 
equal the mark-up revenue of entrepreneurs. 
b. Choosing Functional Forms 
Unfortunately there are some restrictions on the choice of functional forms best suited to 
CGE modelling exercises. Ideally, one would like to utilise flexible functional forms 
where for any data point any set of elasticities could be achieved through an appropriate 
set of parameter values and hence no prior restrictions are imposed on consumer or 
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producer behaviour at the base equilibrium. However, in order to be suited to CGE 
modelling exercises, cost! and utililf functions need to be globally regular, that is well-
behaved everywhere in price space. This is because the computational algorithms 
employed for finding equilibria typically involve a search path in price space which can 
contain points lying arbitrarily far from an equilibrium point. Lack of global regularity 
can thus cause an algorithm to fail even when the function is well-behaved at the 
benchmark equilibrium. 
Lack of global regularity is not crucial for econometric estimation, where the functional 
forms are used to estimate the local characteristics of technologies and preference 
orderings from a given set of observations. In CGE analysis, on the contrary, lack of 
global regularity may be a problem since functional forms are used as a global 
representation of technologies and preferences. In these models the information available 
to the modeller is local, and this local information is extrapolated to the full domain of 
the modelling exercise by specifying utility or production functions that are locally 
consistent with such information. As a result, the information available to the modeller is 
typically limited to the calibration point and the true technology or preferences are 
unknown. In the absence of global information on the technology or preferences, the 
modeller must adopt explicitly or implicitly certain assumptions concerning the out-of-
benchmark characteristics of functions on the basis of local information available 
(Perroni and Rutherford, I 995a, 1995b). Traditional flexible forms (such as translog, 
generalized Leontief and normalized quadratic models) do not guarantee global 
regularity3, and the functions from the CES (constant elasticity of substitution) family are 
the suitable ones. 
I Cost function must be nonnegative, monotonic and concave in prices. 
2 Indirect utility function must be monotonic (positive expenditure share of commodities) and quasi-
convex. 
3 Perroni and Rutherford (1995a) compare the global properties of flexible functional forms (such as 
translog, generalized Leontiefand normalized quadratic models) for utility function and describe the cases 
these models depart from regularity and cause problems. Other studies comparing the global properties of 
flexible functional forms include Caves and Christens en (1980), Diewert and Wales (1987), Perroni and 
Rutherford (1 995b). 
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c. Mixed Complementarity Problem 
The best way of expressing general equilibrium problems is to define the problem in a 
mixed complementarity problem4 format (Mep). The complementary problem adds a 
combinatorial twist to the classic square system of nonlinear equations, thus enabling a 
broader range of situations to be modeled. In its simplest form the combinatorial problem 
is to choose from 2n inequalities a subset of n that will be satisfied as equations. In 
economics this property could be used to generate a model with different regimes and let 
the solution determine which ones are active. For example, complementarity allows the 
choice of only profitable sectors or firms to be active in equilibrium. Formulations of 
equilibria as a system of equations, on the contrary, do not allow for the model to choose 
the activities present, but make a priori assumption on this matter. 
A mixed complementarity problemS is specified by three pieces of data, namely the lower 
bounds I, the upper bounds u, and the function F(z}. There will be a z such that precisely 
one of the following conditions holds (1): 
F;(z) > 0 and Ij = z/ (1) 
F;(z) < 0 and Zj = u j • 
4 Problems of this type occur in many branches of the sciences, including mathematics, engineering, 
economics, operations research and computer science. 
S The MCP format encompasses a number of special cases such as a linear system of equations, a non-
linear system of equations, a linear complementarity problem, a non-linear complementairty problem, a 
non-linear program. When a model can be directly expressed as a linear or non-linear program, it is more 
efficient and reliable to apply a linear or non-linear programming algorithm. MCP is particularly useful for 
mathematical programs which cannot be processed as optimization problems. 
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In a more compact form, these conditions can be written as (2): 
o ::;; Z ..1 F(z) ~ 0 (2) 
where ..L signifies that one of the inequalities is satisfied as an equality, so that ziFi(z) =0. 
Walrasian equilibrium to find the price and activity levels can be formulated as a 
complementarity problem (3): 
o ::;; y ..L L(P) ~ 0 
O::;;P..LS(P,y)~O (3) 
Here, S(p, y) represents the excess supply function, and L(P) represents the loss function. 
Complementarity allows choosing from the activities (yJ to run (i.e. 0 ~ y ). Only those 
firms which do not make a loss will be chosen (Le. L(P) =0 ). The second set of 
inequalities state that the price of a commodity can only be positive (i.e. 0 ~ P ) if there is 
no excess supply (i.e. S(P,Y) =0). Similarly, if the excess supply is positive (Le. S(P,Y) ~ 
o ), then the price of the commodity is zero (Le. 0 = P ), hence no further production 
takes place. These conditions indeed correspond to the standard exposition of Walras' 
law which states that supply equals demand if we assume all prices (P) will be positive at 
a solution. 
3. Structure of the Model 
a. Assumptions 
The model has two countries (denoted by subscripts i and j) with open economies, but no 
government, savings or investments in order to keep analysis simpler. There are two final 
good sectors (X and 1'), two intermediate good sectors (X and Z) and two factors of 
production (unskilled labour, L, and skilled labour, S) in the model. Both factors of 
production are mobile between sectors but not countries. 
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Sector X produces a homogenous product under increasing returns to scale by imperfectly 
competitive Cournot firms. The sector faces fixed costs at both firm-level (arising from 
R&D), and plant-level. The firm-level fixed costs (or knowledge capital) are skilled-
labour intensive relative to the final production and act as joint input reducing the added 
cost of a second plant. A multinational production structure is possible in this sector since 
knowledge capital may be fragmented from production. As a result six different firm 
types, differentiated by their mode of supply to home and foreign markets, and the 
location of their headquarters compete in order to operate in this sector. Domestic firms 
(type-d firms) are headquartered in the home country and supply a foreign market via 
exports, while horizontal multinational firms (type-h firms) are based in home country 
make local productions in both countries. Vertical multinationals (type-v firms) are 
headquartered in the home country supply the foreign country from a plant in that country 
and export to the home country. These differences endow each type of firm with different 
strengths and weaknesses or, in other words, different cost structures as a result of which 
they prefer different country conditions to exist. 
Since there are two factors of production in a country, both fixed cost requirements and 
marginal cost requirements of firms will be measured only in terms of these factors of 
production (skilled and unskilled-labour). The main difference between these two 
requirements is that fixed costs are committed a priori to production and are not affected 
by levels of production. Consequently, level of output relies on factor endowments left 
over after fixed costs are incurred in terms of factor endowments (skilled and unskilled 
labour). Firm-level fixed costs (e.g. research and development, further technical activities 
for implementing the blueprint, and managerial and coordination activities etc.) are more 
skilled labour intensive than plant-level fixed costs. Therefore, firm level fixed costs are 
measured in only skilled labour, whereas plant level fixed costs are measured in terms of 
both skilled and unskilled labour. The fixed cost of implementing a new plant (G) is the 
same for all types of firms, and is measured in terms of unskilled labour. In addition to 
the unskilled labour required for the implementation of a plant, firms require skilled 
labour (such as engineers and technicians working at production site, accountants etc) for 
managerial and coordination activities at the plant level. Domestic firms naturally incur 
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all costs in the home country, where their headquarters and production are located. On the 
other hand, internationally fragmented firms as a result have skilled labour requirements 
not only in the host country where headquarters are located, but in the host country where 
their affiliate plant is located. They also incur a technology transfer cost for supplying 
services of the knowledge based asset to a foreign plant. Hence, total fixed costs incurred 
by vertical MNFs are higher than those of domestic firms headquartered in the same 
country. Hence, without factor price differences vertical multinationals cannot be 
advantageous compared to domestic firms. Moreover, two vertical multinationals based 
in different countries do not co-exist. Horizontal MNFs incur the same amount of fixed 
costs in the home country as does a domestic firm, but horizontal MNFs also have 
additional fixed costs incurred in the host foreign country where the second plant is 
located. To sum up, total skilled labour requirements of a horizontal firm are more than a 
domestic firm, but due to jointness property of knowledge capital the total skilled labour 
requirements of a horizontal multinational firm is less than double the skilled labour 
requirements of a domestic firm 6• 
In addition to skilled and unskilled labour, sector X also requires some intra-industry and 
inter-industry intermediate products during the production process. Each unit of X 
requires Oz unit of intermediate product Z, and Ox unit of X This input-output linkage 
generates agglomeration economies, where the abundance of sector X and sector Z 
products in a region attract further X sector firms due to lower price level for intermediate 
products (forward link). Similarly a large sector X implies a larger home market for itself 
and sector Z firms (backward link). As there is no labour or skilled labour mobility 
internationally in the model, the level of endowments in countries constitutes a constraint 
limiting agglomeration tendencies. Additionally as both intermediate products X and Z 
are skilled labour intensive they compete for skilled labour. This competition also works 
against agglomeration, strengthening the limiting force of endowments. 
6 A horizontally organised firm benefits from economies of scope due to potential cost savings from joint 
production of head quarter activities for more than one plant. As knowledge capital is transferable between 
plants with very little cost, it is less costly for two or more businesses to operate under centralized 
management than to function independently. 
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Sector Y is a perfectly competitive final product industry producing a homogenous good 
under constant returns to scale using both labour and skilled labour. Sector Z, on the other 
hand, is a perfectly competitive intennediate product industry producing a homogenous 
good under constant returns to scale, using only skilled labour. The price ofY is used as a 
numeraire (P y= 1) throughout the simulations. One of the crucial assumptions of the 
model is that finns in the final product sector X and intennediate product sector Z incur 
transaction costs (t) for export sales, while transport costs of sector Y are zero. 
Transaction costs are measured in tenns of unskilled labour. All sectors are assumed to 
produce homogenous goods internationally in order to keep the model simple, hence the 
goods are not differentiated by their country of origin. 
b. Production, Demand and Equilibrium 
This section provides the functions representing the consumers and producers of the 
model, as well as the market clearing conditions as required by the SAM. There are two 
constant returns to scale (CRTS) industries (Y and Z), one increasing returns to scale 
(lRTS) industry (X) and one consumer to model for each country. The economy is 
formulated as a mixed complementarity problem, and the variables given on the right 
hand-side are the associated complementary variables of equations. Only equations for 
country-i are provided below, but symmetric equations apply to country-j. A summary of 
notation used in the chapter is provided in Table IV.2. 
Production and Factor Demand in Sector Y and Sector Z 
Sector y7 has a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production functions. It uses both 
factors of production and is relatively labour intensive. Since the consumers do not 
7 1'; = AySP L1-P , where Ay is the scale (or efficiency) parameter and ~ represents the share of each 
factor in production. 
8 Cobb-Douglas production function has unitary elasticity of substitution. Elasticity of substitution 
measures the curvature of an isoquant. More specifically, it is the percentage change in factor ratio divided 
by the percentage change in the technical rate of substitution (slope of an isoquant» at a given output level. 
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u 
P 
Lbar 
Sbar 
L 
S 
wl 
ws 
M 
c 
b 
t 
F 
G 
m 
N 
a 
(X)T 
(X)DEM 
(X)SUP 
(X)IMP 
(X)DD 
Superscripts 
d 
h 
v 
Subscripts 
x,y,z 
ij 
TABLE IV.2: Notation 
homogenous good produced with CRTS, using L and S 
homogenous high technology product produced with IRTS, using Land S 
homogenous intermediate product produced by eRTS, using only S 
utility 
price 
total unskilled labour endowment 
total skilled labour endowment 
units of unskilled labour demanded 
units of skilled labour demanded 
price of unskilled labour 
price of skilled labour 
national income 
units of unskilled labour required to produce one unit of value added product 
units of skilled labour required to produce one unit of value added product 
unit cost of shipping products between countries 
units of skilled labour requiredfor fixed costs ofafirmproducing X 
units of unskilled labour requiredfor fixed costs of afirm producing X 
mark-up on production of X 
number of firms in sector X 
share of intermediate products infinal product 
total quantity of (X) produced in a country 
total quantity of (X) demanded in a country 
total quantity of (X) supplied 
total quantity of (X) imported 
total quantity of (X) producedfor domestic market 
domestic or nationalfirm (single plant and HQ in the home country) 
horizontal multinational (plants in both countries, HQ in the home country) 
vertical multinational (single plant in the host and HQ in the home counties 
type of product 
general references to countries 
output of X produced by the k-type firm head quartered in i and selling in j 
fIXed cost incurred inj by a type kfirm headquartered in country i 
skilled labour demanded in country j by a k type firm head quartered in country i 
total skilled labour demand in country i by sector X 
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differentiate between domestic products and imports, and there are no trade costs 
involved, prices in both countries are equal. Solving for the standard cost minimization 
problem for sector Y, the unskilled labour (1) and skilled labour (2) input demand 
functions of the sector are written below. 
LY,i = ~(WS'i JP((1- fJ))P 
Ay WL,i fJ 
(1) 
s - 1'; . WL,i fJ ( J
I-P( I-P 
y" - Ay ws, l-P) (2) 
In perfectly competitive markets producing under CRTS, representative firms take prices 
as given and their cost structures determine their output levels at given prices. More 
formally, this implies that firms maximize their profits when their marginal cost equals 
price. As an explicit supply function could not be derived for perfectly competitive firms, 
the zero-profit condition (3) is used instead in order to solve the model. The inequality 
sign is due to the complementarity nature of the problem. If the total cost (right-hand 
side) is greater than the total revenue of the firm, then output level will be zero. On the 
other hand, if total revenue and cost of the firm are equal, then the firm will produce at 
positive levels. 
( J
p ( J(I-P) P, y ~ W . WS,i (1- fJ) 1'; + W . WL,i fJ 1'; 
Y I L,I fJ A S,I (1- fJ) A WL,i Y WS,i Y 
(3) 
The intermediate sector Z also produces under constant returns to scale. It is skilled-
labour intensive, since it uses only skilled labour during production while needs unskilled 
labour only for shipment9• Below are the input demand functions (4-5) of the sector, 
where Zij represents output of Z produced in country i and sold in country j. 
9 The production function for sector Z is assumed to be: Zj=AzSj, where Az is the scale parameter. 
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Lz · = tzZ .. ,I IJ (4) 
1 Sz· =-(Z./ +Z.) 
.' A ' I) 
z 
(5) 
As the product is homogenous internationally, the price of domestic products and imports 
are equal in a country. Export prices, on the other hand, include trade costs. Because of 
this pricing difference two cost functions are identified for the Z-sector producing in a 
country depending on the target market for products. If we define the total Z production 
in country i (ZT;) as in (6), then the inequalities (7-8) below provide the zero profit 
condition in the sector to produce for the domestic market (Z;;) and export market (Zij). 
(6) 
Z .. 
Pz .Z. ~Ws'_" 
.' 11 .' A 
z 
(7) 
(8) 
Production and Factor Demand in Sector X 
Sector X produces a homogenous product under increasing returns to scale, which implies 
that the firms in the sector face diminishing average cost as their output level rise. In 
general equilibrium modelling constant average cost function (Le. CRTS production 
function) is preferred due to its flexibility and simplicity. One way of introducing IRTS 
into the model without loosing this flexibility is using a fixed cost intercept. In other 
words it is assumed that a subset of inputs are committed a priori to production and their 
costs must be covered regardless of the output level, while marginal cost is assumed to be 
governed by the preferred CRTS production function. The fixed costs may employ the 
same mix of inputs as the marginal cost, or a different set of inputs. In either case, 
average cost equals and takes the form of a monotonically declining function with respect 
to output (9). 
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FC AC=-+MC 
X 
(9) 
In the model, sector X is assumed to have both firm level and plant level scale economies. 
Since firm level scale economies arise from more skilled labour intensive operations such 
as R&D, it is incorporated into the model as fixed costs using only skilled labour. Plant 
level costs are composed of implementation of plant (G, measured in unskilled labour), 
management and coordination activities (measured in skilled labour) and technology 
transfer cost (only at the foreign plant, measured in skilled labour). Hence the total 
amount of skiIled labour required by an X firm (F) is composed of firm level scale 
economies plus management and coordination activities at the plant level and technology 
transfer cost at the foreign plant. The product X is produced using not only Sand L, but 
also two intermediate products, X and Z. Hence, there are both intra-industry and inter-
industry linkages in the sector incorporated into the model using a fixed proportions 
function. The following diagram gives the structure of production . 
.. 
.... 
...... 
.... 
...... 
.... 
...... 
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In the first stage skilled and unskilled labour are employed to produce a value added (VA) 
product under CRTS using a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function lO• The unit 
requirements oflabour (ex) and skilled labour (bx) to produce the value added product are 
given by (10) and (11), respectively. 
(1- y)CT W L- CT 
ex = -A-
x
-( y-CT-w-~:-:-I--CT-':-)-+----'-(--'l-_-y---"') CT-W~i:-:-I--CT-:-)-)-CT-:-:I(-CT--I:-:-) (10) 
CT -CT Y Ws (11) 
In the second stage, the value added product is combined with intermediate goods using 
fixed proportions (12). 
f(SKL,L,X,Z) = min(_I-VA,_1 X INT ,_1 Z) 8VA 8x 8z 
(12) 
Since we know that the firms will not waste any input with a positive price, the firm must 
operate at a point where X = _1_VA = _1_XINT = _1_Z . Hence, if the firm wants to 
8VA 8x 8z 
1 
where v is one due to constant returns to scale and -- = U (elasticity of substitution). 
I-p 
A CES function allows for a range of different curvature of isoquants. For example, if the elasticity of 
substitution equals one, then we would have a Cobb-Douglas production function. If the elasticity of 
substitution equals zero, then we would have a Leontief production function. Minimizing the standard cost 
function of V A with respect to a given level of output provides the standard first order condition: 
w r (S)P-I 
w: = (1- r) L 
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produce X units of output, it must use 0VAX units of value added, ° xX units of 
intennediate X and 0zX units of intermediate product Z, no matter what the input prices 
are. Hence the cost function of a firm can be written in the form of (13). The fixed costs 
which are incorporated into the model to bring about economies of scale are a function of 
value added product. 
(13) 
The market structure of sector X is oligopoly, where each firm produces a homogenous 
product, faces downward sloping demand, adjusts output to maximize profits with a 
common market price while anticipating the output responses of its competitors. In a 
classic Cournot specification each firm believes that the others will not change their 
output, and the change in the industry output will coincide with the firm's own. The 
pricing rule is that the marginal revenue equals the marginal cost to the finn 
(Pr ice(1- markup) = M arg inal cos t). In general equilibrium (see SAM table) fixed 
costs should equal to the mark-up revenue of entrepreneurs. Hence we can write the 
general equilibrium condition that total revenue of firm equals to the total cost of the finn 
as (14), and the profit maximization rule that marginal revenue equals to marginal 
revenue as (15). 
PxX = (wLCX +wSbX)OVA X +PxoxX +PzozX +PXmrkoVAX 
Px (1- mrkoVA ) = (wLc X + wsbx )OVA + Pxox + Pzoz 
(14) 
(15) 
This basic cost structure is applied to the six possible firm types of the model (one of 
each type in both countries). The main differences between these firms (domestic firms, 
vertical multinational firms and horizontal multinational firms) are in their fixed cost 
requirements and international trade structures. For example, a vertical multinational firm 
headquartered in country i has skilled labour requirements in both countries. It requires 
F/ amount of skilled labour from country i in order to produce the blueprint. In country j 
it requires skilled labour to implement this blue-print technology in its plant (F /). The 
91 
cost of implementing the blueprint technology abroad is higher than implementing it at 
home and this additional cost of technology transfer is also embodied in Fir In addition 
to these, the firm requires some skilled labour at the production level depending on the 
level of production (bxX/). A vertical multinational headquartered in i, on the other 
hand, requires labour only in the foreign host country where the plant is located. The 
amount includes a fixed cost (G, for building the plant), a variable amount depending on 
the level of total production (cx(X/ +X/)) and cost of shipment of exported products 
(txX/). Given the assumptions about the firms the labour and skilled-labour demands of 
each type of firm headquartered in country i can be summarized as below (16). 
Sjd = F';; +bx(Xj~ +X:) 
Sj~ = F';; + bxXj~ 
S; = F';; +bxX; 
L~ =G+cxXj~ +(cx +tx)X: 
L% =G+cxXj~ 
Lt =G+cxX: 
L~ =G+cxX; +(cx +tx)X; 
(16) 
All firms headquartered in country-i have skilled labour requirements from this country, 
as well as horizontal and vertical multinationals headquartered in country-j but producing 
in country-i. Similarly, domestic firms and horizontal multinationals headquartered in 
country-i have demand for unskilled labour in this country. Horizontal multinationals and 
vertical multinationals which are headquartered in country-j also have affiliate plants in 
country-i and hence require unskilled labour from this country (17-18). 
(17) 
(18) 
The pricing equations for each type of firm (that marginal revenue equals marginal cost) 
are given below (19) with their associated complementary variables on the right-hand 
side. As with sectors Y and Z, the consumers do not differentiate between domestic 
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products and imports of sector X, so that the prices of domestic products and imports are 
equal. 
Px,;(l-m~OVA)::; (WL,;CX +ws,;bx )OVA +PZ,;OZ +PX,;OX 
P)(,1 (1- m~OVA) ::; (WL,;C X + ws,;bx )OVA + wLi x + Pz,;Oz + Px,;O x 
Px,;Cl-miovA)::; (WL,;CX +Ws,/bX)OVA +Pz,;Oz +Px,;Ox 
Px,ll-mtovA) ~ (WL,jCX +WS,jbX)OVA +PZ,jOZ +PX,jOX 
Px,;(1-m;;OVA) ~ (WL,jCX +ws,jbx )OVA +WLjx + PZ,jOZ +PX,jOX 
Px./l- m~OVA)::; (WL,jCx + ws,jbx )OVA + Pz,iz + PX,jOX 
X;~ 
X: 
X;~ (19) 
xt 
X;; 
X~ 
For oligopolistic firms the price cost margin varies parallel to the market share of the 
firm, and inversely with the market elasticity of demand. In case of a Cobb-Douglas 
demand, as is in this model, the market elasticity of demand of the product is unity and 
hence the mark-up rate reduces to the market share of the firmll (20). 
11 Revenue of a Coumot type-k finn serving from j in country i is given by Ry; = P; [X dem,; JXJ;, since 
prices are a function of consumer demand. Hence the marginal revenue is: 
There is no price differentiation for intermediate product and consumer product. The demand for the 
intermediate product is not affected by price level. As a result the Marshallian price elasticity of market 
ax 
d d · I C . . I h dem,; 1 h . . f' . fi' I eman IS -. oumot conjectures Imp y t at k = ; t at IS a one umt 0 IOcrease m a Inn s supp y 
aXj; 
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(20) 
Substituting the mark-up equations into the pricing equations gives expressions for output 
in terms of price (21). 
h Px . -[(WL .cx +ws .bx)o." +Pz .oz +Px .ox] x. ~ (aM. + Po XT.)·J .J .J '''.J .J 
ij J X.J X J 0, P 2 
VA X.J 
Px . - [(WL ·C + Ws .bX )O,n + Pz .OZ + Px .OX] x~ ~ (aM + P .0 XT.)·J .J et .J '''.J .J 
1J j X.J X J 0, P 2 
VA X.j 
The zero-profit conditions (free entry and exit) imply that mark-up revenue equals total 
fixed costs. Adding the zero-profit conditions complete the general equilibrium model 
(22) by providing the number of firms operating. The number of firms is assumed to be a 
continuous variable as in monopolistic competition models in the literature. 
Px .m~ O,nXdl + Px .m~ O"AX~ ;5; WL .G + Ws .F,d ,I 11 t'~ I ,j lJ YJ'1 1J " ,I I 
(22) 
is a one unit increase in market supply. As a result the mark-up rate is reduced to the market share of a 
finn. 
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Total X production in country i (23), 
where XDDj = N;d Xj~ +NlhXI~ +NJX; +N;X;I 
XEXP; = N jd X: +N;X; 
Commodity Demand 
(23) 
In the model there are two types of consumers, a representative household, and sector X, 
which uses intermediate goods to produce the final product. The representative household 
consumes two final goods (X and Y) and has constant-returns to scale Cobb-Douglas 
utility function (24). In equilibrium, the sectors make no profits, so the national income 
of country-i is as in (25). This income (MI ) equals budget constraint, hence in the model 
household income and outlays are in equilibrium. The demand for final goods by the 
representative consumers of country i (XC,pYC,I) are hence as follows (26): 
U X a y:l-a 
. - c· c· I ,1,1 (24) 
aMI 
XC,j =p' Ye,j = (1-a)Mj (26) 
X,j 
Since there is no demand for Yat the intermediate level, total commodity demand for Y 
(YDEMj) equals the consumption demand (Ye I)' On the other hand, total quantity 
demanded (27) in sector X (XDEMI) is a summation of consumer demand and 
intermediate demand by producers (X in!,I)' 
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(27) 
The intermediate sector Z is used only by sector X, hence the total quantity of Z 
demanded is given by equation (28). 
(28) 
Market clearing 
In equilibrium all markets clear. The total supply of endowments (l and S) equal the 
total input requirements by all sectors in the country (29-30). 
WL,; 
Similarly the demand and supply in each sector also clear (31-33). 
YDEM, +YDEMj = 1'; +Yj , 
ZDEM; = ZSUp; where ZSUp; = Zjj + Zji Pz · ,I 
XDEM, = XSUP;, where XSUP; = XDD, + XIMP; PX ' ,I 
(29) 
(30) 
(31) 
(32) 
(33) 
According to SAM, individual agents can only spend what they earn. This gives us the 
accounting identity of Walras Law, which states that when each agent is on its budget 
constraint, the value of excess demand (pricexvolume of excess demand) is identically 
zero. According to Walrasian equilibrium, on the other hand, demand does not exceed 
supply, and in eqUilibrium undesirable goods with excess supply have a zero price. 
Combination of Walras's Law with Walrasian eqUilibrium generates a market clearing 
condition where the existence of equilibrium in k-l markets indicate that demand must 
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equal supply in the kth market as well if pricek>O. As a result one sector may be dropped 
from the system. Price of sector Y is used as numeraire (assumed to be one) and the 
equilibrium condition for this sector is dropped from the system. 
4. Insights into the results through partial analysis 
All inequality and equality conditions provided need to be solved simultaneously to find 
the general equilibrium condition. Although it is not possible to find the general 
equilibrium outcomes without computer simulations, it is possible to make some simple 
partial analysis where only one variable is changed, and all others are kept constant. 
a. Profit Functions 
In order to compare the profitability of firms under different conditions, zero profit 
conditions derived in (22) are re-written more explicitly by substituting the mark-up and 
output equations with equations given in (20) and (21). Inequalities given in (34a-34c) 
represent the profit functions domestic, horizontal multination and vertical multinational 
finns, respectively. 
(Nh (34a) 
::; WL .G+WL G+ws .F/h +ws F~ 
.' .J .' .J J 
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(Px ; -[(WL)'CX +ws)bx)o." +WL)·tX +P.Z)OZ +PX)·OX])2 (aM. + P .8X'E), , , ".., , , 
, X" , 8. P 2 
VA X,/ 
(PXj -[(WL)'C" +WS)bX)OVA +PZ)'OZ +PX)·OX])2 +(aM.+P8XT.) ' " , , ) X,) ) 8. P 2 
VA X,j 
(Nn (34c) 
With some simplifications12, the profit functions of all firm types headquartered In 
country-i are presented below with a clearer format (35a-35c). 
n~ =a;(aM/+PX,joxXI;)+b/aMj+Px,jox~)-d/-e; ~o 
n~ =bj(aMj +Px,joXXTj)+aj(aM; +Px,;oxXI;)-dj -eJ ~o 
n; =a/(aM; +PX,joxXI;)+aj(aMj +Px,joxXTj)-d;-dj -e: - fjh ~o 
n~ = a; (aM/ +PX,joxXI;)+a/aMj +Px,JoxXTj)-d/-dj -eJ - f/ ~o 
n; =bj(aM; +PX,joxXI;)+aj(aMj +Px,joxXTj)-dj -e; - f/ ~O 
n; = a; (aMj + Px,;oxXI;)+b/aMj +Px,joxXTj)-d/-e; - J/ ~O 
(35a) 
(35b) 
(35c) 
12 Inequalities represented in (34) could be converted into a simpler more understandable fonnat by 
assigning new names to a group of variables. 
plant level fixed costs d. =wL·G , " 
firm level fixed costs faced in the base country k "C'k e/ = WS,/r j ; 
firm level fixed costs faced in the host country 
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h. Comparing profitability of firms 
By making some assumptions on the initial conditions the profit effects of changes in 
variables may be observed for each firm type. If the initial conditions in both countries 
are assumed to be identical, that is both countries have the same income and relative 
endowment levels, then all commodity and input prices are equal initially (36). 
(36) 
Then in the initial equilibrium following conditions also hold (37). 
f/ =// (37) 
These conditions mean that only domestic firms or horizontal multinationals are active 
initially, since relative wage levels are equal in both countries. Vertical multinational 
firms cannot compete with domestic firms if there are no wage cost differentials between 
two countries. Vertical multinationals face higher fixed costs due to separation of 
activities and technology transfer costs. 
Given the initial conditions, an increase in total income of countries (aM; = aM) > 0), 
keeping all prices constant makes multinational production more profitable than single-
plant production, since serving a larger market through exports will be more expensive. 
Therefore, the profit levels of horizontal multinational firms (35b) increase more than the 
profit levels of domestic (35a) firms (i.e. an~ = an~ > an~ = an~), since a > b. While 
an increase in the world income supports horizontal multinationals over domestic firms, a 
change in the distribution of income in the world (aMI = -aM) > 0) gives domestic 
firms in the country with higher income, an advantage against horizontal multinational 
firms (aII~ > an~ = aII~ = 0 > an~). Higher transport costs (at x > 0) also provide 
incentives for becoming a horizontal multinational firm rather than a domestic firm which 
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serves the foreign market through exports (Bn~ = Bn~ = 0 > Bn~ = Bn~). Larger firm 
level scale economies relative to plant level scale economies (BF = -BG > 0) supports 
multi-plant production rather than single plant production, hence gives horizontal 
multinationals and advantage over domestic firms (an~ = an~ = 0 > Bn1 = Bn~). To 
sum up, higher total income, higher transport costs, similar income levels between 
countries and larger firm level scale economies compared to plant level scale economies 
support horizontal MNFs. Differences in relative wages between countries gives an 
advantage to vertical multinationals over domestic firms since they can locate 
headquarters in skilled labour intensive country and production in unskilled labour 
intensive country. 
The partial analyses above are similar to those of Markusen (2002). However, in this 
model, it is also possible to have an insight on the potential effects of locating in close 
proximity to intermediate product suppliers. The partial effects of agglomeration 
economies can be analysed through the changes in the cost of obtaining intermediate 
products. In the case of intra-sector linkages, a region with a relatively large 
manufacturing sector X implies lower costs of production for final goods as a result of 
savings on intermediates' transport costs. This constitutes forward linkages. In addition to 
this a large final good sector provides a large local market for intermediates. This 
backward linkage results in a larger total expenditure on manufacturing. Firms in the 
country with larger manufacturing sector become more profitable as a result of lower 
costs. In the profit functions (34a-34c), an increase in total X production in a region 
(BXI'; > 0) make domestic firms producing in this country more profitable compared to 
domestic firms in the other country. Profit levels of horizontal multinationals 
headquartered in both countries increase equally as they both produce in both countries, 
hence they also become more profitable compared to domestic firms producing in the 
other country. A similar analysis can be done to understand the potential effects of 
locating close to inter-sector intermediate product suppliers. The variable that will change 
is within the simplified coefficients of 'a and b'. If country-i produces more of product Z, 
the price of this product will be lower in this country due to lack of transport costs. Lower 
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cost of product Z in country-i (8Pz I < 0) will reduce the costs of firms producing X in 
this country. Hence, domestic firms producing in this country and horizontal 
multinationals head quartered in both countries will benefit from locating in close 
proximity to intermediate product suppliers. 
These analyses only provide some preliminary deductions for the potential effects of each 
variable on the location decisions of multinationals. As each variable is examined 
keeping all other variables constant, none of the interaction between variables which 
normally takes place in a real equilibrium is allowed. Therefore, it is necessary to extend 
these analyses into numerical simulations to have an insight on the potential effects in a 
general equilibrium framework. Hence, a solver and suitable algorithm is required to 
solve the model. 
5. Choosing A Mixed Complementarity Problem Solver and Algorithm 
Many solution methods based on different theories have been developed to solve non-
linear problems. However, due to the inherent mathematical limitations of the solution 
methods, none of the existing methods assure the optimal convergence of all non-linear 
problems (NLP). Kao (1998) investigates the performance of various non-linear 
programming packages on microcomputers from the viewpoints of effectiveness, 
efficiency, accuracy, and ease of use. The results provide information regarding the 
suitable package to use under different considerations. The results show that AMPL and 
GINO have the best ability in solving NLP problems optimally, GAMS is the most 
efficient package in terms of execution time, GINO has the most accurate solution, and 
MA TLAB needs the least effort in modelling problems. Overall, GAMS and GINO show 
the best performance regarding all criteria followed by AMPL. All three packages are of 
modelling language type. The programming languages are used to code the steps and 
iterative procedures of the algorithm. In contrast, the principal focus of a modelling 
language is on representing the economic model and not the algorithm for solving it. In 
modelling language systems it is therefore, possible to separate the model from the 
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solver. This enables the user solve the model through different algorithms without any 
alterations on the model itself (Kendrick and Amman, 1999). 
Considering its effectiveness, efficiency, accuracy, and ease of use, GAMS 13 will be used 
to solve for the model derived in this chapter. There are two solvers available through 
GAMS for MCP problems. MILES (a Mixed Inequality and non-Linear Equation Solver) 
employs a generalized Newton algorithm with a backtracking line search. The solver is 
originally developed for applied general equilibrium modelling. On the other hand, 
PATH is a recently developed solver, which employs a 'global Newton' method in which 
the backtracking line search is replaced by a 'path search'. Although the algorithms share 
the same rate of convergence near a solution, they may follow different trajectories away 
from the equilibrium. Since convergence cannot always be guaranteed with either 
algorithm, it is helpful to have both algorithms available when working with large or 
difficult problems (Rutherford, 1995a, 1995b). 
Billups et al. (1997) compare various computer algorithms for solving large scale MCP 
which could be interfaced through GAMS. The comparisons for these algorithms are 
done based on a library of test problems. MILES and PATH are both mature algorithms 
and suitable for the purposes of this study. The results of Billups et al. illustrate that 
PATH is not only more efficient than MILES in the solution time required, but also more 
successful for computing a solution to the problems. PATH algorithm manages to solve 
94% and 98% of the problems for large and small models, respectively, while MILES 
finds a solution for only 83% and 84% of problems for large and small models, 
respectively. 
13 More information on GAMS modelling language syntax and resources of information are provided in the 
Appendix. 
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6. Conclusions 
The aim of the chapter is to generate a theoretical framework in order to analyse the 
relationship between the multinational production activity and the combined effects of 
country, sector and firm characteristics. The knowledge capital model (Markusen and 
Venables, 1995, 1996; Markusen et aI., 1996) is extended to include sectoral linkages to 
allow for analysing the potential effects of agglomeration economies. 
The model is presented as a mixed complementarity format with 50 variables to be 
determined from inequalities and equalities. Due to the complexity of the model, it is not 
possible to observe the general equilibrium outcomes in an analytical framework. 
Through partial analyses it is only possible to gain some insight into the potential effects 
of variables. These simple analyses suggest that higher total income, higher transport 
costs, similar income levels between countries and larger firm level scale economies 
compared to plant level scale economies support horizontal MNF production. Differences 
in relative wages between countries give an advantage to vertical multinationals over 
domestic firms since they can locate headquarters in skilled labour intensive country and 
production in unskilled labour intensive country. Firms also benefit from locating in close 
proximity to the suppliers of intermediate product. 
Although these analyses provide some initial deductions on the profitability of different 
firm structures on different occasions, they fail to provide any exact results of the active 
regimes where firms may co-exist. The analyses also overlook the non-linear 
relationships between variables. As a result it is not possible to observe any potentially 
different effects of small and large changes. In addition to these, the interactions among 
factors are ignored in partial analyses, since only one variable is allowed to change while 
all others are kept constant. Therefore, the model needs to be analysed through numerical 
simulations to have an insight on the potential effects in a general equilibrium 
framework. 
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v. CGE SIMULATIONS ON THE LOCATION DECISIONS OF 
MULTINATIONAL FIRMS 
1. Introduction 
The partial equilibrium analyses in the last chapter gave a simple initial insight into 
the potential effects of endowments, trade costs and sector characteristics on the 
location of multinational production. As only one variable at a time is allowed to 
change, these analyses lack the interactions among variables which would take place 
in a real economy. This chapter will take the analyses one step further and allow for 
all variables to be determined endogenously in a simulation environment. The purpose 
of the chapter is to solve the general equilibrium model derived in the last chapter in 
order to obtain testable results for the factors affecting the location of affiliate 
production. As the model is solved in a general equilibrium framework allowing for 
all variables to interact each other, the results are expected to reflect the non-linear 
and non-monotonic structure in real data. Hence, for instance a fall or reduction in 
trade costs from high levels may not have the same effect as a fall or reduction when 
the trade costs are already low. Similarly, the changes may show differing results for 
country pairs with similar or different endowment characteristics, as well as in 
different sectoral conditions. Being able to reflect this variety of effects is the main 
benefit of general equilibrium simulations. This allows them to mimic the diversity in 
a real economy. In this chapter, a special emphasis will be given to the interaction of 
country effects with sectoral characteristics, stressing the potential effects of changes 
in sectors with supply linkages. 
The first step for carrying out computational general equilibrium analyses involves the 
process of defining the intercepts, share parameters and behavioural elasticities of the 
mathematical representation of the . economy. These parameters are generally 
determined through SAM (social accounting matrix) transactions data, which is 
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constructed from national accounts and other government sources with vanous 
adjustments to ensure the existence of equilibrium in all markets. With a large amount 
of data (such as time series of input-output matrices) statistical estimation techniques 
may be employed to find parameter values that characterize agents in the artificial 
economy. The ideal way to estimate the parameters would be to use an econometric 
approach that takes into account all system-wide constraints. However, this approach 
is not routinely used by COE modellers due to data insufficiency and computing 
resource constraints. In some applied models to estimate simultaneously all of the 
model parameters using the time series methods would require very large number of 
observations, or severe identifying restrictions. Therefore, an econometric approach, 
which is largely developed by Jorgenson (1984), based on estimating sub-systems of a 
COE model (demand function, production function etc.) is preferred. Although 
partitioning the model into sub-models may help to reduce or overcome the problem 
of data, partitioning does not fully incorporate all the equilibrium restrictions that are 
emphasized in a general equilibrium model (Shoven and Whalley, 1992). Mansur 
(1980) notes the difficulty in formulating a maximum likelihood procedure 
incorporating all equilibrium restrictions. A less formal method used is to extract 
information from pooled data, or use time series data of cost shares after abstracting 
them from random influences. Further information on the advances in econometric 
methods in COE models could be found in Canova and Ortega (2000). 
A more common method for constructing an applied general eqUilibrium is to 
calibrate parameters working backwards from the initial SAM to construct economic 
agents whose transactions duplicate those observed. This is a deterministic procedure, 
where the main assumption is that the benchmark data is defined as equilibrium. The 
transactions in the SAM are used to calibrate a model function, calculate a policy 
parameter or define a model constraint. During the calibration process, values of the 
relevant elasticities need to be specified by the researcher based on other researches in 
the literature or even on guess work, since the results in the literature are contradictory 
and hence not robust. The reason that elasticity values cannot be determined through 
calibration is that the CES functions, mainly used in COE studies, have three 
parameters, but the SAM provides only two pieces of information to work with. This 
information includes the level of output for given factors and that the isoquant passes 
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through a specifie~ point with specified slope. Therefore, without the knowledge of 
elasticities of substitution, it is possible to construct different isoquants consistent 
with the same data but with different curvatures. Although calibration procedure also 
has some shortcomings due to its deterministic approach and lack of any statistical 
testing of the model specification used, it has been used more commonly in CGE 
analyses than the econometric approach. Additional references and information on 
various aspects of applied general equilibrium are available in Mansur and Whalley 
(1984), Waelbroek (1984), Adams and Higgs (1990), Shoven and Whalley (1992), 
Froncois and Reinert (1997). 
Before continuing onto the next section, where the benchmark equilibrium and 
calibration results used in the rest of the chapter are described, there are a few points 
to mention. For the general equilibrium model being employed, where the source of 
production is differentiated according to firm types (domestic firms, horizontal and 
vertical multinational firms), data restrictions do not allow for analysis at the policy 
level. First of all the available data is not detailed in the firm types. Also, in 
calibrating a model with scale economies, it is necessary to incorporate some 
information on the extent of the scale economies that exist. Failure to incorporate high 
quality information on scale economies may lead to misleading results. However, it is 
difficult to construct a SAM incorporating this information with the available data. 
Moreover, many scale based estimates for sectors in the literature are not robust and 
rely on a small family of engineering studies from 1960s and 1970s. Therefore, an 
artificial benchmark equilibrium, which replicates the stylized characteristics of 
multinational firms, will be generated instead. Although this may sound arbitrary, the 
important point in these analyses is not finding a completely realistic model, but 
finding a model which will provide an answer to the questions asked. Therefore, it is 
essential to construct a simple but highly stylized theoretical specification which 
captures a high number of features of the data. The interest is in examining deviations 
of the model from a hypothetical equilibrium, not in the actual values of the 
equilibrium. The simulations in the rest of the study will employ a 'what-if approach 
and will give an insight into the potential factors affecting the location decisions of 
multinational firms rather than actual policy effects. 
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The chapter is organised as follows. First, an artificial SAM will be introduced and 
the parameter values to be used in the mathematical functions will be calibrated using 
this benchmark equilibrium. Then counterfactual equilibrium results for different 
income, relative endowment and trade cost levels will be obtained. After deriving 
some generalised conclusions from these results, the effects of different firm and 
sector characteristics such as scale economies, industrial linkages and internalisation 
will be analysed through various simulations. All simulations reported in this chapter 
are solved using PATH as a solver, which is suitable for large scale mixed 
complementarity problems. As mentioned in the last chapter, this solver operates 
under GAMS (General Algebraic Modelling Systems), which is a software package to 
solve systems of equations1• It should be noted that using MILES as a solver also 
provided very similar results for most counter-factual equilibria. Only in some cases 
MILES failed to solve the model while PATH provided a solution. The GAMS code 
for the general equilibrium model used for simulations is provided in the Appendix. 
2. Benchmark Equilibrium and Calibration 
The main purpose is to find out under what conditions countries become more 
desirable hosts for multinational investment. For this purpose, many relative 
endowment and income level combinations will be examined for different trade costs 
and sector and firm characteristics. In order to avoid offsetting effects of factors, 
changes in sector and firm characteristics will be introduced after the basic results on 
the effects of endowments are obtained. Therefore, initially a benchmark for an 
economy with X and Y sectors, where sector X uses only skilled labour and labour, but 
no intermediate input (as in Markusen et aI., 1996), is constructed (Table V.l). The 
model is calibrated to the centre of Edgeworth box where both countries have equal 
share of endowments, and same level of income. All factor prices are also assumed to 
equal one. The sector is initially assumed to have high trade costs, high total scale 
economies and high firm/plant level scale economies. Due to high trade costs and no 
factor price differentials in this equilibrium only horizontal multinationals are active. 
I More infonnation on GAMS software, documentation on various solvers and introductory tutorials 
can be found on the following website: www.gams.com. 
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The fixed cost structures of inactive firms in this equilibrium (Le. vertical 
multinationals and domestic firms) are provided in the notes section of Table V.l. 
The values chosen in benchmark equilibrium reflect the assumptions of the model. 
First of all, the model is based on differences between the cost structures of different 
type of firms. According to the assumptions total fixed cost of horizontal MNFs are 
less than double the total fixed costs of a domestic firm. In addition to this operating a 
plant abroad is more costly than operating a plant in home country. Horizontal 
multinationals operate two plants, one in home and one in host country, while 
domestic firms and vertical MNFs are both single plant firms. Domestic firms only 
produce in the home country, and vertical multinationals only produce in the foreign 
country. For a sector with high total scale economies and high firm/plant level scale 
economies, horizontal multinational firms are assumed to spend 20 units as fixed cost. 
They require 12 skilled labour (costing 12 units, as all prices equal 1) in the home 
country, where head quarter is located. They need 4 units of skilled labour in then 
foreign country, where one of the plants is located. In addition to these, they require 2 
units of unskilled labour in each country to operate the plants. 
The notes section of Table V.l provide additional information regarding the fixed cost 
requirements of inactive firm types (domestic firms and vertical multinationals) in the 
benchmark equilibrium. Using the information on the fixed cost requirements of 
horizontal multinationals and the general assumptions of the model, the cost structures 
of firms can be obtained in more detail. In order to produce the given amount in the 
benchmark equilibrium, firms need nine units of skilled labour in the home country 
for headquarter activities. Additionally, three units of skilled labour are required to 
operate a plant in the home country. Due to technology transfer costs (one unit of 
skilled labour), a firm needs four units of skilled labour to operate a plant abroad. 
Firms also need two units of unskilled labour per plant. To sum up, total fixed cost of 
horizontal firms are 20 units, vertical multinationals are 15 units, and domestic firms 
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in values Households 
Notes: 1. The model is calibrated to the centre of Edge worth Box with high trade costs, so that only horizontal multinationals are active in equilibrium. Sector X is produced only 
by using skilled and unskilled labour without any intermediate inputs. The sector also has high fixed costs (total scale economies) and high firmlplant level scale economies. 
Product X and Y has same expenditure share in the incomes of consumers. 2. The parameter values of the model are: a = 0.5; P = 0.1, Ay =1.3S4; y = 0.409, Ax = 1.90S, (J =3, Ox 
= 0, Oz = 0 OVA = 1. The initial values of exogenous variables of the model are: ~bar = 154, Sjbar = 46; Fjjd = 4.S, F/= 0, Fjjh = 4.8, Fjl = 1.6, FjjV = 3.6, Fijv = 1.6, G = 0.8; tx = 0.3. 
The initial values of endogenous variables of the model are: Njd = 0, N jh = 2.5, NjV = 0, mt = 0.2, PXj = 1.25, Xjjb = 16, Xijh = 16; PY=I, Yj=IOO; wLj=l,wSj=1 (all values are 
symmetric for country-j). Initial total quantity of X produced in country-i is SO. SKLj SKLj ~ Lj TOTAL 
3. Fixed cost structure of inactive firms in the benchmark equilibrium: Xjd 12 0 2 0 14 
XjV 9 4 0 2 15 
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are 14 units. Hence the total cost of a horizontal multinational headquartered in 
country-i is 1.43 times of (less than double) a domestic firm headquartered in country-
i. Also, without factor price differentials between two countries a vertical 
multinational firm cannot compete with domestic firms headquartered in the same 
country, since a vertical MNF faces higher total fixed costs than a domestic firm. 
In a market clearing equilibrium, the total of value of fixed costs should equal total 
value of mark-up revenue of entrepreneurs. Mark-up rate can be calculated as share of 
mark-up revenue in total value of value added X production (Le. 10/50=0.2). This 
means there are a total of 5 active firms (Le. 1/0.2=5), half of which (i.e. 2.5) are 
headquartered in country-i. The initial benchmark price level in sector X (Le. 1/1-(1-
markup)) is 1.25. This means that in benchmark equilibrium 40 units of X (Le. 
50/1.25=40) is produced by X;jh and another 40 units is produced by xl in country-L 
Accordingly the total quantity of X produced in country-i is 80 units, and the value of 
X production is 100 (i.e. 80 x1.25), which equals the total value of demand for X 
sector products. The total demand is composed of only by consumer demand as there 
are no intermediate product requirements. All factors of production are assumed to 
have unitary price level in this initial equilibrium. Price of sector Y is used as 
numeraire throughout the simulations, and hence all products and factors are 
measured in relative terms of Y. 
The parameters of production functions are calculated using the initial benchmark 
values of demand for factors of production, their prices and an assumed elasticity of 
sUbstitution2• Input shares (r) can be calculated using the standard first order condition 
by minimizing the cost function. Sector Y is produced by a Cobb-Douglas production 
function, which has a unit elasticity of substitution, while sector X is assumed to have 
elasticity of substitution which equals 3. After obtaining input share values scale 
2 A CES production function can be defined as follows: VA = A(y.S'P + (1- y).LP )v/p , where v is 
one due to constant returns to scale. Minimizing the standard cost function of this value added function 
with respect to a given level of output produces the standard first order condition as: 
~ = ~ - , where elasticity of substitution equals: u = --. W (S)P~ 1 
wL 1-y L 1-p 
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parameters (A) can be calculated using these values. Hence the parameters can be 
calculated using the following formulas: 
(1) 
(2) 
The last parameter required for the model is share of each product in consumption. In 
the benchmark, it is assumed that consumers spend their income equally on X and Y 
products (a=O.5). 
By changing the parameter values (exogenous values) of this initial model (Table 
V.1), counter factual equilibria for different relative endowment, income and trade 
cost levels may be calculated through simulations. However, in order to examine the 
effects of a change in the relative importance of finn/plant level scale economies on 
the regime, slight changes in the benchmark equilibrium are required. Table V.2 
presents the new benchmark equilibrium for a sector with high trade costs, high total 
scale economies and low firm/plant level scale economies. Firm level skilled labour 
requirement are dropped to 5 from 9, and plant level labour requirements are doubled 
from two units to four while plant level skilled labour requirements are unchanged. 
Since the total fixed costs are kept the same as before, initial mark-up and price levels 
are not affected. All parameter values and unit of output produced are identical to the 
previous benchmark. Only initial endowment levels are adjusted to make sure the 
initial benchmark factor price levels equal one in both countries, while producing the 
same quantity of value added output (a total of80 units of X produced in country-i by 
Xjjh and Xl). Table V.3 provides a benchmark for an economy with high trade costs, 
low total scale economies and high finn/plant level scale economies. Total fixed costs 
are half of the initial benchmark. This means initial mark-up and price level are lower, 
and the number of active firms is higher. Hence, the competition in the sector is more 
intense as entry costs are lower. All parameter values and the units of output produced 
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are the same as the first benchmark, although initial endowment levels are adjusted to 
ensure unit factor costs. 
Table VA and Table V.S present the benchmark equilibrium for sectors with inter and 
intra sector linkages, respectively. The parameters for the share of intennediate 
products in production could be obtained by dividing the total quantity of intennediate 
input used to total quantity of X produced (3-S). 
VA (3) OVA =-X 
° = X INT x X (4) 
Z (S) Oz =-X 
In order to keep the models comparable, same parameter values of production 
functions and consumption are employed. Quantity of X produced at the initial 
benchmark equilibrium is also identical to all previous benchmark values. 
When the general equilibrium model is solved using the parameter values obtained 
through calibration, the initial results should mimic benchmark values. This 
constitutes an important checking point for the validity of the model. If the model 
solved fails to replicate the initial benchmark values, then there must be some mistake 
either during the derivation of the mathematical model (that it is not compatible with 
the assumptions) or during its transfer to a solver. Moreover, providing the initial 
equilibrium results of endogenous variables is important to aid the solver during 
simulations. 
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TABLE V.2 
Benchmark Equilibrium: Low scale economies 
in values Activities Commodity market Factor market Fixed costs Households 
XHII XHIJ XHJJ XlUI YI YI ZII ZIJ ZJI ZJI XI Xl YI YI ZI ZJ SI SI LI U FCHI FCHJ 
45 
45 
45 
45 
90 
90 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
10 10 9 6 2 
10 10 9 2 6 
30 30 81 I I 
30 30 81 I I 
5 5 
5 5 
37 143 
Notes: The model is calibrated to the centre of Edge worth Box with high trade costs, so that only horizontal multinationals are active in equilibrium. Sector X is produced only by 
using skilled and unskilled labour without any intermediate inputs. The sector also has low fixed costs (total scale economies) and high frrmlplant level scale economies. Product X 
and Y has same expenditure share in the incomes of consumers. The parameter values of the model are: a = 0.5; P = 0.1, Ay =1.384; Y = 0.409, Ax = 1.908, (J =3, Ox = 0, Oz = 0 OVA 
= 1. The initial values of exogenous variables of the model are: Ljbar = 143, Sjbar = 37; Fjjd = 1.333, Fijd= 0, Fjjh = 1.333, Fl = 0.444, FjjV = 1.0, Fijv = 0.444, G = 0.222; tx = 0.3. 
The initial values of endogenous variables of the model are: N/ = 0, Njh = 4.5, NjV = 0, mjh = 0.111, PXj= 1.125, Xjjh = 8.8889, Xjl= 8.8889; PY=I, Yj=90; w~=I,wSj=l(all values 
are symmetric for country-j). Initial total quantity of X produced in country-i is 80. 
ll3 
TABLE V.3 
Benchmark Equilibrium: Low firm/plant level scale economies 
in values 
Households 
Notes: The model is calibrated to the centre of Edge worth Box with high trade costs, so that only horizontal multinationals are active in equilibrium. Sector X is produced only by 
using skilled and unskilled labour without any intermediate inputs. The sector also has high fixed costs (total scale economies) and Iow frrmJplant level scale economies. Product X 
and Y has same expenditure share in the incomes of consumers. The parameter values of the model are: a = 0.5; P = 0.1, Ay =1.384; Y = 0.409, Ax = 1.908, a =3, Ox = 0, Oz = 0 OVA 
= 1. The initial values of exogenous variables of the model are: ~bar = 158, Sibar = 42; Fjjd = 3.2, Fi/= 0, Fjjh = 3.2, Fil = 1.6, F/ = 2, Fi/ = 1.6, G = 1.6; tx = 0.3. The initial values 
of endogenous variables ofthe model are: Nid = 0, Nih = 2.5, NjV = 0, mjh = 0.2, PXj= 1.25, xl = 16, Xijh = 16; PY=I, Yj=100; wLj=l,wSj=1 (all values are symmetric for country-j). 
Initial total quantity of X produced in country-i is 80. 
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in values Fixed costs Households 
Notes: The model is calibrated to the centre of Edgeworth Box with high trade costs, so that only horizontal multinationals are active in equilibrium. Sector X is produced only by 
using skilled and unskilled labour and intermediate input Z. The sector also has high fIxed costs (total scale economies) and high finnlplant level scale economies. Product X and Y 
has same expenditure share in the incomes of consumers. Initially Z is allowed to be produced in both countries. The parameter values of the model are: a = 0.5; ~ = 0.1, Ay=1.384; 
Y = 0.409, Ax = 1.908, (J =3, Ox = 0, Oz = 0.114 OVA = 0.909; Az = 1, tz = 0.3. The initial values of exogenous variables of the model are: Ljbar = 163, Sjbar = 57; Fiid = 4.8, Fj/= 0, 
Fiih = 4.8, Fijh = 1.6, F/ = 3.6, Fijv = 1.6, G = 0.8; tx = 0.3. The initial values of endogenous variables of the model are: Njd = 0, Njh = 2.5, NjV = 0, mjh = 0.2, PXj= 1.25, Xiih = 17.6, Xjl = 17.6; PY=I, Yj=110; w~=I,wSj=l. After obtaining the parameter values using this symmetric equilibrium, the model is resolved for an asymmetric version where sector Z is 
allowed to be produced only in country-i. 
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in values Fixed costs Households 
Notes: The model is calibrated to the centre of Edge worth Box with high trade costs, so that only horizontal multinationals are active in eqUilibrium. Sector X is produced by using 
skilled and unskilled labour and intra-industry (X) intermediate inputs. The sector also has high fIxed costs (total scale economies) and high firmlplant level scale economies. 
Product X_and Y h~s same expe~~i!W"e share in the incomes o~consumers. The p~eter va~ues of the m~de~ ar~:~= 0.5; t= O.l'hA!=1.38t! = 0.40;~Ax= 1.;~8, CJ =3,!x =. 
0.167, Oz - 0, OvA - 0.833. The mItIal values of exogenous vanables of the model are. L;bar - 154, Sjbar - 46, Fii - 4.8, Fjj - 0, Fii - 4.8, Fjj - 1.6, Fii - 3.6, Fij - 1.6, G - 0.8, tx 
= 0.3. The initial values of endogenous variables of the model are: Njd = 0, N jh = 2.5, NjV = 0, mjh = 0.2, PXj= 1.25, Xiih = 19.2, Xijh = 19.2; PY=I, Yj=100; wLj=l,wSj=I(all values 
are symmetric for country-j). 
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3. Computational General Equilibrium Analysis 
The purpose of the following CGE analysis is to observe the deviations from the 
benchmark equilibrium brought about by new parameter (exogenous) values. The 
effects of income, relative endowments, trade costs and sectoral characteristics are of 
interest. New parameter values for different variables will be introduced only after the 
main attributes of the previous effect is clarified. Therefore, the analysis will start 
from the first benchmark equilibrium with given sectoral characteristics and allowing 
for changes only in endowments and later in trade costs. The significance of the 
sectoral characteristics will be investigated afterwards. The main concern is to find the 
effects of changes on active firm types in equilibrium (Le. to find out which 
conditions are more desirable for each type of firm) and the level of affiliate activity 
(i.e. to find out which conditions support higher volume of affiliate production). 
a) Country-specific factors and trade costs 
In order to find out the potential effects of the relative size and endowments of 
countries for attracting multinational firms, the model is solved for 361 different 
combinations of relative endowments by altering the distribution of world endowment 
by 5-percent steps3. This enables to analyse all possible country pairs that may have 
trading or multinational production links. The results of simulations are presented in 
an Edgeworth-Box, where country-i is measured from the southwest corner and 
country-j from the northeast corner. The axes are the shares of the countries in total 
world endowment of skilled and unskilled labour endowment. 
Figure V.l is a summary of the distribution of active firms for different endowment 
levels of countries for a sector with high trade costs (shipment requires 0.30 units of 
labour per quantity exported), no supply linkages, high scale economies and high firm 
to plant level fixed costs. Before interpreting the simulations results, the relative 
endowment and income combinations within the Edgeworth box need to be clarified. 
3 Parameters used in the simulations are: 
a=O.5,py =O.l,ay =1.384,Px,VA =0.409,ax = 1.908, Ox =O,oz =0 
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The benchmark equilibrium (as given in Table V.I) is realized in the centre box, 
where both countries share total world endowments and hence income equally. Along 
the southwest-northeast (SW-NE) diagonal the two countries have identical relative 
endowments but differ in size. Above this diagonal, country-i is comparatively 
advantageous in skilled labour, and below this diagonal comparatively advantageous 
in unskilled labour intensive products. In each cell endowment allocation changes 
according to the values on axes, while income is determined endogenously depending 
both on quantity and prices of endowments of the country. The income distribution of 
country-i is given Figure V.2 for each endowment combination. As illustrated in the 
figure, the income share of country-i gets larger as the country's share of both 
endowments increase (Le. towards the right of the figure). The boxes are shaded 
according to similarity of income shares. The relative sizes of countries differ 
extremely towards the south-west and north-east corners, while countries tend to have 
more similar incomes towards the middle of the figure. The line in the middle, which 
is slightly sloped to left, is the 'equal income' axis and incomes of countries differ 
parallel to this axis as they depart further. 
The results (Figure V.l) illustrate that for high trade costs horizontal multinationals 
dominate towards the centre of Edgeworth Box. Analysing Figure V.I in conjunction 
with Figure V.2, indicate that horizontal firms prefer to function between countries 
with similar or only moderately different incomes. They also prefer relative 
endowment differences between country pairs to be low. For country pairs with 
similar income but significantly different relative endowments or countries with 
significantly different income but similar relative endowments horizontal firms and 
domestic firms tend to compete. Domestic firms, on the other hand, are the only active 
firms when the relatively labour endowed country is very small (Le. first row on the 
Edgeworth-box). The rest of the country pairs have mixed regimes of all three firm 
types. Vertical multinationals become active in production when countries differ 
significantly both in their relative endowments and sizes, or differ extremely in their 
sizes. 
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OJ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 
W orId endowment oflabour 
Horizontal MNFs only 
Mixed regimes ofH-MNFs and domestic firms 
Mixed regimes with vertical MNFs 
Domestic firms only 
Figure V.I Equilibrium Regimes (high scale economies, high trade costs, no sectoral 
linkages): Parameters used in the simulations are: a=O.5; ~y=O.l, Ay=1.384; ~x,vA=0.409, 
Ax=1.908, ox=O, oz=O; tx=0.3. 
OJ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 
World endowment of labour 
similar income countries 
moderately different income contries 
very different income countries 
extremely different income countries 
Figure V.2 Income shares of countries: Assumptions are the same as in previous figure. 
Values in boxes show the % share of country-i income in total income. 
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The full set of active finn types is given in Figure V.3. The numbers in each cell 
represent the location of headquarters of active finn types (Le. 1 for horizontal 
multinational finns, 2 for vertical multinational finns, 3 for domestic finns). For 
example, in the south-west corner of the box, where country-i has 5% of both world 
endowments and hence income, and country j has 95% income, vertical multinationals 
headquartered in country-i and domestic finns headquartered in country j are active 
(20.300). Since vertical finns headquartered in country-i produce in j, all production, 
in this box, takes place in country-j. In the middle of the graph, where both countries 
are equal in endowments and income, horizontal MNFs headquartered in each country 
are active (1.001), and hence production takes place in both countries. When country-i 
has 50% of unskilled labour endowments and 60% of skilled labour endowments, 
only horizontal finns headquartered in country-i are active (1.000). The horizontal 
MNF produces in both countries, in domestic plants in country-i and affiliate plants in 
country-j. Therefore although there is X sector production in both countries, affiliate 
production takes place only in country-j. 
Figure V.3 also provides an answer to the question of the links between endowments 
of a country and the volume of affiliate production. In addition to showing active 
finns in equilibrium, each cell illustrates the total level of affiliate sales taking place 4• 
The cells have been shaded according to the level of production. From the graph, it 
may be observed that total affiliate sales are none or at very low levels when one 
country-is extremely scarce in skilled-labour, and very small (Le. in the first row and 
the last row of Edgeworth-Box). There are two darkly shaded sections in the figure 
where affiliate sales are at their highest levels. These sections correspond to when 
relative endowments and sizes of countries are significantly different, and the country 
which is comparatively advantageous in skilled-labour intensive products is smaller in 
size than the labour intensive country. Hence, total multinational production reaches 
its highest level when one country is small, skilled-labour intensive and labour scarce, 
and the other country is large, labour intensive and abundant in both endowments. 
These country characteristic are compatible with vertical MNF activity. 
4 Total affiliate production (or total affiliate sales) of country-iequals the value of output of plants in 
country-i owned by horizontal or vertical multinationals headquartered in country-j. Total affiliate 
production is the sum of affiliate production taking place in each country. 
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0.05 0.10 
150-199 
100-149 
50-99 
1-49 
0.15 
No affiliate sales 
0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 
World endowment oflabour 
0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 
300. Domestic firms headquartered in i 
020. Vertical MNFs headquartered in i 
001. Horizontal MNFs headquartered in i 
.300 Domestic firms headquartered in j 
.020 Vertical MNFs headquartered in j 
.001 Horizontal MNFs headquartered in j 
Figure V.3 Equilibrium Regimes and Affiliate Production: Assumptions are the same as in Figure-I. Values in boxes show active firms headquartered in 
either country at the given endowment shares. When countries are exactly the same in their endowments (each country have 50% of skilled and unskilled labour), only 
horizontal firms headquartered in both countries are active (1.001). This means that there is affiliate production in both countries. When country-I owns 15% of skilled 
labour and 5% oflabour, vertical firms headquartered in country-i and domestic fIrms headquartered in country-j are active (20.300). This means that all production 
takes place in country-j. 
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On the SW-NE diagonal where relative endowments are equal, affiliate sales are low 
for large income differences (i.e. corners of the Edgeworth box), but keep rising 
towards the middle of the graph as income differences disappear. Therefore, 
similarities in income levels seem to encourage overall multinational production. 
Multinational production seems to be quite high in general between countries with 
moderately different incomes and relative endowments. The active firm type under 
these conditions is horizontal multinational firms. 
Figure V.4 illustrates the same equilibrium results only for when there is positive 
affiliate production in country-i. It is more obvious from this figure that when a 
country is advantageous in labour endowment to it is more likely that it will attract 
multinational production. Although it is advantageous to be labour-intensive, still this 
does not mean that a county attracts more affiliate production as it only gets more and 
more labour intensive. Affiliate production tends to increase towards the right of the 
box. In this part of the box country-i is not only more labour intensive, but also has a 
larger income (or market potential). Accordingly, it may be sensible to conclude that 
countries with cheap labour plus a large market are attractive to multinational 
investors. There is also an increase in affiliate sales as the labour intensive country 
gets more abundant in skilled labour. This is due to skilled labour requirements of 
multinationals in the host country such as engineers, technicians, accountants etc. One 
thing clear from these figures is that the link between multinational production and 
country endowments is not a monotonic link which can be summarized easily. 
b) Trade costs 
In the analyses to follow, trade costs are assumed to measure all costs of doing 
business at a distance such as lack of face to face contact, more complex and 
expensive communication and information gathering, different languages, legal 
system, product standards, cultures and existence of shipping costs and tariffs. Recent 
years have witnessed lower international trade cost levels, with the advancements in 
technology, a trend for trade liberalization and regional integration, all of which 
resulted in lower shipping costs and tariffs as well as convergence in tastes, cultures 
and product standards. Examining the individual and joint effects of trade costs (with 
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o· 1 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 025 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 
World endowment oflabour 
300. Domestic firms headquartered in i 
150-199 020. Vertical MNFs head quartered in i 
100-149 001. Horizontal MNFs headquartered in i 
50-99 .300 Domestic firms headquartered inj 
1-49 .020 Vertical MNFs headquartered inj 
No affiliate sales .001 Horizontal MNFs headquartered in j 
Figure V.4 Equilibrium Regimes and Affiliate Production in Country-i: Assumptions are the same as in Figure-I. Values in boxes show active fmns 
headquartered in either country at the given endowment shares. Only boxes where there is affiliate production in country-i are filled in. 
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other country and sector characteristics) is essential to project future developments in 
international production. A major difference between the cost structures of horizontal 
and vertical multinationals and domestic flrms is the trade costs they face. Horizontal 
MNFs avoid these costs by producing in both markets. Therefore, the flrst expected 
outcome of lower trade costs on flrm types is that horizontal MNFs become less 
profitable as there is less beneflt from tariff jumping and there are two plants to run. 
On the contrary, single plant flrms which rely on serving the other market through 
exports gain advantage as a result of lower trade costs. 
Figure V.5 gives an idea on the potential changes in the equilibrium production 
structure as a result of changing trade costs. Figure V.5a delivers the simulation 
results for high trade costs, and hence is identical to Figure V.l. Figure V.5b, on the 
other hand, shows that for low-medium level trade costs. The number of county pairs, 
where only horizontal multinational flrms operates drops considerably, while more 
single plant firms (vertical MNFs and domestic firms) become active. Figure V.5c 
present the simulation results for low trade costs, where domestic firms become 
dominant for similar income and endowment countries (towards the middle of 
Edgeworth-Box). For low trade costs affiliate activity continues only between 
countries with significant differences in income and/or relative endowments. 
Although not illustrated in graphs, for very low levels of trade costs vertical MNFs 
may also lose advantage compared to domestic firms, if relative factor cost between 
countries is not significant enough to cover the transfer cost of vertical MNFs to 
operate a plant in a foreign country. 
The affiliate production levels for each country pair at different trade costs are 
provided in a 3-D setting in Figure V.6. The results linked to country endowment 
effects are similar to those of before, the figures showing the same saddle like look 
that is affiliate production increasing towards the middle of Edge worth-Box as a result 
of similarity between countries, which supports horizontal multinational production, 
and reaching a maximum level for large labour intensive countries with abundant 
skilled labour. The interactive effect of trade costs with endowments is observable 
through comparisons of the three flgures (Figure V.6a-Figure IV.6c) utilizing 
different trade cost levels. With lower trade costs, horizontal multinational production 
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World endowment of labour 
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World endowment ofJabour 
.:. : 
OJ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 ; Horizontal MNFs only Mixed regimes ofH-MNFs and domestic finns Mixed regimes with vertical MNFs 
Domestic finns only 
0.90 0.95 
Figure V.S Effects of trade costs on equilibrium regimes: a) High trade costs, 
tx=OJO; b) Low-medium trade costs, tx=O.I5; c) Low trade costs, tx=O.IO 
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Share in L 0.115 
150-199 
100-149 
50-99 
1-49 
0.9S 
Share in L 0.8S 
Figure V.6 Effects of trade costs on total volume ofaffiliate production: 
a) High trade costs, tx=0.30; 
b) Low-medium trade costs, tx=0.15; 
c) Low trade costs, tx=0.10 
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loses its appeal and affiliate production drops between similar countries, while 
affiliate production by vertical MNFs continues. At very low trade costs, horizontal 
multinational production between similar countries is completely replaced by 
domestic production. 
The outcomes from the simulations draw attention to a potential rise in vertical 
multinational structures as a result of falling trade costs globally. Especially within 
closer regions, which experience more convergence in standards, and tastes rather 
than only falling trade barriers, there may be a shift towards single plant production to 
benefit from scale economies and low costs of exporting. 
c) Results on Country Characteristics and Trade costs 
The results obtained embody many non-linear and non-monotonic relationships. 
Therefore, it is not possible to generalise the results, and hence say, for instance that 
lower trade costs decreases/or increases affiliate production. Instead the effects of the 
changes have to be analysed interactively with other factors, and have to be classified 
to a group of characteristics jointly. For the purposes of obtaining more clear and 
testable results, the results presented in 3-D graphs will be reduced into some 2-D 
analyses to identify common characteristics of individual boxes. 
The first question of interest is the effects of a change in home and host country trade 
costs. Previous simulations employed symmetric trade cost levels for both countries. 
Therefore, in the following simulations parent and host country trade costs will be 
differentiated. It is assumed that country-i increases its custom duties to discourage 
imports, while country-j maintains the same level. The changes in the volume of 
affiliate production in country-i are shown in Figure V.7a, for when trade cost in 
country-i is increased from 0.15 to 0.30, while the trade cost in country-j is still 0.30. 
The change is positive for all country pairs. An increase in host country trade costs 
encourages affiliate production by supporting further horizontal multinational 
production. The rise in the trade costs do not discourage vertical MNF plants either, 
since their exports back to the home country are not affected' from this rise. As a 
result, the increase is the largest in the middle of the graph for countries with 
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relatively similar income. On the other hand, if host country trade cost is unaltered 
and home country trade cost has increased, only vertical MNFs operating in this 
country are affected. The effect on the volume to affiliate production is negative, as it 
is more costly for vertical multinational finns to export to home country (Figure 
V.7b). 
Proposition 1: Trade cost levels of the host country effect the volume of affiliate 
production positively by supporting horizontal multinational activity which benefit 
from tariff jumping. 
Proposition 2: Home country trade costs have a negative impact on the affiliate 
production of vertical multinationals. This means when the home country is small and 
relatively skilled labour endowed, a fall in trade cost of the home country will cause 
an increase in the host country affiliate production. 
Considering these propositions regarding the individual effects of home and host 
country trade costs, it is possible to infer the potential effects of a simultaneous 
change in trade costs of both countries. For example, when countries reduce their 
tariffs mutually (i.e. as a result of a trade agreement or regional integration 
agreement), the intra-regional FDI (or FDI between country pairs with a trade 
agreement) is expected to be more of vertical type and less of horizontal type. 
Horizontal multinational activity loses its appeal as a result of lower host country 
trade costs, and vertical multinational activity will ascend due to lower home country 
trade costs. 
The next question is what the impact of higher total world income is on international 
production. Statistics on affiliate production point to a positive link between these 
variables. Therefore, it is important that the model replicates this trend. Figure V.7c 
shows the difference in the volume of affiliate production in country-i, when total 
world income is approximately 40% higher. The difference is positive for all country 
pairs, indicating that both vertical and horizontal multinationals will benefit from this. 
Figure V.8 and Figure V.9 examine the effects of world income in more detail, 
illustrating both the equilibrium regimes and the volume of affiliate production for 
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Figure V.7 Change in the total volume of affiliate production in country-i: 
a) Trade cost of host country-i is raised to 0.30 from 0.15, while trade cost of parent country-j is kept unchanged at 0.30. 
b) Trade cost of host country-i is kept unchanged at 0.30, while trade cost of parent country-j is increased from 0.15 to 0.30. 
c) Total world income is increased by 43%. 
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Figure V.S Equilibrium regimes: a) High total world income, medium trade costs, 
tx=0.20; b) 30% lower total world income, medium trade cost, tx=0.20. 
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Figure V.9 Total volume of affiliate production a) High total world income, medium trade costs, 
tx=0.20; b) 30% lower total world income, medium trade cost, tx=O.20. 
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two different world income levels. The distribution of equilibrium regimes among 
country pairs does not show large differences for different world income levels. 
Higher total income seems to only slightly favour horizontal multinational production, 
while lower total income slightly favours single plant production. The effects of total 
income are more obvious on the total volume of affiliate production. A 30% decrease 
in total world income leading to lower total affiliate production in the world (Figure 
V.9). 
Proposition 3: Higher total income encourages more affiliate production in each 
country. 
The following analysis will summarize the simulation results for specific groups of 
countries. Choosing specific country groups, such as equal income, allows for 
changing other country characteristics, such as relative endowments in a controlled 
manner. According to international production statistics, multinational activity has 
been highest between high income countries throughout decades. Among these 
countries total income has been high, and differences between incomes and relative 
endowments have been relatively low. Figures V.10a summarizes the results for equal 
income countries. In this simulation, countries are assumed to share world endowment 
of labour equally, while their shares of skilled labour endowment differ. For example, 
when the share of skilled labour endowment of country-i is 0.5, relative endowments 
become equal as countries already have equal shares of labour. To the right of point 
0.5 on the horizontal axis, country-i is more skilled labour intensive, and to the left 
more unskilled labour intensive. Hence the potential effects of relative endowment 
changes may be observed through this simulation. Figures V.10a presents the volume 
of total affiliate production for different trade cost levels. Except when the trade cost 
becomes very low, total affiliate sales between equal income countries are highest 
when relative endowments are equal or similar. 
Figures V.l Ob investigates potential effects of market size changes on multinational 
production. The simulations solve the general equilibrium model for 19 cases, each of 
which represent increasing shares of country-i income in total, keeping relative 
endowments of countries identical. As has been mentioned before, countries have 
I3l 
.. 
'* 
.. 
.. 
~ 
~ 
.. 
B 
'0 
.. ] 
~ 
.. 
.!< 
.. 
.. 
.. 
~ 
.. 
.. g 
'0 
.. 
E 
" "0 
> 
.. 
'* 
.. 
.. 
:;; 
~ 
~ g 
'0 
.. 
E 
.2 
0 
> 
120.0 
100.0 
80.0 
60.0 
40.0 
20.0 
0.0 
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 
Equal Income Countries 
...................... __ ................... -_ .... --.............. _---.............. _-----.-.......... _---.----.. -..... _-_._---.-........... . 
. . 
------------'!------------- -------- ------------------------------------------------------------- -------- -------------:~-------------
•• _--••••• # •••••••• __ ••••• - ••••• --.------.--••••••••••••• -----.-------••••••• --------.-••••••••• _____ • _._ •• _._ •••••• _____ I. .•••• 
u 
••• 
. . 
••• ___ • ..l.. ••• _ •••••••• ____ ._ ••• u ••••••• ___ •• ___ • __ ••••••••••••• ___________ •••••••••••••• __ •• __ •••• __ •••••••• _______ •• _ ••••• __ ~ __ •• __ •• 
. . 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 O.S 0.6 
SKLshare of country; 
Countries with Equal Relative Endowments 
0.7 
. . 
0.8 0.9 
.... _-.................. , ................... __ . __ ....... --.... -... ----.------... -.... ~ .... ~ ...... ~-------.... --.,..~ .. -.----....... ---.... . 
. . 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.' 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Size of country ; as a share ofth. ""rid 
Countries with Equal Relative Endowments 
:...----""A:::--------------------------------------------------------------
.~ 
20 ....... ---.. ~.-.......... _ .......................... _-_ .... _ .......... _ ..... _. __ ....... _--_ ....... _ .... _ .. _--_ .. - ---_ ... __ ." ... _ ..... _. 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Size ofcountry;as a share ofth. ""rid 
---x- -- high trade cost 
--.- mediwn trade cost 
--m-Iow trade cost -.. ---- low trade cost 
Figure V.tO a) Effects of relative endowments and trade costs on total affiliate production 
b) Effects of market size and trade costs on total affiliate production 
c) Effects of market size and trade costs on total horizontal affiliate production 
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identical relative endowments on the SW-NE axis, while the income share of country-
i increases again from SW corner to NE corner. Hence, the simulations include the 
country pairs on this axis, allowing for income distribution to change. The results 
suggest that total affiliate production increases as countries have more similar 
incomes (Le. towards the middle of the graph). In this section of the figure, only 
horizontal multinationals are active. At lower trade costs smaller size differences are 
tolerated by horizontal multinationals, the spread of the figure narrowing down. The 
negative effects of lower trade costs on horizontal multinationals may also be 
observed from Figure V.I Dc. At low trade costs there is no horizontal firm activity in 
the graph. 
In Figure V.lOb, there is also a nse of multinational activity at significant size 
differences (Le. towards the right and left ends of the figure). This activity comes 
from vertical multinational firms which benefit from operating a plant in the larger 
country with abundant endowments. This section of the graph is more sensitive to 
trade cost changes, and benefits from reductions in trade costs as it exports to the 
home country at a lower cost. 
Proposition 4: Similar income and relative endowments yield higher total affiliate 
production in the world at higher trade costs. 
Proposition 5: Affiliate production in a country increases when the host country is 
large, and trade costs are lower. 
These propositions are compatible with the stylized country characteristics 
multinational firms prefer to operate in. Table lA have presented the distribution of 
FDI stocks in the world, revealing a preference towards high income developed 
countries. Even among the developing countries, the countries which are preferred for 
multinational production are the ones with relatively high incomes and development 
levels. 
The analyses up to this point have mainly looked into the effects of changes on total 
affiliate production. However, it may be useful to separate individual country results. 
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Figure V.11 a and Figure V.11 b illustrate affiliate production in country-i, affiliate 
production in country-j as well as total affiliate production for high and low-medium 
trade costs. The results suggest that affiliate production in a country is higher when 
the parent country is slightly larger than the host country. 
Proposition 6: Affiliate production in a country increases when parent country is 
larger than the host country but when the difference is not extreme. 
It is also evident from the figures that multinational activity is negligible when the 
country is very small. This finding is parallel to the insignificant amounts of affiliate 
activity in less developed countries (LDCs). The small domestic markets and low 
skilled-labour endowments of these countries make them unattractive locations 
despite their low labour costs. 
Proposition 7: If a country is very small, it does not attract multinational production at 
any trade cost. 
Figure V.l2a presents similar analyses for equal income countries at high trade costs. 
The results suggest that affiliate production in a host country reaches its peak, when 
the countries are similar, but host country is slightly more labour intensive. Before 
generalising this result, a case with different country sizes needs to be checked. Figure 
V.12b gives the results of solving the general equilibrium model for two countries 
when one country owns approximately 80% of world income. The horizontal axis 
shows the share of skilled labour owned by country-i. This represents the abundance 
of skilled labour in the country as well as the relative endowment levels since 
country-i owns 80% of world labour endowments. When country-i also owns 80% of 
skilled labour, relative endowments of countries are equal. To the left of point 0.80 on 
the horizontal axis, country-i is labour intensive, and to the right skilled labour 
intensive. Affiliate production in country-i is at its maximum when the country is both 
labour intensive and abundant in skilled labour, and it drops if the country is skilled 
labour intensive or scarce in skilled labour. 
134 
Countries with Equal Relative Endowments 
120 
100 
VI 
~ 
lA 
.. 80 .~ 
~ 
.. 60 g 
'0 
.. 40 ~ 
0 
> ':K. 
20 ......... -........... -_._------------.. _--....... _---................ !'\.;--------------------
X.. _' 
"x"x' 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 O.S 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Size of country i as a share of the ""rid 
Countries with Equal Relative Endowments 
120 
100 
lA 
.. 
.. 
lA 
.. 80 
1;; 
:= 
% 
.. 60 g 
'0 
.. 40 E 
~ 
> 
20 ........................................ )1( ............................................................................................... . 
0.1 0.2 O.l 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Size ofcountryias a share ofth. ""rid 
• - 'X- - - Affiliate production in i 
---- Total affiliate production 
-..-Affiliate production inj 
Figure V.ll Total affiliate production and affiliate production by country 
a) High trade costs, tx=0.30 
b) Low-medium trade costs, tx=O.15 
135 
Equal Income Countries 
120.0 ........................................................................................................................................... . 
Oh 100.0 ••••••••••••••••••• ::. ••• :.:: ••;;: •••••• ~ ••• ::j. it·;.;·· ... -lI ....... -t-----,p'*-i ...... ···'jI· F··:.:;···1Ij··;:;···::,::························ 
.. 
~ 
.. 
~ 
~ 
~ 60.0 
'0 
~ 40.0 
~ 
20.0 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•• ............ ~ ............................................................. . 
0.0 -I--/lr---; ....... -Ir-_,..-.... -/Ir---;"-=~--..,--~~,.4-'l"--4-_r--lr-_--'_~ 
o 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 o.s 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
SKLshare of country i 
Large vs Small Country 
180.0 .- •••••••••• _-_ •••• -•••••••••••••••••••• -_ •• __ •••••••••••• -----••• ---••• - ••••••••••• -----.---.--•••••••••• --..... _-_ •• _-_ ••• -••••••••••• -._--
160.0 ._-_ ••••••••••••.•••••••• __ • __ ••••••••••••••••••• __ ••••• ----........ -.-
= 140.0 
-= .! 120.0 
~ 
~ 100.0 ••••••.••••• _--............. -•••• __ ..................... __ ••• ______ •• __ ••••••• __ •• ___________ •• _.' ••• _···· ________ • ___ u •••••••• ________ ·_ 
-;;; 
B 80.0 
'0 
• 60.0 >~ 40.0 
20.0 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
0.0 +---ll!t-,I!r-+--,j~ .......... ,.-,I!r-... --,j~+--.lr-....... ""'-~----=;~*~r-.... -
o 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 o.s 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 I 
SKLshare of CO W1try i 
Figure V.I2 Effects of relative endowments on host country affiliate production 
a) Equal income countries at high trade cost, tx=0.30 
b) Large versus small country at high trade costs, tx=0.30 
Equal Share of Skilled Labour 
180 ..........................................................................•.................................................................... 
160 
Oh 
~ 140 
~ 120 
.!! 
~ 100 
-;;; 
g 80 
E 60 
:2 
~ 40 
20 
I I I I 
... 1 ............................... 1................. . .............. J ..............•......•..•... 1.. 
I : Nlll: I 
..................•.. j ............ ············j·················NlU················ .. ······ ...... ···········r····················· 
I I NW 
···NVI ···1·········· ··························r·· .. 
.. Nlll I "1 I NlU 
.............. ::·L:· Nlll ........ : ............................ :~~~:::T::::::::· NlU :I::: ................ . 
: : .:K-: : 
......................... j .............................. j .....•.••••••.••••. ····;~················· .. ··························T··· ................. . 
I I • I I 
................................................................. ;. .•....... ················r···························r········· ........... . 
I I ,x I I 
····1 ··················I·········~~·· ........................................................ . 
I I X I I 
Share oflabourendo"",en! 
and income of country lincrease 
--Total affiliate production . --x- -- Affiliate production in i 
--.er-- Affiliate production inj 
Figure V.I3 The joint effects of comparative advantage in labour and market size 
136 
Proposition 8: Affiliate production in a country increases when the country is both 
labour-intensive and abundant in skilled labour. 
The next figure (Figure V.l3) illustrates the volume of affiliate sales on row nine of 
the Edgeworth-Box where countries have equal shares of skilled labour. Towards the 
right of the horizontal axis both the labour share intensity and income share of 
country-i increases. Hence the graph shows the joint impact of income and relative 
endowments. Affiliate production in country-i tends to increase as the country 
becomes more labour intensive and has a greater market potential. In the simulations 
provided, both horizontal multinationals and vertical multinationals produce in the 
country as the country becomes larger and both endowments become abundant. 
Proposition 9: Affiliate production in a country increases as the country becomes 
more labour intensive and has a greater market potential. 
These propositions on trade costs and country characteristics can be interpreted jointly 
to deduce the potential effects of regional integration on multinational activity, such 
as the EU. A regional fall in trade costs may have different impacts on intra-regional 
FDI and extra-regional FDI. A fall in trade costs of home and host country provides 
support for more vertical multinational firms and deters horizontal multinational 
investment. Hence relative size and input cost differences will gain importance in the 
location decisions of multinationals. As a result of the shift towards efficiency-
seeking multinationals from market-seeking multinationals, some countries may gain 
and some may lose investors during the integration process. Hence, the distribution of 
multinational activity within the region will be affected. Within the region, large 
countries with relatively cheap labour and abundant skilled-labour are expected to 
attract larger amounts of FDI. The regional integration is expected to have a different 
impact on multinational investors from countries outside the region. As the host 
country trade costs are not changed towards extra-regional countries, the impact on 
FDI from extra-regional countries will not be due to trade cost changes. Rather, the 
effect will be as a result of a growth in market potential, since when a firm invests in 
any country within the region it will be able to serve all other regional countries 
without any tariffs. Therefore, the region can be thought of as one large country 
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receiving multinational investment from countries outside the region as a result of its 
market potential. If the integrated region increases trade barriers against countries 
outside the region, then a tariff-jumping incentive will emerge for investors from 
extra-region countries. The increase in trade costs against extra-regional investors 
may be as a result of a choice by the domestic market as they prefer to trade with 
companies within the region rather than export from outside. This preferential 
treatment may act as a barrier against exporters into the region. Hence, in order to 
keep their market share, they may switch to multinational production rather than 
exporting. 
d) Sector and firm-specific factors 
This section analyses the differences on the location decisions of firms from different 
sectors, that is with different scale economies, industrial linkages and government 
policies (such as taxes). 
Figure V.14a illustrates the active firms in equilibrium at high trade costs for all 
relative endowment and income combinations as in Figure V.Sa. However, this time 
(Figure V .14) the sector has a lower ratio of finn/plant level scale economies (i.e. 
using benchmark in Table V.3). The distribution of equilibrium regimes in the 
Edgeworth-Box is similar to previous results, since horizontal MNF are active for 
similar income and relative endowment countries, while vertical multinationals 
become active with dissimilarities in income and relative endowments. The main 
difference at same trade cost levels is that horizontal MNFs are active for a 
significantly smaller number of country combinations. On the other hand, vertical 
MNFs become active at even moderate differences. These results suggest that the 
strength of firm level and plant level scale economies in a sector has an impact on 
active firm types in equilibrium. When firm level scale economies are high, multi-
plant production structure and hence horizontal multinationals are supported. On the 
contrary, high plant level scale economies encourage single plant firm structures, and 
hence vertical multinationals and domestic firms. 
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Figure V.14b and Figure V.14c illustrates the equilibrium regimes for lower trade 
costs for the same sector. The general effect of trade cost is the same as in Figure 
V .S5, and horizontal multinationals lose advantage against single plant finns, which 
now can export at lower costs while benefiting from scale economies. Yet, in Figure 
V.14, the equilibrium regimes change towards single plant finns more swiftly than in 
Figure V.5. The equilibrium regimes at low FIG scale economies seem to be more 
sensitive to trade cost changes. At lower trade costs horizontal MNF structure is 
replaced with vertical MNFs and domestic firms for a larger set of country pairs. 
Figure IV.15a illustrates the affiliate production levels between equal income and 
equal relative endowment countries, respectively, for a sector with low FIG scale 
economies. Total scale economies are, however, the same as before. The results are 
not different to those of a sector with high FIG fixed costs. Hence, the total affiliate 
production reaches a maximum when countries are similar. Although not explicitly 
shown on the graph affiliate production in country-i reaches a maximum when the 
country is relatively labour-intensive and slightly smaller than the parent country. 
However, as illustrated in Figure V.14, the relative importance of firm versus plant 
level scale economies has an impact on the sensitivity of production regime to 
changes in trade cost levels. Figure V.I5a also support that for a sector with lower 
FIG fixed costs, the decline in horizontal affiliate production is much larger at lower 
trade costs compared to a sector with higher FIG fixed costs. 
Similar results can be deducted from Figure V.I5b, where relative endowments are 
identical, and only the relative sizes of countries change. With lower trade costs, 
affiliate production between similar countries (Le. where horizontal affiliate 
production is dominant) decreases more than for a sector with higher FIG ratio. The 
sectors with lower FIG seem, however, to be more suitable for affiliate activity 
between countries with moderate to large size differences, where vertical 
multinationals start gaining advantage against horizontal multinationals. Relatively 
high plant level scale economies generate a tendency towards single plant firms. 
5 Figure IV.5a and Figure IV.14a represent high trade costs (tx=0.30), and Figure IV.Sb and Figure 
IV.c represent low-medium trade costs (tx=O.lS). 
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The result in Figure V.16 also supports the view that vertical MNFs may become 
active for much smaller country size and relative endowment differences. However, 
this time for very large country differences domestic firm production is also active 
and competes with other firm types. 
Proposition 10: Higher FIG supports multi-plant production, and lower FIG supports 
single-plant production. For single plant sectors trade cost changes have a larger 
impact on the amount of affiliate production. 
Figure V.17 illustrates affiliate production at high trade costs for sectors with different 
levels of total scale economies. Lower total scale economies indicate that the sector is 
more competitive and entry barriers are low. Figure V.17a replicates the results for a 
sector with high scale economies using the initial benchmark equilibrium in Table 
V.1. Figure V.17b provides the results when total scale economies are 50% lower. 
The benchmark equilibrium for this simulation is provided in Table V.2. There is a 
clear reduction in the total affiliate production for the sector with lower total scale 
economies. The difference is highlighted as the total scale economies are reduced 
further in Figure V.17c. The difference between the figures supports the fact that 
multinational production ismore compatible with higher total scale economies, or in 
other words, imperfect competition. This result is compatible with the statistics on 
multinational production. Table 1.3 have presented the sectoral distribution of inward 
FDI stocks indicating that the capital and technology intensive sectors such as 
chemicals, electrical and electronic equipment and motor vehicles attract a significant 
share of world FDI, while low technology sectors such as textile, publishing, rubber 
and plastic products constitute a small share of total world FDI stock. 
Proposition 11: Multinational activity is more pronounced for sectors with higher 
total scale economies. 
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e) Industrial linkages and agglomeration 
Another potential factor which may have an impact on the location decisions of 
multinational firms is the potential benefits through proximity to suppliers. Depending 
on the sectoral linkages in the production structure, proximity to an intermediate 
sector may be rather important for a firm to reduce its costs, for which otherwise it 
would have to rely on imports at higher prices. This section will look into the 
potential effects of sectoral linkages and agglomeration economies on multinational 
production activity. The main purpose is to investigate whether just the existence of 
other firms attract further affiliate production into a region. Hence the effects of other 
factors such as market potential need to be separated from the agglomeration effect 
which leads to a spatial concentration of production. 
Previous studies have shown that horizontal multinational firms actually tend to 
weaken agglomeration tendencies of firms (Markusen and Venables, 1996; Ekholm 
and Forslid, 2001). Nevertheless, agglomeration may occur eventually with vertical 
multinationals at lower trade costs. Yet, this is expected to happen at a more gradual 
level than the abrupt changes as in core-periphery models (Ekholm and Forslid, 
2001). In addition to the potential existence of horizontal multinational firms, 
immobile factors of production also act as centrifugal forces limiting concentration of 
activity in a region. 
As the partial equilibrium results suggest firms prefer to be in close proximity to 
intermediate input producers and reduce their costs. First, the presence inter-sectoral 
supply linkages between firms will be analysed. In this case, in addition to the factors 
of production (Le. unskilled-labour and skilled labour), sector X also requires 
intermediate input Z produced by another sector. The initial (symmetric) benchmark 
for this case is provided in Table VA. However, as both Z and X are skilled labour 
intensive sectors coexistence of these sectors in a country means higher competition 
and hence higher prices for skilled labour. This effect will work against agglomeration 
in equilibrium. Due to the offsetting effects of centrifugal forces, it is not easy to 
observe the potential impact of the existence of inter-sector linkages in a symmetric 
environment. 
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Therefore, an extreme case is chosen in which the intermediate sector-Z is only active 
in country-i. Figure V.18 illustrates affiliate production activity in and Edgeworth-
Box setting for two different sectors, one with low inter-sectoral linkages (Figure 
V.18a) and one with higher inter-sector linkages (Figure V.18b). In both graphs, 
affiliate production in sector X is active in country-j for low income levels of country-
i which already accommodates sector Z. As country-i becomes larger, it becomes 
available to accommodate both sectors simultaneously. The asymmetric appearance in 
the graphs illustrate that affiliate production is active in country-i for a higher number 
of country pairs. Hence, affiliate production in sector X is more likely to locate in 
country-i to be in close proximity to intermediate product sector Z. 
Proposition 12: Affiliate production prefers to locate in a region where intermediate 
inputs are cheaper, as long as competition for factors of production by all sectors do 
not make the location disadvantageous. 
Intra-industry linkages create self reinforcing agglomeration of production. The 
locational patterns of firms depending on country characteristics are the same as 
before. The only difference is that producers of X benefit from being close to other 
sector X producers. Therefore, countries with high X production are expected to attract 
further X production. As higher income should be expected to attract more production 
due to market size, this effect is eliminated by using adjusted results as the ratio of 
volume of production to income. 
Figure V.19 shows the ratio of volume of total production (Le. domestic and 
multinational firm production) to income for country-L A ratio of one indicates that 
all demand by consumers is provided by production in the country by domestic firms 
or affiliates. At the benchmark equilibrium (equal income and endowment countries) 
when the ratio is 1.20 both consumer demand and intermediate product demand by X 
sector is supplied by production in the country. When the ratio is higher than this, 
country X accommodates more than the total demand (consumer demand + 
intermediate product demand) in the country. Figure V.19 suggests that when country-
i is very large, production of X concentrates in the country. This effect becomes more 
prominent at low trade costs. 
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This concentration tendency, however, is not only due to the market potential of this 
country, but also to benefits from plant scale economies and agglomeration 
economies. In order to separate the individual effect of agglomeration economies, two 
sectors, one without intra-industry linkages and one with intra-sector linkages are 
simulated (Figure V.20). From high to low trade costs both sectors agglomerate, 
producing more than the total demand in the country, when the country is very large. 
At very low costs, however, there is an increasing gap between the ratios of these two 
sectors, indicating the extra agglomeration effect born from intra-sector linkages. 
Higher production of X in a country attracts further sector X production due to low 
prices of intermediate sector product. To sum up, sector X tends to concentrate in the 
larger country not only due to its market potential, but also to benefit from both scale 
economies and existence of intra-sector linkages. This process of clustering is 
triggered by low trade costs. 
Figure V.21 looks into two sectors both having intra-industry linkages, but one with 
high scale economies and one with low scale economies. The sector with higher scale 
economies tends to show more agglomeration tendencies at large income levels in 
country-i for high to low trade cost levels. This tendency, however, disappears for 
very low trade costs (i.e. at very low trade costs, both graphs become adjacent), as the 
effects of intra-sector linkages become more dominant, and as result both sectors 
show similar concentration tendencies. 
The simulations above looked into the agglomeration tendencies in total production 
(i.e. domestic and multinational firm production). The subsequent analysis will focus 
on the effects of agglomeration economies on only multinational production and the 
behaviours of MNFs in sectors with and without intra-industry sector linkages will be 
compared. Other than their differences in supply linkages, the sectors that are 
compared next have identical characteristics in terms of total scale economies or 
relative firm versus plant-level scale economies. The following figures provide the 
simulation results for the volume of affiliate production. In order to account for the 
total country size differences in simulation benchmark equilibriums (i.e. due to the 
presence of an intermediate sector in one sector, and not in the other), volume of total 
affiliate production is divided by the total income. 
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Figure V.22 illustrates that affiliate production also tends to concentrate in large 
countries. For the regions where horizontal multinationals are dominant, the 
difference between the two lines is mainly due to intennediate demand. Hence there 
are not any agglomeration economies attracting further production into the area. This 
result is in line with the propositions in the literature that horizontal MNFs tend to 
weaken concentration within regions. On the other hand, as size differences between 
countries increase and single plant fInns gain advantage, the difference between the 
lines is much higher than the level of intennediate demand generates. The difference 
emerging between two sectors at high host country income levels is born by intra-
sector linkages and triggered by the presence of plant-level scale economies and lower 
trade costs. 
As Figure V.23 presents, affiliate production in sectors with higher scale economies 
are more likely to agglomerate than sectors with low total scale economies. This result 
of the model replicates a stylized fact on multinational production. Raw statistics 
(Table I. 7) show that multinational fInns are geographically most concentrated in high 
technology sectors such as semiconductors and bio-technology. These sectors also 
have very high export ratios as a result of low shipment costs, and show less 
dependency on regional factors such as culture or tastes. These characteristics make 
such sectors suitable for vertical multinational finn activity as well as geographical 
concentration. Other sectors such as motor vehicles or appliances, which are produced 
at a medium-high technology level, also show some tendency towards concentration 
in some regions, although to a lesser extent than high technology sectors. Moreover, 
these sectors face higher shipment costs as a result of the weight of the products. Low 
technology sectors, on the other hand, are geographically the most dispersed ones. 
Proposition 13,' Affiliate production in sectors with high scale economies, low trade 
costs and high supply linkages tend to agglomerate in countries with industrial 
clusters. 
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4. Conclusions 
This chapter has provided various testable propositions for the potential effects of 
country, sector and firm characteristics on the factors affecting the location of affiliate 
production. The propositions are deduced from general equilibrium simulations 
allowing country endowment levels, sectoral characteristics (Le. scale economies) and 
trade costs to interact with each other. The simulations are successful in capturing the 
diversity in real data through non-monotonic and non-linear results. The main 
contribution of the chapter is the incorporation of supply linkages into the knowledge 
capital model through which further characteristics of multinational firms are captured 
in a general equilibrium environment. This allows for a better observation on the 
sources of sectoral differences in multinational activities in conjunction with host 
country's comparative advantages and hence better policy decisions to benefit the host 
country. Promoting sectors which will interact with the existing supplier network 
within the country may contribute to the dynamic comparative advantage of the 
country in the long term. The formation of industrial clusters in an economy may 
trigger a process as a result of which initially similar countries may end up with 
different sizes and comparative advantages. 
The simulations replicate various stylized characteristics of multinational production 
such as compatibility with high total scale economies. Higher firm level scale 
economies tend to encourage horizontal multinational production while higher plant 
level scale economies promote vertical multinational production. The simulation 
results suggest that similar income and relative endowments yield higher total affiliate 
production at higher trade costs attracting tariff jumping horizontal multinational 
firms. Multinational firms also prefer countries with higher market potential, cheap 
labour and abundant skilled labour. Affiliate production favours locations where 
intermediate inputs are cheaper, as long as competition for factors of production by all 
sectors do not make the location disadvantageous. Locating close to intermediate 
sectors may result in agglomeration economies in high technology sectors at low trade 
costs and hence further attraction of firms into the country. The findings on the effects 
of supply linkages are important, since MNFs in some sectors show an increasing 
tendency for locating in close proximity to clusters of related firms. The findings are 
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also not confined to only manufacturing sectors with intermediate input demand. 
More and more MNFs choose to contract their whole production systems, or 
headquarter activities such as call centres and concentrating on their core activities. 
Consequently, having a strong supplier network within the country is becoming an 
important factor for attracting multinationals into the country. 
The knowledge capital model has further potential to be extended in future research. 
For policy analysis one extension may be to introduce trade costs into the agricultural 
sector (sector Y). Although this will not change the main essence of 'what if type 
experiments performed here, one potential result is that the range of parameters where 
agglomeration occurs may be reduced. This is due to the fact that agricultural trade 
costs work against agglomeration, since a location with concentrated manufacturing 
sector will have to import these products which have higher prices as a result of trade 
costs. Another extension may be to allow factors of production to move in response to 
international factor price differences, and hence allow for skilled and unskilled labour 
mobility between countries. The model may also be expanded to incorporate 
agglomeration externalities through the knowledge production function allowing for 
Iocational spillovers to reduce the cost of subsequent innovations in a region where 
headquarters locate. 
Having obtained various propositions on the location choices of multinational firms, 
the next step is to perform statistical analysis and empirical tests on the suitability of 
the model to data. 
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VI. TESTING THE MODEL OF AFFILIATE PRODUCTION 
IN MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
1. Introduction 
Chapter V has provided various testable propositions for the potential effects of country, 
sector and firm characteristics on the locational determinants of affiliate production. 
Allowing for interactions among variables in a general equilibrium framework, the 
diversity in real data has been captured. In this chapter, the propositions concluded from 
these computational general equilibrium (CGE) simulations are tested empirically on 
manufacturing sector. For this purpose a large bilateral country data set is constructed to 
represent a range of developed and developing home and host country partners. This 
large data set helps to test the locational characteristics both horizontally and vertically-
integrated multinational firms (MNFs) may find attractive. The main challenge for 
finding a good empirical representation of the model is due to the presence of non-linear 
and non-monotonic effects of variables suggested in the CGE simulations. These 
characteristics require a non-linear empirical specification with various interaction terms. 
The main contribution of this chapter is specifying, estimating and testing an empirical 
model, which incorporates endowment characteristics as well as sectoral differences 
which potentially affects the choice and level of multinational production. Detailed 
analyses are carried out in order to choose a correct specification and estimation method 
for the model. 
The plan of this chapter is as follows: Section 2 explains the specification of the model in 
association with the CGE results. Section 3 gives details on the construction of the data 
set and alternative variables, while Section 4 provides the preliminary OLS estimation 
results. The problems in the model are dealt with and various remedies to improve the 
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performance are suggested in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the final estimation results 
and section 7 concludes. 
2. Model Specification 
The computational general equilibrium simulations in Chapter V demonstrated the 
resource-seeking (e.g. human resources), market-seeking (e.g .. host country market) and 
efficiency-seeking (e.g. factor cost differentials, agglomeration economies) motives of 
multinational firms. Depending to their motivations, multinational firms may choose 
horizontally or vertically integrated production structures. The main difficulty for 
capturing all these motivations for different firm structures is that one country or firm 
characteristic which supports one type of multinational production may have adverse 
effects on the other. For example, the simulations suggest that host and home country 
trade costs have different effects on horizontally and vertically integrated MNFs. The 
trade cost levels of the host country have a positive impact on the volume of affiliate 
production of horizontally integrated MNFs which benefit from tariff jumping, and no 
effect on vertical MNFs. Home country trade costs, on the other hand, have a diverse 
impact on the affiliate production of vertically integrated multinationals. This means that 
when vertical MNFs are active, a fall in trade cost of the home country will cause an 
increase in the host country affiliate production. 
The CGE simulations also demonstrated that the volume of production (sales) is likely to 
be higher when the total market potential is larger. A higher level of total income of 
home and host countries supports both the horizontally and vertically integrated 
multinational production. Total horizontal affiliate production reaches a maximum when 
two countries are assumed to have similar income levels and relative endowment 
structures. As these firms duplicate roughly the same activities in both countries, they 
benefit from similarities between the home and host countries such as similar income 
levels, endowment structures and tastes. At the individual country level horizontal 
affiliate production in a host country is highest when the parent country is slightly larger 
than the host, but when the size difference is not extreme. This inverse V-shape relation 
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between parent country size and affiliate sales needs to be represented in estimated 
" 
equations. Vertically integrated MNFs, on the other hand, become more advantageous 
when the parent country is small and skilled labour intensive, while the host economy 
provides a large market potential and cheap labour. Hence, they benefit from separating 
the production activities with different factor intensities and locating them into countries 
according to relative factor costs. 
One of the most striking results of the simulations is that the countries, which jointly 
offer a large market and cheap labour in addition to adequate levels of skilled labour are 
the most attractive ones for affiliate production. In this combination of relative 
endowment and income levels, vertical and horizontal multinationals tend to co-exist. 
Although MNFs prefer low unskilled labour wages in the host country, they still do have 
some skilled labour requirements in the host country (i.e. technicians, accountants etc.). 
For this reason, the skilled labour ratio in the total labour force is also an important factor 
for attracting multinationals into a host country. Another important factor is the clustering 
of firms and production in a host economy. Agglomeration economies tend to occur in 
sectors with higher scale economies. Hence, an interaction term, composed of the scale 
economies in the sector and the size of manufacturing (or all production) in the host 
country, may help to capture the agglomeration effect in the econometric model. 
Given these results, the following equation (1) has been proposed for estimation 
purposes!, where AFFSALE is the real volume of production (or sales) by affiliates in 
country-j, of parent firm in country-i: 
AFFSALE = Po + f3..TOTINCOME + /32PINCOMESH + /33PINCOMESH2 
+ /34 (HINCOMESHx HCOMPSKL) + /3sHSKLRATIO (1) 
+ /36 (PSCALE X HINCOMESH) + /37HTRADEC + /3gPTRADEC + & 
I In the specification given the initial letters p and h represent parent (home) and host countries, 
respectively, TOTINCOME is the total level of income of home and host country. INCOMESH represent 
the income share of a country in the TOTINCOME. COMPSKL represent the comparative advantage of a 
country in skilled labour, SKLRATIO is the ratio of skilled labour in the total labour force, SCALE is the 
scale economies in the sector, TRADEC is the level of trade cost. 
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In the specification above, the coefficient of total income of home and host countries (fh) 
is expected to be positive. This coefficient tests the proposition that higher total income 
supports higher affiliate activity (Le. proposition 3 of Chapter V). The inverse-U shape 
relation between parent county size and affiliate sales is captured with the second and 
third independent variables (i.e. propositions 4-7 of Chapter V). A positive coefficient for 
the income share of parent country ({h) and a negative coefficient for the squared version 
of the same variable (fh) are expected. The squared income share of the parent country is 
included in order to penalize high differences in income levels. The joint effect of the 
host country income share and the comparative advantage in skilled labour (J34) is 
expected to be negative, since large market potential and relatively cheap unskilled-
labour seem to attract potential multinational investors rather than cheap skilled labour 
(i.e. proposition 9 of Chapter V). The skilled labour ratio variable tests the significance 
MNFs give to abundance of skilled labour in the countries they choose to invest (i.e. 
proposition 8 of Chapter V). The coefficient of this variable is (f3s) is expected to be 
positive. The next variable measures the joint effect of scale economies and income share 
of host country. The findings oflast chapter indicate that MNFs of technology or capital-
intensive sectors benefit from locating in close proximity to industrial clusters. The 
coefficient of this variable (J36) is anticipated to be positive. In this interactive 
agglomeration term, the level of scale economies in the sector is represented by the 
overall scale economies of the parent country. The reason for this is the fact that the more 
technology intensive the production in the parent country, the more likely they are to 
invest abroad in technology intensive products. Finally, the coefficient of host country 
trade cost (J37) is expected to be positive, while the coefficient of home (parent) country 
(fJ8) is expected to be negative. 
3. Data 
Most empirical studies tend to use FDI flows or stocks to proxy multinational activity in 
a country. However, multinational FDI flows or stocks include only funds transferred 
from the parent company, and as a result overlooks to the fact that the MNFs may finance 
their operations by taking up loans in the host economy to fund future expenditures. In 
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that case effective FOI flows into the host economy may be Iow or zero, despite the 
continuing activities ofMNFs in the economy. Some studies have overcome this problem 
by employing the data on capital expenditures of countries abroad regardless of source of 
financing of the funds invested. In this chapter, the affiliate sales (or production) data is 
used to capture the multinational activity in an economy. Although the data is scarcer, 
this variable is more meaningful in economic terms. 
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Figure VI.1 Full data coverage of country pairs 
Until recently, the only internationally available information on foreign investment was 
on capital stocks and flows collected for balance of payments statistics. The OECD now 
also collects and reports data on the petformance of foreign affiliates of the OECD 
countries. The majority of data is based on inward investments, although a few countries 
(i.e. USA, Germany, Italy) also provide information on their outward investment 
performance. One of the performance measures reported is the volume of turnover (or 
production for some countries) of affiliates, and this will be used as the dependent 
variable (AFFSALE) in this study. The data enables to arrange it according to parent and 
host country pairs over a period of 1985-1999. However, not all countries report the 
volume of affiliate turnover (or production) every year and especially before 1992 the 
majority of home and host countries reported are developed countries. Two data sets are 
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constructed, one (AFFSALEZ) with turnover data including sales reported as zero 
(missing values are left as missing values), and one (AFFSALE) with only positive 
volume of sales (no zero values). The original data set with zero values included has 44 
home and host countries (Figure VI.li. However due to unavailable data for other 
variables (skilled labour share and R&D share in GDP, in particular) only 30 home and 
44 host countries have been covered in the regressions to be estimated. All turnover and 
production data are in million USD converted from local currency by using average 
exchange rates and deflated by the US wholesale price index. 
In order to represent relative incomes or market potential of countries real GDP data 
measured in billions of 1995 constant US dollars are used. Share of parent (host) country 
GDP is calculated as parent (host) country GDP divided by the summation of home and 
host country real GDP levels. As an alternative measure of income, real GDP per capita, 
which takes income allocation differences into account, was also used. The data on GDP 
and exchange rates are obtained from the World Development Indicators, 2003. 
Parallel to CGE simulations, relative endowments are represented by skilled and 
unskilled labour shares. Data on the share of skilled labour is obtained from ILO 
(SEGREGA T data), which reports the ratio of workers in each occupational category. 
According to ISC068 methodology, occupational categories Oil (professional, technical 
workers) and 2 (administrative workers) fall under the category of skilled labour. There 
have been two problems with this data set, however. First, labour data by occupational 
classifications has not been reported every year by every country. Therefore, in cases 
where some annual figures were missing period averages for each country are used to fill 
in the missing observations, with the assumption that skilled and unskilled labour share 
do not change dramatically between two consecutive years. The second problem has been 
2 The following countries have data on affiliate sales (or production) for various years as host or parent 
countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxemburg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, 
Ukraine, UK, US. Some country pairs have zero affiliate sales. There is no data available for Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Ukraine, India, Philippines, Thailand, Chile, Hong Kong, Brazil, and Luxembourg as (home) 
parent countries. 
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caused by a change in methodology for collecting occupational data. In this new 
classification occupational categories 1 (legislators, senior officials and managers), 2 
(professionals) and 3 (technicians and associate professionals) fall under the category of 
skilled labour. Most countries have switched to ISC088, but at different times. Moreover, 
not all countries have adjusted their previous figures according to this new reporting 
system. Therefore, for these countries an adjustment is made to report all data in ISC088, 
again with the assumption that the share of skilled labour in total labour force does not 
change much in two consecutive years. The variable HSKLRATIO is computed as the 
ratio of skilled labour divided by the total labour force. The comparative advantage index 
of the host country (HCOMPSKL) is constructed as the ratio of skilled labour divided by 
the ratio of unskilled labour of the host country divided by the equivalent ratio for parent 
country. Hence, a higher HCOMPSKL ratio indicates a higher comparative advantage in 
skilled labour for the host country. 
As suggested by Braconier et al. (2003), an alternative measure of income (SIZE) has also 
been constructed using endowment levels of home and host countries. This measure is 
directly mapped to the Edgeworth box presentations of the previous chapter and the size 
of a country is calculated by the length of a ray from the origin to its endowment point 
using the law of Pythagoras. Hence, the size of a country is equal to the squared root of 
the summation of squared skilled and unskilled labour shares of the country in total world 
endowmene. 
In the CGE model, scale economies are assumed to be the result of fixed costs of skilled 
labour in the headquarters located in the home country. In order to represent the 
technology intensity of the parent country, the ratio of general expenditure on research 
and development (GERD) in GDP is used. The data is obtained from World Development 
Indicators, 2003. As an alternative measure of scale economies, the number of scientists 
3 SIZE = .J SKLSHARE2 + LSHARE2 , where SKLSHARE and LSHARE represent skilled and 
unskilled labour shares of a country, respectively. SKLSHARE (LSHARE) is calculated as skilled 
(unskilled) labour endowment of a country divided by the total labour endowment of home and host 
country partners. 
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and engineers per million has also been tried in the regressions. This data set, however, is 
much shorter than GERD and does not extend to years prior to 1990. 
The most difficult variable to construct has been the trade cost measure, as there is no 
direct measure available to cover the extent of information used in the CGE assumptions. 
As a result, more than one variable is used simultaneously to cover' different aspects of 
the required information. The first measure is the trade cost index (TRADEC), 
constructed as one minus the share of foreign trade in GDP. The assumption used is that 
the more open a country is the lower the trade costs will be. This index represents the 
more policy controllable aspect of trade cost. Higher host country trade cost is expected 
to attract horizontal investment aiming to jump over the tariff barrier. On the other hand, 
higher home country trade costs tend to discourage vertical multinational firms which 
produce in a foreign country and export back to home country. Accordingly, the variable 
HTRADEC is expected to have a positive sign, while PTRADEC is expected to have a 
negative sign. As a second measure of trade cost, the distance between the capital cities 
of home and host country pairs (as crow flies) is included to the model. The coefficient of 
DISTANCE is expected to have a negative sign since dissimilarities between two 
countries increase parallel to distance. H~wever, this variable also proxies transport 
(shipment) costs between countries, and according to our simulation results high transport 
costs tend to encourage horizontal multinational investment. Therefore, a quadratic 
version of this variable, DISTANCE2, is also included in order to capture this potential 
effect and is expected to have a positive coefficient. In addition to these variables, a 
dummy variable (SIMILAR) is included to capture the effects of similarities such as 
language, culture and tastes. The dummy variable takes the value one if the country pairs 
share a border or if they have the same official language. The coefficient of this variable 
is expected to be positive. 
The estimations also include dummy variables in order to capture country fixed effects. 
Rather than using a dummy variable for each country pair (i.e. for example, capturing 
fixed effects of UK affiliates in the USA separately from those of UK affiliates in 
Germany), only individual parent and host country dummies are utilised to capture cross 
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section effects. For example, HUSA, represents a dummy variable which takes value one 
when USA is a host county and zero otherwise. Similarly, PUSA, represents another 
dummy variable which takes value one when USA is a parent country, and zero 
otherwise. 
4. Preliminary OLS Regression results 
Various models using the alternative variables mentioned above are estimated using 
Ordinary Least squares (OLS) for two different data sets of affiliate sales (AFFSALEZ 
and AFFSALE). In the estimations all the alternative variables suggested in the previous 
section had the correct coefficient signs and in all cases the addition of fixed host and 
home country effects provided a better fit based on the R 2 and F statistics. The results for 
AFFSALE and AFFSALEZ with and without fixed country effects are reported in Table 
VI.l. 
The coefficients of all variables have the correct signs and are significantly different from 
zero in all model specifications. The results, therefore, show support for the potential 
agglomeration effect in addition to endowment and trade cost effects. In industries with 
higher scale economies, agglomeration of firms seems to generate further attraction for 
multinational investment. The home and host country fixed effects are jointly significant 
and improve the fitness of the model, yet, the explanatory power of the model is still only 
56%. Moreover, these results are valid only if the standard regression assumptions are 
satisfied. The properties of least squares estimators and the statistical analysis are based 
on the assumptions that the relationship between the dependent variable and the 
regressors is linear, the errors are independently and identically distributed normal 
random variables each with mean zero and a common variance, (52 • Therefore, the model 
residuals need to be examined before commenting on the overall performance of the 
model. 
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Variable 
AFFSALE 
GDPSUM 
PGDPSH 
PGDPSH2 
HGDPSH 
HSKLRATIO 
HCOMPSKL 
PGERD 
HTRADEC 
PTRADEC 
SIMILAR 
DISTANCE 
DISTANCE2 
TABLE VI.la 
Description of Variables and Expected Signs 
Description of Variable 
Real volume of production (or sales) by affiliates of parent country-j in host country-i. 
All turnover and production data are in million USD converted from local currency by 
using average exchange rates and deflated by the US wholesale price index. 
Sum of home and host country real GDP data measured in billions of 1995 constant US 
dollars. The data on GDP and exchange rates are obtained from the World Development 
Indicators, 2003. 
Share of parent country GDP, calculated as parent country real GDP divided by the sum 
of home and host country real GDP levels. 
This variable aims to capture dissimilarities in sizes of home and host countries. 
Share of host country GDP, calculated as host country real GDP divided by the sum of 
home and host country real GDP levels. 
The ratio of skilled labour in host country divided by the total labour force of that 
country. Data on the share of skilled labour is obtained from ILO (SEGREGAT data), 
which reports the ratio of workers in each occupational category. The variable aims to 
capture skilled labour availability in host country. 
The comparative advantage index of the host country constructed as the ratio of skilled 
labour to unskilled labour ratio of the host country divided by the equivalent ratio for 
parent country. Hence, a higher HCOMPSKL ratio indicates a higher comparative 
advantage in skilled labour for the host country. 
In order to represent the technology intensity of the parent country, the ratio of general 
expenditure on research and development (GERD) in GDP is used. The data is obtained 
from World Development Indicators, 2003. The more technology intensive a parent 
country, the more likely it is that affiliates of firms from this country will be involved in 
technology-intensive sectors abroad. 
Host country trade cost constructed as one minus the share of foreign trade in GDP. The 
assumption used is that the more open a country is the lower the trade costs will be. This 
index represents the more policy controllable aspect of trade cost. 
Parent country trade cost, constructed as above. 
A dummy variable included to capture the effects of similarities such as language, 
culture and tastes, takes the value one if the country pairs share a border or if they have 
the same official language. 
The distance between the capital cities of home and host country pairs (as crow flies). 
Dissimilarities between two countries increase parallel to distance. 
Squared DISTANCE variable. Proxies transport (shipment) costs between countries. 
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Expected sign 
Dependent 
variable 
(+) 
(+) 
(-) 
(+) 
(+) 
(-) 
(+) 
(+) 
(-) 
(+) 
(-) 
(+) 
TABLEVI.lb 
Preliminary OLS Estimation Results 
Method OLS OLS with Fixed EtTect 
Dependent Variable AFFSALEZ AFFSALE AFFSALEZ AFFSALE 
GDPSUM 4.69 (14.76) 5.50 (15.10) 6.63 (7.16) 7.87 (7.98) 
PGDPSH 61111 (10.60) 87553 (10.36) 72337 (10.55) 101869 (9.75) 
PGDPSH2 
-59010 (-9.85) -75436 (-9.57) -58852 (-9.12) -72807 (-8.87) 
HGDPSH*HCOMPSKL 
-1577 (-5.47) -1859 (-3.74) -2749 (-5.03) -2298 (-2.85) 
HSKLRATIO 16394 (5.12) 15886 (4.25) 28202 (3.50) 20754 (2.16) 
PGERD*HGDPSH 1662 (3.37) 4385 (6.11) 7627 (6.52) 9152 (5.66) 
HlRADEC 345 (3.22) 498 (2.80) 343 (2.39) 432 (2.32) 
PlRADEC 4.11 (0.027) 39.14 (0.21) -999 (-4.75) . -1684 (-5.90) 
SIMILAR 7346 (5.31) 9420 (6.35) 3374 (2.61) 5226 (3.51) 
DISTANCE 
-3.17 (-7.48) -3.40 (-5.94) -5.98 (-6.50) -6.14 (-4.94) 
DISTANCE2 0.0002 (5.23) 0.00018 (3.10) 0.00042 (5.43) 0.00037 (3.02) 
C 
-81285 (-2.63) -132790 (-3.18) 107821 (2.64) 222012 (3.59) 
# observations 2121 1654 2121 1654 
IP 0.435 0.462 0.532 0.561 
Log likelihood -23174 -18200 -22952 -18010 
AIC 21.86 22.02 21.69 21.84 
SBC 21.90 22.07 21.84 22.03 
F-stat 126.7 110.5 44.1 38.8 
Prob.(F-stat) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DW 1.910 2.096 2.095 2.30 
Notes: 1. AFFSALEZ is the volume of real turnover including zero observations, while AFF ALE includes only 
positive observations. The first letters, P and H in the regressors denote parent, and host countries, respectively. All 
variable definitions are on Table Vl.la 2. All models are estimated using White heteroscedasticity consistent standard 
errors and covariances. The figures reported in parenthesis are t-statistics. 3. Fixed effect specifications include home 
and host country dummies. 
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The Durbin-Watson statistic of our model is close to 2, and does not indicate a significant 
autocorrelation problem. However, the White statistic4 is significant [Obs*R2=458, 
Prob(O.OOOO)], and hence the model residuals do not have an homogenous variance. 
When heteroscedasticity is present OLS estimation places more weight on the 
observations with large error variances than those with smaller error variances. Because 
of this implicit weighting, OLS parameter estimators are unbiased and consistent, but not 
efficient: i.e., the variances of the estimated parameters are not the minimum variances. 
In addition the estimated variances of the estimated parameters will be biased estimators 
of the true variance of the estimated parameters. If these biased estimates are used 
statistical tests and confidence intervals will be incorrect. 
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Figure VI.2 Standardized residuals versus OLS 
fitted values: Under standard assumptions the standard 
residuals should be uncorrelated with the fitted values. 
4 White's test is a test of the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity against heteroscedasticity of some 
unknown general form. The test statistic is computed by an auxiliary regression, where we regress the 
squared residuals on all possible (non-redundant) cross products of the regressors. The White statistic is 
computed as the number of observations times the centred R2 from the test regression, and is asymptotically 
distributed as a·l distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of slope coefficients (excluding 
the constant) in the test regression. 
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The regression results reported in TableVI.1 are with White heteroscedasticity consistent 
standard errors to provide unbiased estimates for variances of the coefficient estimators. 
However, the least squares estimators are still inefficient, even if the variances of the 
parameter estimates are correctly determined. 
Residual analysis is an effective way to detect the problems in a model. Figure VI.2 is a 
scatter plot of the standardized residuals5 versus the fitted values of the estimated OLS 
model with fixed effects using dependent variable AFFSALE. Under the standard 
assumptions, the standardized residuals should be uncorrelated with the fitted values; 
therefore, this residual plot should be a random scatter of points around zero mean. 
However, in Figure VI.2, the standardized residuals are scattered around a clear curve, 
and hence the model is not sustained by the data. Also the variation around the mean 
tends to increase for higher values of fitted variable, illustrating the existence of a non-
constant variance. 
500 
Sample I 3237 
Observations 1654 
Mean 4.30&09 
Median -702.4350 
Maximum 129049.8 
Minimum -32957.52 
Std. Dev. 12968.49 
200 Skewness 2.955486 
Kurtosis 21.67426 
100 Jarque-Bera 26441.10 
Probability 0.000000 
Figure VI.3 Summary statistics of residuals 
5 Standardized residual is defined as e; = .JiJsE ' where ei is the residual, and MSE (error mean square) 
MSE 
is an estimate ofthe variance ofthe error terms. 
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The residual series of the OLS regression do not seem to posses a normal distribution 
either. When normality does not hold, the inference procedures are approximate, which 
means that the level of a test or confidence interval may not be as the normal theory says. 
However, when the sample size is reasonably large relative to the number of regression 
coefficients (as is in this model), the inference procedures for regression coefficients are 
generally quite accurate (the accuracy increases with the sample size). 
Figure VI.3 provides the summary statistics of the residuals of the same model. The 
series tend to exhibit a high peak around the mean and possess long tails, indicating too 
many small and large values compared to a normal distribution. The non-normality of the 
residuals could also be observed from the normal probability plot of standardized 
residuals (Figure VI.4), where the ordered standardized residuals are plotted against the 
so-called normal scores. The normal scores are what we would expect to obtain if a 
sample of size n is taken from a normal distribution. 
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Figure VI.4 Normal probability plot of 
standardized residuals: Under normality 
assumption, this plot should resemble a nearly 
(straight) line. 
If the residuals are normally distributed, the ordered residuals should be approximately 
the same as the ordered normal scores. Under the normality assumption this plot should 
resemble a (nearly) straight line with an intercept of zero and a slope of one (these are the 
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mean and the standard deviation of the standardized residuals, respectively). The 
standardized residuals clearly deviate from the expected normal levels, with some 
extreme positive residuals (outliers). A more in-depth analysis of the series indicates that 
the positive outliers tend to occur when both the home and host countries are highly 
developed countries. Hence, when the US is the home country and Canada, Germany or 
UK are the host counties (for largest outliers), or the US is the host country and Japan or 
UK are the home countries (for largest outliers). The model does not seem to capture 
affiliate production tendencies for highly developed country pairs. 
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Figure VI.S Dependent variable (AFFSALE) 
versus OLS fitted values: The curvilinear relation 
indicates that the data is not sustained by a linear 
regression. 
Thus the model fails to provide residuals compatible with standard regression 
assumptions. Furthermore, a scatter plot of the response variable against fitted values 
shows a non-linear trend (Figure VI.5) questioning the suitability of a linear estimation 
method for this data set. Transformation of the response variable is a common method to 
linearize a curvilinear regression relation (simultaneous transformations on one or more 
of the predictors may also be needed for a better fit). Only after achieving a linear 
regression relation, may the problems of heteroscedasticity and non-normality be subject 
to further investigation. The problems of unequal error variances and non-normality of 
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the error tenns frequently appear together, and it is a better practice to first remedy the 
heteroscedasticity problem, and then if still necessary deal with non-nonnality of 
residuals. Since the transfonnation of a response variable also changes the shape and the 
spread of the distribution of this variable, the problems of unequal variance and non-
nonnality of distribution of error tenns are also likely to be eliminated or reduced as a 
result of a response variable transfonnation. If not, weighted least squares estimation may 
be required. 
The next section provides some analysis to decide how the dependent variable should be 
transfonned, if at all, in order to achieve a model more compatible with the statistical 
assumptions. The decision on the transfonnations will be made using numerical (Box-
Cox approach) and graphical approaches in collaboration. Each potential transfonnation 
will be compared using various goodness of fit, heteroscedasticity and nonnality 
perfonnance criterion. At the end, residual and response plots of these transfonnations 
will be compared to support the final choice of transfonnation or a group of potential 
transfonnations. After the response variable transfonnation has been selected, non-
linearities in the predictor variables will also be checked using Box-Tidwell 
transfonnations. This will help to decide whether we need higher order predictor 
variables instead of the linear ones in order to achieve a better fit. If the response 
transfonnations do not eliminate the heteroscedasticity problem, weighted least squares 
estimation (WLS) method may be considered. 
5. Remedial Measures 
a. Variable Transformations to Achieve Linearity 
Cook and Weisberg (1994 a,b) have suggested using an inverse response plot (a scatter 
plot of Y against Y, where Y is the dependent variable and Y is the fitted values of the 
dependent variable), and fitting a curve to the plot to estimate the appropriate value for 'A.. 
As with many graphical methods, however, the inverse response plot may be more 
valuable as a device for suggesting that a transfonnation is needed, rather than providing 
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a clear signal as to the fonn of the appropriate transfonnation. In order to obtain the 
inverse response plot the axis should be reversed in Figure VI.S. This provides a 
monotonically increasing figure. Curves obtained using power transfonnations of (Y) for 
Og,<l seems to provide a better fit to the plot than non-transfonned (y), and the best fit 
seems to occur around 0.3<1..<0.4. Box-Tidwe1l6 approach may also be used to estimate 
the appropriate transfonnations, with Y playing the role of regressor to be transfonned. 
The Box-Cox transfonnation approach is one of the most widely used transfonnations. 
Transformations suggested by this numerical method and the graphical inverse response 
plot method need not always agree. The inverse fitted value plot chooses transfonnations 
to linearize the response function, while the Box-Cox method tries to make the errors in 
the transfonned scale as close to normally distributed as possible. As originally presented 
by Box and Cox (1964), the objective is to transfer Y to V'). in such a way that the 
transfonned Y is a linear function of the regressors, with approximate nonnality for Vi'). 
and a constant variance. The Box-Cox family oftransfonnations is generally presented in 
textbooks as (2) below. When we use a model with an intercept, we may simply use yA. 
in place of (yA. -1) / A. 
yA. = {(yA. -1)/ A 
log( Y) 
A:I;Q 
A=O 
(2) 
6 Box and Tidwell (1962) provided a method to detect the need for a non-linear term instead of the 
corresponding linear term. With the Box-Tidwell procedure one assumes that: E(Y) = Po + PI X' 
{
In( X) a = 0 
where X' is the transformed X, with X I = 
Xa a:l; 0 
Expanding E(Y) in a Taylor series and employing the chain rule for derivatives produces 
E(Y) = 130 + PI X + y[x In(X)] , where y = (a -l)PI. 
In order to find the estimate of the appropriate transformation, n, we need to obtain PlO by estimating (1), 
and obtain f by estimating (2), both by using OLS technique. Then solve for n using equation ( 3 ). 
Y=POo+Plo X (1) 
Y = Po + PIX + yXln(X) 
a=L+l P; 
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(2) 
(3) 
After transforming the response variable for a range of possible values of A., the 
transformation best suits the needs of the model should be selected by regressing the 
transformed variable on the model predictors, and evaluating the performance of each 
model using parametric and non-parametric indicators. Various power transformations of 
the dependent variable (affiliate sales) ranging between -2 to +2 have been tested, and the 
performance indicators for each transformation have been reported in Table V1.2. Next, 
some explanations for these performance criteria will be provided. 
The standard approach for choosing the appropriate A., explained in Draper and Smith 
(1981), is to compute (3) for a range of possible values of A, and then select the one that 
maximizes L(A). 
1 SSE L (A) = - - n log( -) + (A - 1) L log( Y) 
2 n 
(3) 
One disadvantage of this method is that the transformed dependent variable is assumed to 
have a normal distribution, and if the transformed dependent variable is not at least 
approximately normally distributed, then the selection of A could be undermined. Since 
this cannot be guaranteed in this model, this selection method should be viewed as of 
secondary importance. Also the choice will not guarantee approximate normality in the 
transformed variable. 
Therefore, in addition to this standard approach, some non-parametric measures which do 
not depend on the assumption of normality will be reported. These measures also allow 
the performance on normality to be checked. This approach has been suggested and 
illustrated in Ryan (1997). The first point to keep in mind is that whenever the dependent 
variable is transformed, the proper form of R2 should be used to check whether the 
transformation has been beneficial for obtaining a better fit. This point has been 
emphasized by K valseth (1985) and Scott and Wild (1991). The former suggests using 
the form (4), 
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R 2 =1_L(Y-Yraw)2 
raw '" 2 LJ (Y - Y) (4) 
where Y raw is the predicted value ofY converted back to the original scale. However, the 
downside of this statistic is that the value of R2 raw may be negative, especially when a 
predicted value on the transformed scale is very close to zero, and as result it 'blows up' 
when transformed back to the original (raw) scale. Ryan (1997) suggests using, ~Y,Yraw, 
the square of the correlation between the response values and the predicted values 
obtained after converting back to the original (raw) scale. There will usually be close 
agreement between the two statistics for good models, though. Goodness of fit measures 
for models with transformed variables is reported under columns 2-4 in Table VI.2. 
In addition to the goodness of fit measures, the homoscedasticity and normality 
assumptions will be checked by three indicators each. The performance of 
transformations on normality will be inspected roughly by computing the correlation 
between the scaled residuals and their normalized values after transformation, in addition 
to the classic Jarque-Bera statistics7• The skewness statistic will also be reported for each 
')... value in order to observe whether the non-normality problem sources mainly from non-
symmetry or kurtosis. First measure of homoscedasticity reported is the White test. As a 
second measure, (rHl), the correlation between the squared standardized residuals and 
fogeY) will be presented. The third measure is to observe whether there is any linear 
relationship between the standard deviation and a power of the mean response. Hence, 
the correlation between the log of the absolute value of the residuals and 10g(Y) will be 
reported8• 
7 Jarque-Bera is a commonly used test statistic for testing whether the series is normally distributed. The 
test statistic measures the difference of the kurtosis and skewness of the series with those from the normal 
distribution. The statistic is computed asJB= n~k(S2 +! (K -3Y). where S is skewness, K is 
kurtosis and k represents the number of estimated coefficients used to create the series. Under the null 
hypothesis of normal distribution, the JB statistic is distributed as X2 with two degrees of freedom. The 
reported probability is the probability that a JB statistic exceeds (in absolute value) the observed value 
under the null (a small probability leads to the null hypothesis of a normal distribution). 
8 This measure has been suggested by Carroll and Ruppert 1988, and Ryan, 1997. 
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Using some graphical evaluation methods might help further which dependent variable to 
use in the estimations. Figure VI.6 scatter plots transformed dependent variables against 
their fitted values. The transformed dependent variables for 0~~0.2 have approximately 
linear relationships with their fitted values, and hence linear regression estimation 
methods are appropriate to apply on these models. Standardized residual plots also 
support these transformations. A fitted lowess 9 curve of order two is shown on each 
graph. For 0~~0.2, the plots are scattered around mean zero, while for ~0.3 
standardized residuals are still correlated with fitted values. None ofthe graphs, however, 
seem to have a constant standard variation function. Especially in the first two graphs (a. 
1..=0, b. 1..=0.1), it is clearly evident that the variability of residuals is much larger for low 
levels offitted values. 
According to Table VI.2, power transformations ranging between 0-0.5 generate an 
improvement in fitness of the model, increasing the rY,Yraw from 0.58 to over 0.71. 
Particularly, the transformations of y0.l, YO.2 seem to fit the model quite well. 
Nevertheless neither the homoscedasticity nor normality conditions are met in any of the 
transformations. To sum up, the Box-Cox transformations have been useful to achieve 
linearization of the model, but have not been sufficient to mimic the standard regression 
assumptions. Weighted least squares estimation technique is still required to obtain the 
efficient estimates and this is the subject of the next section. It should also be noted that 
replacing the linear predictor variables with power transformed ones (according to Box-
Tidwell transformation choices) did not provide any improvements on goodness of fit, 
and therefore the tests are not reported here. As a result the models only with response 
variable transformations will be considered for further improvements. 
9 The lowess method is a nonparametric method to obtain a smoothed curve by fitting successive linear 
regression functions in local neighbourhoods. It does not provide an analytical expression for the functional 
form of the regression relationship, but suggests the shape of the regression curve. Higher order 
polynomials can also be utilized with this method. The name lowess stands for locally weighted regression 
scatter plot smoothing. 
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TABLE VI.2 
Box-Cox Transformations 
Goodness of Fit Measures for Normality Measures for Homoscedasticity 
A. R2raw rY,Yraw LL skewness JB r e,en White rH! rH2 
-0.1 negative 0.33 -20178 1.29 3546 (0.0000) 0.921 415 (0.0000) -0.435 -0.318 
0.0 0.31 0.71 -14061 -0.51 845 (0.0000) 0.945 415 (0.0000) -0.346 -0.308 
0.1 0.84 0.83 -9823 O.oI 179 (0.0000) 0.960 336 (0.0000) -0.235 -0.194 
0.2 0.80 0.85 -10773 0.25 61 (0.0000) 0.970 271 (0.0000) -0.021 -0.014 
0.3 0.76 0.84 -ll470 0.40 92 (0.0000) 0.968 372 (0.0000) 0.173 0.115 
0.4 0.72 0.81 -12124 0.65 346 (0.0000) 0.957 502 (0.0000) 0.260 0.148 
0.5 0.70 0.78 -12756 0.99 ll53 (0.0000) 0.942 546 (0.0000) 0.327 0.219 
1.0 0.59 0.58 -15663 2.95 26441 (0.0000) 0.864 458 (0.0000) 0.270 0.657 
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TABLEVI.3 
OLS Estimation with Transformed Dependent Variables 
Method OLS with Fixed Effects 
Dependent Variable AFFSALE Log(AFFSALE) (AFFSALE)O.i (AFFSALE)O.l 
GDPSUM 7.87 (7.98) 0.0005 (11.48) 0.0001 (14.13) 0.0005 (14.91) 
PGDPSH 101869 (9.75) 5.03 (7.75) 1.33 (11.33) 7.02 (14.14) 
PGDPSH2 -72807 (-8.87) -3.26 (-6.86) -0.91 (-10.94) -4.94 (-14.31) 
HGDPSH*HCOMPsKL -2298 (-2.85) -0.06 (-1.23) -0.02 (-2.1 0) -0.12 (-2.48) 
HSKLRATIO 20754 (2.16) 1.95 (2.07) 0.48 (2.70) 2.37 (3.16) 
PGERD*HGDPSH 9152 (5.66) 0.75 (5.25) 0.18 (7.38) 0.88 (8.89) 
HTRADEC 432 (2.32) 0.05 (2.91) om (3.44) 0.04 (3.67) 
PTRADEC -1684 (-5.90) . ~O.ll (-3.26) -1.2E-0.5 (-3.18) -0.12 (-5.48) 
SIMILAR 5226 (3.51) .0.42 (4.83) 0.10 (6.29) 0.49 (6.99) 
DISTANCE -6.14 (-4.94) -0.0007 (-11.55) -0.0001 (-14.48) -0.0006 (-15.39) 
DISTANCE2 0.00037 (3.02) 6.7E-08 (8.10) I.3E-08 (9.82) 5.3E-08 (10.37) 
C 222012 (3.59) 15.89 (1.99) 4.29 (3.14) 16.40 (3.15) 
# observations 1654 1654 1654 1654 
R;aw 0.576 0.31 0.84 0.80 
Skewness 2.955 -0.51 0.01 0.25 
Kurtosis 21.67 6.34 4.61 3.79 
Jarque-Bera 26441 (0.0000) 845 (0.0000) 179 (0.0000) 61 (0.0000) 
White 458 (0.0000) 415 (0.0000) 336 (0.0000) 271 (0.0000) 
Notes: 1. The first letters, P and H in the regressors denote parent, and host countries, respectively. All variable 
definitions are presented on Table VI.la. 2. All models are estimated using White heteroscedasticity consistent 
standard errors and covariances. The figures reported in parenthesis are t-statistics. R2 raw is computed on the original 
scale. The figures reported in parenthesis for JB and White statistics are the probability values that the JB and White 
statistics exceed the observed value under the null.-a small value leads to the rejection of null hypothesis of normal 
distribution or homoscedasticity. 3. Fixed effect specifications include home and host country dummies. 
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Figure VI.6 Dependent variable versus OLS fitted values: The graphs show the scatter plots oftransfonned 
dependent variables on fitted values where (a) A=O, (b) 0.1, (c) 0.2, (d) 0.3, respectively. Transfonnations ranging 
between 09..:sG.2 have resulted in approximately linear models, and hence linear regression estimati~n techniques are 
now appropriate to use for these particular transfonnations. 
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Figure VI. 7. Standardized residuals versus OLS fitted values: Comparing these figures to Figure V1.2, it is 
possible to observe that the transformations, 0:9..~0.2, have achieved a constant mean around zero, but have failed to 
achieve a constant standard deviation. (a) ,(b) For the logarithmic transformation and 1..=0.1, the standardized residuals 
are scattered around mean zero, with increasing variation for lower fitted values. c) For 1..=0.2, the standardized 
residuals have an approximate mean of zero, although some outliers affect this tendency for low and high fitted 
values. The tendency of heteroscedasticity is less obvious. d) For 1..=0.3, the residuals do not have a constant mean. 
The model is not sustained by the data. 
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b. Dealing with heteroscedasticity and non-normality 
Although approximate linearity has been attained via response transformations, the 
problems of significant heteroscedasticity and non-normality persist. Since an appropriate 
model for linear estimations is attained, weighted least squares (WLS) methodlO can be 
used to reduce or eliminate unequal variances of the error terms. 
Ifwe have the following simple linear model (5) 
(5) 
and it is known that 
(6) 
then we can divide through by Wj and use OLS on the transformed model!! 
(7) 
where 
(8) 
Of course, in practice Wj (weights) will be unknown, but we can get some idea of its form 
by running various auxiliary regressions!2. The squared residuals, e2j, are an estimator of 
cr\ and the absolute residuallejl is an estimator of the standard deviation crj. Therefore, it 
10 Infonnation of WLS estimation may be found in most econometrics textbooks, such as Kutner et al. 
(2004), Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998). 
11 It is important to note that ifthere is an intercept in the original equation, there will not be one in the transformed 
equation: Y / W is regressed on 1/ W and X / W alone, and the estimate of the slope coefficient on the regressor 
l/w is the estimate of the intercept. 
12 Additional information regarding the modelling of (J or ~ could be found in Carroll and Ruppert (\988) 
and Davidian and Carroll (1987). 
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is possIble to estimate the variance function describing the relation of cr2i (cri) to relevant 
predictor variables by first fitting the regression model using unweighted least squares 
and then regressing the squared residuals (absolute residuals) against the appropriate 
predictor variables. One possibility is to regress squared residuals against all possible 
(non-redundant) cross products of regressors (Le. as in White test). Regressions using the 
absolute residuals in the second stage are called Glejser tests, and it is advisable to use 
this approach especially if there are outliers in the data, because regressing absolute 
residuals is less affected by outliers then regressing squared residuals. After the variance 
function or the standard deviation is estimated, the fitted values from this function are 
used to obtain the estimated weights. 
Another simple commonly used model is a power of the mean model in which cri is 
modelled as (9), where cr is the constant of proportionality. 
(9) 
With this model the cri (and hence cr?) are thought to vary as the mean varies. If we take 
the logarithm of each side, we then have a simple linear regression model. Specifically, 
we obtain (10). 
log( (J";) = log( (J") + 0 log(,uy;) (10) 
Hence after substituting appropriate estimators for cri and Jli, which would be obtained 
from the OLS fit using Y as the dependent variable, the weights would be obtained from 
the predicted values from the logarithmic model. Log(lei/) can be regarded as a substitute 
for IOg(cri), and Vi as a substitute for Jli. Thus by regressing 10g(leil) against 10g(Vi) it is 
possible to see if a strong relationship is indicated. The predicted values for cri would then 
be used as weights. Whichever approach is used in estimating the variance, it is likely 
that iteratively reweighted least squares (IRLS) will be necessary. Often one or two more 
iterations are sufficient to stabilize the estimated regression coefficients. 
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Table VI.4 reports the performance measures of the transformed dependent variable when 
the model is estimated with weighted least squares technique. The normality and 
homoscedasticity measures reported are based on weighted residuals. All three methods 
for obtaining weights mentioned above are used to estimate the weights to remove 
heteroscedasticity in each transformation. For most of the estimated weights, one or two 
iterations have been sufficient for estimated regression coefficients to converge. Only the 
non-transformed (/",=1) model required four iterations to converge while using the Glejser 
adjustment method. All heteroscedasticity adjusted WLS models resulted in better 
normality and homoscedasticity statistics. Glejser method (using lel to estimate weights) 
provided the best results in all transformations in particular outperformed all other 
methods, and removed heteroscedasticity in all cases. Especially for the logarithmic case 
the White statistic provides a very strong support against the existence of any 
heteroscedasticity. 
Weighted residuals reported in Table VI.4 show less non-normality tendencies compared 
to their non-weighted versions. Although the Jarque-Bera statistic still rejects the 
existence of normal distribution in all cases at 5% significance level, and the correlation 
measures of normality are still lower than preferred, there is improvement in the 
symmetry of the residuals. Response transformations of /...=0.1 and 0.2, in particular tend 
to have a symmetric residual distribution for the weighted models. This indicates that 
most of the non-normality comes from high kurtosis, and possibly from outliers (or from 
long tails). Despite the improvements in all cases, we should note that the transformations 
ofA2:0.3 still show significant non-normality even after the removal ofheteroscedasticity. 
The improvements achieved could be observed by comparing the graphs in Figure VI.8 
with the previous ones. If the model is correct, then in a plot of residuals versus fitted 
values (or predictors or a combination of predictors) the residual mean function and the 
residual variance functions should be approximately constant. All standardized residual 
plots in Figure VI.8 seem to be a random scatter of points around mean zero, indicating 
an appropriate mean function and removal of heteroscedasticity. However, the models 
still seem to suffer from some outlier values. The effects of these outlier values could be 
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observed better from the normal probability plots. The standardized residuals of the 
logarithmic model (Figure V.8a) deviate from expected normal values especially for 
larger absolute values. The other two transformations seem to be approximately normally 
distributed both having only three significantly large outHers. The outHers are not the 
same and do not seem to be as a result an apparent error such as typing. 
Table VI.4 also reports the goodness of fit measures at the original scale. Hence, first the 
fitted values are computed using the weighted estimates of coefficients (as mentioned by 
Willett and Singer (1988)), and then these fitted values are transformed back to their 
original scales. Removing heteroscedasticity has improved the fitness of models for 1.=0 
and 0.1 considerably, while the goodness of fit has remained approximately the same for 
1.=0.2. Nevertheless, the goodness of fit at the original scale worsened with the WLS 
estimation for transformations where ~0.3. 
To sum up, the WLS estimation method has been successful to remove the problem of 
heteroscedasticity, and hence outperformed the OLS estimation method. Weighted least 
squares estimation on the transformed variable, AFFSALEo.1, provides the best fit and the 
residuals meet all standard assumptions. The logarithmic transformation also provides a 
good fit, and strongly rejects the existence of any heteroscedasticity. However, the 
residuals do not seem to be normally distributed. Since the data set is large, the effects of 
outHers should not effect the estimations significantly. Therefore, if the outliers are not 
influential as a result of the large data set the logarithmic transformation may be 
preferred. The reason for this preference is that the logarithmic transformation provides 
ease of coefficient interpretation. Next section checks whether the estimation results 
could be improved further upon by deleting outHers. 
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TABLEVI.4 
Weighted Least Squares 
Goodness of Fit Measures for Normality Measures for Homoscedasticity 
A R2 r2 " Y,Yraw skewness JB r e,en White fHl rlU 
0 non-weighted 0031 0.71 -0.51 845 (0.0000) 0.945 415 (0.0000) -0.349 -00308 
r 0.89 0.89 -0.23 77 (0.0000) 0.966 157 (0.0000) -0.100 -0.140 
Irl 0.83 0.87 -0039 64 (0.0000) 0.970 29 (0.9999) -0.020 -0.060 
loglrl 0.87 0.87 -0.50 244 (0.0000) 0.959 285 (0.0000) -0.028 -0.015 
0.1 non-weighted 0.84 0.83 0.01 179 (0.0000) 0.960 336 (0.0000) -0.235 -0.194 
r 0.85 0.85 -0.16 137 (0.0000) 0.961 71 (0.2501) 0.000 -0.004 
Irl 0.88 0.88 0.05 16 (0.0003) 0.973 63 (0.4902) -0.037 -0.077 
loglrl 0.88 0.88 -0.16 34 (0.0000) 0.969 269 (0.0000) 0.006 -0.016 
0.2 non-weighted 0.80 0.85 0.25 61 (0.0000) 0.970 271 (0.0000) -0.021 -0.014 
r 0.81 0.84 0.00 399 (0.0000) 0.958 116 (0.0000) -0.009 -0.001 
Irl 0.81 0.84 0.05 47 (0.0000) 0.971 68 (0.3268) -0.029 -0.005 
loglrl 0.81 0.86 0.17 26 (0.0000) 0.972 264 (0.0000) -0.057 0.004 
003 non-weighted 0.76 0.84 0040 92 (0.0000) 0.968 372 (0.0000) 0.173 0.115 
Irl 0.68 0.80 0.25 87 (0.0000) 0.968 45 (0.9655) -0.030 0.004 
1.0 non-weighted 0.59 0.58 2.95 26441 (0.0000) 0.864 458 (0.0000) 0.270 0.657 
Irl -0.05 0.12 0.75 2062 (0.0000) 0.914 53 (0.8328) 0.077 0.220 
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Figure V.S. *Standardized residuals versus WLS fitted values: In all graphs standardized residuals 
are randomly scattered around mean zero. 
**Normal probability plot of standardized residuals: (a) The residuals are not normally distributed. 
(b), (c) The residuals are approximately normally distributed except some outliers. 
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c. Iteratively Re-weighted Robust Least Squares Regression 
In the graphical representations above it has been demonstrated that outlying values 
effect the distribution of residuals. Ordinary Least Squares COLS) method is susceptible 
to existence of outliers, resulting sometimes in a seriously distorted fitted model for the 
remaining cases. The outliers in the transformed models above are not as a result of a 
clear error (such as typing etc.), therefore a robust regression procedure in order to 
dampen the influence of outlying cases will be utilized in an effort to provide a better fit 
to the majority of cases. Iteratively re-weighted least squares (IRLS) used in the previous 
section may also be used to provide robust regressions. Instead of using weights based on 
the error variances, IRLS robust regression uses weights based on how far outlying a case 
is, as measured by the residual for that case. Outlying cases that have large residuals are 
given smaller weights, and the weights are revised at each iteration, until the estimation 
process stabilizes. The stabilization point can be decided by observing whether the 
weights change relatively little, whether the estimated regression coefficients change very 
little, or whether the fitted values change relatively little. 
Table VI.S reports the performance measures for WLS estimations where the largest 
residuals after the removal of heteroscedasticity are given zero weights. This means these 
values will not be used in the estimation of parameters. For the models (b) and (c), 
removal of only three observations each have been adequate to achieve approximately 
nonnally distributed residuals. Moreover, the White homoscedasticity measures have also 
improved in both cases, rejecting the existence of heteroscedasticity stronger. For the 
logarithmic case I % of the observations (17 observations) are weighted at zero for the 
estimations. As a result, the model also shows a much clearer tendency of normality with 
improved symmetry (Figure VI.9). 
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TABLE VI. 5 
Iteratively Re-Weighted Least Squares 
Goodness of Fit Measures for Normality Measures for Homoscedasticity 
A. weights R2 2 • r Y,Yraw skewness JB r e,en White rH! rID 
0 Irl 0.83 0.87 -0.39 64 (0.0000) 0.970 29 (0.9999) -0.020 -0.060 
Outlier adj. 0.83 0.87 -0.20 12 (0.0025) 0.979 45 (0.9677) -0.06 -0.07 
0.1 Irl 0.88 0.88 0.05 16 (0.0003) 0.973 63 (0.4902) -0.037 -0.077 
Outlier adj. 0.88 0.88 -0.05 3 (0.2267) 0.980 55 (0.7813) -0.061 -0.073 
0.2 Irl 0.81 0.84 0.05 47 (0.0000) 0.971 68 (0.3268) -0.029 -0.005 
Outlier adj. 0.80 0.84 0.03 8 (0.0164) 0.981 47 (0.9369) -0.032 0.014 
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Figure VI.9. (a) 17 outlier values (1 % oftotal data set) 
are given zero weights for estimations. The residuals are 
now approximately nonnally distributed. (b), (c) 3 
outlier values are given zero weight in each case. The 
residuals are approximately normally distributed. 
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6. Results 
The WLS and IRLS robust regression estimation results are presented on Table VI.6 and 
Table VI.7, respectively. The coefficient estimates are very close in both estimations, 
since as a result of the large data set employed the effects of outHers have not been large 
enough to change the estimates significantly. 
The results of the model are encouraging. All the coefficients of the model have the 
expected signs and are significant. Thus, the propositions of the previous chapter are 
supported with empirical evidence. The model supports the importance of market-related 
factors for MNF production, since all three variables (GDPSUM, PGDPSH, PGDPSH2) 
are statistically significant. The GDPSUM variable captures the market size effect for 
both host country (target market for horizontal MNFs) and parent country (target market 
for vertical MNFs). The PGDPSH and PGDPSIi variables, on the other hand, reveal that 
MNFs tend to originate from higher income countries, and prefer to locate in countries 
with incomes not very different to that of the parent country. In addition to these 
variables, a positively signed host country trade cost variable and a negatively signed 
distance variable captures the market-seeking motives of horizontally integrated MNFs. 
The results also provides support on the importance of cost-related factors for MNFs. 
Cheap labour (i.e. comparative disadvantage of host country in skilled-labour) is an 
important determinant of location choice as long as the country also provides a good 
market potential. Availability of skilled-labour in the host country is another concern for 
location decisions. These two findings also explain why countries with cheap labour but 
not sufficient skilled-labour or a large market potential do not attract significant amounts 
of FDI. In addition, in the technologically intensive sectors, agglomeration tendencies of 
firms tend to make that country more attractive to potential new investors. 
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TABLEVI.6 
WLS Estimation with Transformed Dependent Variables 
Method 
Dependent Variable 
GDPSUM 
PGDPSH 
PGDPSH2 
HGDPSH*HCOMPsKL 
HSKLRATIO 
PGERD*HGDPSH 
HTRADEC 
PTRADEC 
SIMILAR 
DISTANCE 
DISTANCE2 
C 
# observations 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Jarque-Bera 
White 
WLS with Fixed Effects 
Log(AFFSALE) (AFFSALE)O.1 
0.0004 (14.16) 0.0001 (16.79) 
3.0(7.65) 1.07 (11.59) 
-2.52 (-8.61) -0.82 (-12.71) 
-0.23 (-5.13) -0.04 (-5.33) 
5.95 (9.36) 1.14 (7.63) 
0.73 (8.54) 0.15 (8.59) 
0.06 (4.13) om (5.63) 
-0.16 (-6.28) -0.02 (-5.51) 
0.55 (13.08) 0.14 (11.43) 
-0.0003 (-13.49) -0.0001 (-17.28) 
3.07E-08 (7.52) 8.7E-09 (10.05) 
20.9 (3.23) 3.51 (2.97) 
1654 1654 
0.83 0.88 
-0.39 0.05 
3.54 3.47 
64 (0.0000) 16 (0.0003) 
29 (0.9999) 63 (0.4902) 
(AFFSALEti 
0.0005 (17.97) 
5.89 (14.08) 
-4.52 (-14.98) 
-0.21 (-7.60) 
4.29 (5.87) 
0.68 (8.39) 
0.06 (5.97) 
-0.09 (-4.94) 
0.61 (10.45) 
-0.0006 (-19.18) 
4.9E-08 (12.46) 
6.95 (1.50) 
1654 
0.81 
0.05 
3.81 
47 (0.0000) 
68 (0.3268) 
Notes: 1. The first letters, P and H in the regressors denote parent, and host countries, respectively. All variable 
definitions are presented on Table VI.la. 2. All models are estimated using White heteroscedasticity consistent 
standard errors and covariances. The figures reported in parenthesis are t-statistics. R2 raw is computed on the original 
scale. The residual statistics are based on the weighted residuals. The figures reported in parenthesis for JB and White 
statistics are the probability values that the JB and White statistics exceed the observed value under the nul I.-a small 
value leads to the rejection of null hypothesis ofnonnal distribution or homoscedasticity. 3. Fixed effect specifications 
include home and host country dummies. 4. In each estimation, the weights are obtained by using Glejser method (i.e. 
regressing the absolute residuals against all possible (non-redundant) cross products of regressors (i.e. as in White test). 
Maximum two iterations have been required to remove heteroscedasticity. 
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Method 
Dependent Variable 
GDPSUM 
PGDPSH 
PGDPSH2 
HGDPSH*HCOMPsKL 
HSKLRATIO 
PGERD*HGDPSH 
HTRADEC 
PTRADEC 
SIMILAR 
DISTANCE 
DISTANCE2 
C 
# observations 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Jarque-Bera 
White 
TABLEVI.7 
IRLS Robust Regression Estimation 
Robust Regression with Fixed Effects 
Log(AFFSALE) 
0.0004 (18.03) 
3.16 (8.47) 
-2.56 (-9.37) 
-0.22 (-5.12) 
5.29 (9.32) 
0.78 (9.61) 
0.05 (3.85) 
-0.17 (-7.30) 
0.50 (12.52) 
-0.0003 (-15.10) 
3.26E-08 (8.36) 
24.86 (4.20) 
1654 
0.83 
-0.20 
2.89 
12 (0.0025) 
45 (0.9677) 
(AFFSALEt·t 
0.0001 (18.44) 
1.10 (12.20) 
-0.81 (-12.68) 
-0.04 (-5.31) 
1.07 (7.78) 
0.16 (9.28) 
0.01 (5.44) 
-0.02 (-5.80) 
0.13 (11.44) 
-0.0001 (-17.72) 
8.8E-09 (10.34) 
3.53 (3.15) 
1654 
0.88 
-0.05 
2.83 
3 (0.2267) 
55 (0.7813) 
(AFFSALE)O.l 
0.0005 (18.99) 
6.09 (15.74) 
-4.55 (-15.23) 
-0.20 (-7.51) 
3.79 (6.25) 
0.72 (9.25) 
0.05 (5.79) 
-0.09 (-5.23) 
0.59 (10.50) 
-0.0006 (-19.53) 
5.0E-08 (12.81) 
7.36 (1.70) 
1654 
0.81 
0.03 
2.66 
8 (0.0164) 
47 (0.9369) 
Notes: 1. The first letters, P and H in the regressors denote parent, and host countries, respectively. All variable 
definitions are presented on Table VI.1a 2. All models are estimated using White heteroscedasticity consistent 
standard errors and covariances. The figures reported in parenthesis are t-statistics. R2raw is computed on the original 
scale. The residual statistics are based on the weighted residuals. The figures reported in parenthesis for JB and White 
statistics are the probability values that the JB and White statistics exceed the obserVed value under the null.-a small 
value leads to the rejection of null hypothesis of normal distribution or homoscedasticity. 3. Fixed effect specifications 
inchide home and host country dummies. 4. For 1..=0, seventeen (1% of total data set) outlier observations are given 
zero weights for estimations. For 1..=0.1 and 0.2, three outlier observations are given zero weight in each case. 
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7. Conclusions 
In this chapter a new empirical model based on theoretical analysis is specified to capture 
the effects of scale economies and agglomeration tendencies, in addition to the effects of 
relative endowments and trade costs. The specification required a response variable 
transformation in order to become compatible with the assumptions of linear estimation 
methods. Application of the Box-Cox transformations resulted in successfullinearization 
of the model, however, failed to eliminate the problems of non-constant variance and 
non-normality of residuals. Hence, despite the transformation, the model failed to meet 
the standard regression assumptions indicating a need for the weighted least squares 
(WLS) estimation technique in order to obtain the efficient estimates. The WLS 
estimation of the model, using the weights obtained from Glejser variance estimation 
method, removed the heteroscedasticity problem. As a result, the WLS estimation 
outperformed the OLS estimation, and the Glejser method outperformed the other 
methods of variance estimation to obtain weights in this model. 
Weighted least squares estimation on the transformed variables 10g(AFFSALE) and 
AFFSALE°.l, provide good fits and the model residuals meet all standard assumptions. 
As the transformations are very close to each other, using the logarithmic transformation 
will be more beneficial for ease of coefficient interpretations. Moreover, logarithmic 
transformation is a more common transformation, and hence there will be more potential 
for future model comparisons. On the overall, the estimation results indicate the market 
potential of the home and host countries, availability of cheap factors of production and 
skilled labour in the host country encourage multinational investment. Similarities 
between countries in their income levels, tastes and cultures are also important factors. In 
addition, in the technologically intensive sectors, agglomeration tendencies of firms tend 
to make that country more attractive to potential new investors. The results are in line 
with the propositions suggested. 
There is further need in the literature for studies combining theoretical analysis with 
empirical estimation. As more detailed data becomes available to researchers which 
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enables distinguishing the activities of vertically and horizontally integrated MNFs, better 
specifications can be obtained. There is also scope for further sector-based empirical 
analysis to identify different motivations on the location decisions of multinational firms. 
An alternative methodology to estimate a multinational production model to the one 
employed in this chapter may be employing a two-stage estimation technique. In the 
current model, the transformed response variable models have caused loss of data on the 
reported zero values. Therefore, a two-stage estimation may be beneficial, where in the 
first stage multinationals make the decision of whether to invest or not to invest, then at 
the second stage decide on the level of production. 
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VII. THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ON THE 
AFFILIATE PRODUCTION IN EUROPE 
1. Introduction 
Although many CGE models have attempted to explain the potential effects of regional 
integration on multinational investment, there is stilI a lack of a specific theory on the 
subject. The crucial issue is whether trade and FDI are substitutes or complements. If 
trade and FDI are substitutes, then the removal of trade barriers will entail that markets 
will be increasingly served by exports rather than overseas production. On the other hand, 
if trade and FDI are complementary, then trade liberalisation will stimulate FDI flows. 
The relation between trade and affiliate production is linked to the type of active 
multinational firms in equilibrium, that whether MNFs operating in a country or sector 
have vertically or horizontally integrated production structures. In other words, MNFs 
with market or efficiency seeking motives may give different responses to policy 
changes. Since vertically and horizontally integrated production motives prevail in 
different conditions, countries and sectors with different characteristics should also 
respond integration policies in a different manner. 
In recent years there has been an increase in interest on the effects of European economic 
integration on foreign direct investment flows. The regional integration policies applied 
in Europe are more comprehensive than applied among various other countries, as they 
go beyond removal of trade and investment barriers and aim to harmonize monetary and 
fiscal regimes as well. The gradual changes which took place in Europe from the 
formation of a Common Market to the adoption of a Single Currency create a suitable 
background to analyse the effects of various stages of regional integration on 
multinational investment. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the determinants of 
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location decisions of MNFs in Europe with special emphasis on the impact of the 
formation of the European Union (EU). The analysis will involve three components of 
integration: Membership to EU, the Single Market Programme (SMP) and Currency 
Union. The first question to be answered is whether MNFs find different characteristics 
attractive in central and peripheral countries, and whether the integration process had an 
impact on this perception. The second question is whether multinational firms become 
more sensitive to factor-based differences between member states as a result of regional 
economic integration, and less sensitive to changes in market conditions in the host 
country. The third question of interest is whether there are any sectoral differences in the 
investment patterns of multinational firms and whether the integration process had 
different effects on each sector. For these analyses the affiliate production model 
specified in the previous chapter will be expanded to include various integration 
variables. 
The plan of this chapter is as follows: Section 2 summarizes the theoretical expectations 
on the potential consequences of economic integration regarding foreign direct 
investment and affiliate production. In addition to this detailed information on the data 
sets and variables used for estimations are provided. Section 3 discusses the full sample 
and split sample estimation results for the aggregate manufacturing sector. Section 4 
presents the findings for the sectoral determinants of US affiliate production in Europe. 
2. Model Specification and Data 
a. Theoretical Insights 
Theoretical studies have yielded ambiguous results for the potential consequences of 
economic integration on foreign direct investment patterns. The problem is that the 
outcome may vary depending on both the character of existing foreign direct investment 
and the characteristics of countries. Whether the production structure of multinational 
firms is horizontal or vertical, and in a related manner whether it is import-substituting or 
export-oriented makes a difference. Integration policies between developed countries 
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(North-North integration) may differ from the characteristics of integration between 
developing countries (South-South integration) or agreements taking place between 
countries with differing levels of development (North-South integration). The effects of 
these policies depend on how competitive and complementary the economies are. The 
patterns of trade and investment before the regional integration are also important 
determinants of how much adjustment is necessary after the agreement. Moreover, some 
dynamic long-term effects may also be present. A detailed survey on the subject of 
regional integration and FDI could be found in Blomstrom and Kokko (1997), and 
Dunning (1997). 
It is reasonable to expect that regional integration will have different impacts on investors 
from the participating economies and outside investors. The first hypothesis suggested by 
the trade and FDI literature is that the Internal Market Programme will have a positive 
effect on intra-EC trade, and an ambiguous effect on intra-EC FDI. Depending on the 
form and height of existing non-tariff barriers, it is likely to have ambiguous effect on 
extra-EC trade, but a positive effect on extra-EC FDI and intra-EC trade by foreign 
affiliates of non-EC MNFs (Dunning, 1997). As a result of the elimination of the tariff 
jumping motive, the intra-regional FDI is expected to decrease and be substituted by 
trade. However, if regional integration results in trade creation, it is likely that changes in 
regional production will be required which would motivate a shifting of investment from 
one participating country to another to reap the benefits of regional comparative 
advantages. Hence the reduction of trade barriers could stimulate FDI flows by enabling 
MNFs to operate more efficiently across international borders by utilising a vertical 
organisation structure. Production in different activities would become more concentrated 
in those regions where each activity is performed more efficiently. Hence, rather than the 
total amount of FDI activity in the region, the allocation of activity among countries 
within the region may be influenced for intra-regional FDI. On the other hand, for inter-
regional flows there are three major reasons to expect increases in FDI activity. The first 
is the tariff jumping effect. The inflows ofFDI from outsiders into the region could go up 
if the average level of protection against non-regional countries increases as a result of 
regional integration. Integrated countries may prefer to promote regionally produced 
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goods. The second is the internalisation effect, which indicates that the integrated 
common market may be large enough to bear the fixed costs for the establishment of new 
foreign affiliate. The third reason is competition. The outsider firms may lose their export 
markets as a result of the regional integration since regional trade is free from tariffs. This 
might stimulate them to start producing within the integrated area. In addition to these, 
horizontally organised multinational affiliates producing in several countries may 
rearrange their network of affiliates, so whole region could be supplied from a smaller 
number of affiliates located in member countries with most favourable economic 
conditions. 
Regional integration agreements may also liberalize capital flows by directly or indirectly 
reducing or eliminating restrictions on inward direct investment such as by the 
elimination of trade related investment measures (e.g. requirements for foreign affiliates 
to satisfy specific export targets) or by strong investor property rights which reduce the 
risk of direct or indirect expropriation. A significant effect of regional integration 
agreements is the long term credibility they bring to participating countries. The 
agreements may create a more predictable policy environment for foreign investors who 
might otherwise fear that purely national reform efforts are temporary and that various 
kinds of restrictions may be reintroduced. These effects are likely to be most important 
for North-South agreements, where the south partners may benefit both from a credible 
policy environment and access to the markets of the northern partner countries, and 
South-South agreements where increased credibility benefits both (Blomstrom and 
Kokko (1997). In addition to these there may be some dynamic effects that influence the 
levels of FDI inflows through increased economic growth and efficiency over the 
medium or long term. Increased FDI flows into a region are also important forces behind 
the competitive pressure that is expected to encourage local producers to adopt efficient 
production strategies and methods. It is also likely that FDI will stimulate technology 
transfers and diffusion both directly and through technology spillovers to local firms. 
These dynamic benefits might increase the attractiveness of the integrated areas as a 
location for both national and foreign investors. On the other hand, one must also 
consider that if integration influences the regional industry's average size, R&D intensity, 
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marketing investments etc, there may also be dynamic effects that stimulate outflows of 
FDI from the integrating region. In the current theoretical and empirical literature there is 
no consensus regarding the size and significance of these dynamic effects. 
Economic integration is expected to lead to a more concentrated geographical distribution 
of economic activity in the EC in technology-intensive sectors in which plant level 
economies of scale relative to transport costs are important, but a less concentrated 
pattern where products are more dependent on classical resource endowments (Le. 
unskilled labour) for their competitiveness (Dunning, 1997). Countries characterized by 
relatively unprotected and efficient domestic markets prior to regional integration are 
likely to enjoy more foreign and domestic investment, since they are not likely to host 
import substituting foreign investment that might be withdrawn as a result of regional 
integration. Sectors characterised by high initial levels of trade protection combined with 
relatively weak locational advantages may suffer decreases in investments both by 
foreign and domestic firms. The more investing companies perceive the market as 
integrated, the individual country markets will be treated as being unimportant, leading to 
sectoral specialization in production across countries. 
b. Model specification 
Chapter 6 has provided an empirical specification parallel to the findings of 
computational general equilibrium simulations. In this chapter this specification is 
expanded by the inclusion of various variables to capture different aspects of integration. 
Different than most regional integration agreements, the European integration is not only 
concerned with the elimination of trade barriers, but also aims to harmonize the monetary 
and fiscal regimes of member countries. Therefore, the effect of EU membership is 
divided into three categories. The first is the common market effect which covers the 
reduction or elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers. As a result of the common 
market, multinationals are faced by a larger market potential as well as a choice of 
countries to invest according to production efficiencies of countries without the loss of 
the potential market. The second category is the monetary union effect which investigates 
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the impact of harmonised monetary policies between member countries. The third is the 
impact of reduced long-term riskiness brought by membership in the EU. This 
membership provides increased credibility to the member country due to a long term 
commitment to macroeconomic stability and European economic integration. 
The following models are specified to estimate the determinants of multinational 
production (1-3). The first model is the same specification used in the previous chapter. 
The second model analyses the outcome of a membership to EU, while the third model 
partitions the EU membership effects into common market (SMP), harmonised monetary 
policies and long-term macroeconomic stability and commitment to integration. Hence, 
the third model could be treated as the general model, and the first two as the restricted 
versions ofthe general specification. 
AFFSALE = 130 + f31TOTINCOME + f32PINCOMESH + f33PINCOMESH2 
+ 134 (HINCOMESH * HCOMPsKL )+f3sHSKLRATIO (1) 
+ 13" (PSCALE x HINCOMESH) + f37HTRADEC + f3sPTRADEC +& 
AFFSALE = model.l + f39(EU) +& (2) 
AFFSALE = mod el.1 + f39EU + f3\OSMP + f3IlMU + & (3) 
c. Variables and Data 
In order to test the effects of integration on multinational production in Europe, a subset 
of the data used in the previous chapter has been utilised. The data set includes all 
European countries as host economies, rather than only EU countries, to allow for 
different levels of integration within the data set. The data is organized as a panel, where 
each country pair represents a cross section. The main advantage of using a panel data set 
is the ability to control for individual heterogeneity. Time series and cross section studies 
not controlling for this heterogeneity run the risk of obtaining biased results. Panel data 
allows for an increased number of data points and hence additional degrees of freedom. 
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As a result panel data may reduce the gap between the information requirements of a 
model and the information provided by the data. A large number of data points also 
reduces the collinearity among explanatory variables and hence improve the efficiency of 
econometric estimates. Incorporating information relating to both cross section and time 
series variables can also substantially reduce the problems that arise when there is an 
omitted variables problem. The effects that are not detectable in pure cross section or 
time series models become more identifiable. Additionally, biases resulting from 
aggregation over cross sections or time series are eliminated (Greene, 2003; Baltagi, 
2001). 
The dependent variable is the affiliate sales (or production depending on data availability) 
in European host countries by all investing parent (home) countries. The affiliate sales (or 
production) data covers the period 1985-1998, with 1028 (prior to estimations) 
observations1• The data is composed of 25 hosr European countries, and around 35 
parene countries, providing over 200 cross section country pairs. The data has an 
unbalanced and non-contiguous nature due to missing observations in reports and lack of 
data reporting for some countries and time periods. The time span for cross sections 
ranges between 1-14 observations. The average time span is approximately 4.5 years per 
country pair. Furthermore, the number of observations is biased for the second half of 
data, the period 1985-1991 including 189 observations and the period 1992-1998 
including 839 observations. 
The main exogenous variables used to proxy market size, the similarity between country 
sizes, comparative advantages of countries, the level of skilled labour and agglomeration 
are the same as in the previous chapter. The effects of EU integration are analysed in two 
levels. At the first level a binary variable HEU is added in order to capture all the impact 
1 More infonnation on the data set is provided in the previous chapter. In this chapter only positive levels of 
affiliate sales are taken into account since a log-linear specification is used following the results of last 
chapter. 
2 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia Denmark, Greece, Finland, France Gennany, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovak Rep, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, UK, Ukraine. 
3 All European host countries and Argentine, Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Singapore, the USA. 
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of European Union membership. This variable takes the value of one when the host 
county is a member of European Union, and zero otherwise4• In the second level of 
analyses a binary variable to represent the Single market programme (HSMP) is 
introduced in order to distinguish the customs union effect (reduction or elimination in 
tariff and non-tariff barriers). This variable takes the value of one when the host country 
is a member of the Single Market Programmes. A positive coefficient for this variable 
represents the importance given to reaching a larger market by multinational firms. In 
other terms, this variable represents the joint EU market potential. As a result of the 
inclusion of HSMP variable, HEU dummy only captures the reduced riskiness through a 
long term commitment to macroeconomic stability and integration. In addition to these, 
an exchange rate volatility measure (EXCV) is included in order to investigate the 
potential effects of harmonized monetary policies between countries. This variable 
captures the potential effects of currency union for EU member host-home country pairs, 
and the effects of exchange risk on the location decisions of MNFs originating from non-
EU countries. Although the time span of the data set does not cover the period of the 
introduction of the single currency, it is still possible to investigate the potential effects of 
a monetary union through this exchange rate volatility measure. EXCV is calculated as 
the five year moving standard deviation of the annual percentage change of the bilateral 
exchange rate between the home and host countries. An increase in EXCV may lead risk 
adverse firms to reduce their FDI with the expectations of macroeconomic instability. 
Independent of this factor, foreign direct investment may be reduced with exchange rate 
volatility, if an affiliate imports inputs or exports output. On the other hand, it may 
encourage the source country to replace exports to the partner country by local 
production to avoid exchange uncertainty (higher transaction costs). The variable may 
also capture similarity between countries as currency unions are more integrated than 
countries with their own currencies. 
4 The binary variable HEU has an entry of '1' for the following counties: For 1985-1999: Belgium, 
Germany, France, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, UK, Greece. For 1986-1999 Spain 
and Portugal. For 1995-1999 Austria, Finland and Sweden. 
5 The Single European Act was signed in 1986, setting out a timetable for completing the single market by 
1993. However, this series takes 1989 and onwards as a period of single market, since 95% of legislation 
was completed at the end of 1988. Hence the binary variable HSMP has an entry of '1' for the following 
counties: For 1989-1999: Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, 
UK, Greece, Spain and Portugal. For 1994-1999: Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. 
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Variable 
AFFSALE 
GDPSUM 
PGDPSH 
PGDPSH2 
HGDPSH 
HSKLRATIO 
PSKLRATIO 
HCOMPSKL 
HTRADEC 
PTRADEC 
. SIMILAR 
DISTANCE 
DlSTANCE2 
HSMP 
HEU 
EXCV 
INTRA-SECTOR 
TABLE VII.la 
Description of Variables and Expected Signs 
Description of Variable 
Real volume of production (or sales) by affiliates of parent country-j in host country-i. All 
turnover and production data are in million USD converted from local currency by using 
average exchange rates and deflated by the US wholesale price index. 
Sum of home and host country real GDP data measured in bill. of 1995 constant USD. 
Share of parent country real GDP in total real GDP of parent and host countries. 
This variable aims to capture dissimilarities in sizes of home and host countries. 
Share of host country GDP, calculated as host country real GDP divided by the sum of home 
and host country real GDP levels. 
The ratio of skilled labour in host country divided by the total labour force of that country. The 
variable aims to capture skilled labour availability in host country. 
The ratio of skilled labour in parent country divided by the total labour force of that country. 
The variable aims to capture technology intensity of parent country affiliates. 
The comparative advantage index of the host country is constructed as the ratio of skilled labour 
to unskilled labour ratio of the host country divided by the equivalent ratio for parent country. 
Hence, a higher HCOMPSKL ratio indicates a higher comparative advantage in skilled labour 
for the host country. 
Host country trade cost constructed as one minus the share of foreign trade in GDP. The 
assumption used is that the more open a country is the lower the trade costs will be. 
Parent country trade cost, constructed as above. 
A dummy variable included to capture the effects of similarities such as language, culture and 
tastes, takes the value one if the country pairs share a border or if they have the same official 
language. 
The distance between the capital cities of home and host country pairs (as crow flies). 
Dissimilarities between two countries increase parallel to distance. 
Squared DISTANCE variable. Proxies transport (shipment) costs between countries. 
This variable takes the value of one when the host country is a member of the Single Market 
Programme. A positive coefficient for this variable represents the importance given by MNFs to 
market potential (all countries within customs union). 
This variable takes the value of one when the host country is a member of European Union. If 
used jointly with HSMP variable, HEU captures the reduced riskiness through a long term 
commitment to macroeconomic stability and integration. 
Exchange rate volatility variable is calculated as the five year moving standard deviation of the 
annual percentage change of the bilateral exchange rate between the home and host countries. 
The share of total manufacturing (or the sub-sector) of host country in total European 
production. A higher share indicates the presence of stronger supply linkages. 
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Expected sign 
Dependent 
variable 
(+) 
(+) 
(-) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(-) 
(+) 
(-) 
(+) 
(-) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+, - ) 
(+) 
3. Testing the Impact of Integration on Aggregate Manufacturing Affiliate 
Production in Europe 
This section will provide the estimation results on the aggregate manufacturing 
production data set. The models are estimated using panel data estimation techniques, for 
which further information could be found in various text books such as Greene (2003), 
Petersen (2004), Baltagi (2001), Wooldridge (2002) and Hsiao (1986, 2003). After a brief 
summary of the main features of these estimation techniques to clarify the reason of 
model choice, the estimation results for full and split sample results are provided. 
a. Fixed versus Random Effects Specification 
A panel data regression differs from a regular time series or cross section regression in 
that it has a double subscript on its variables representing the cross section and time. The 
basic regression model takes the form (1), 
(1) 
where Yit denotes the dependent variable for individual-i in period t. There are two 
different types of independent variables, those that for an individual may vary over time, 
and those that are time constant. The former are collected in the vector Xib and the latter 
in Zi, There are K regressors in Xit, not including a constant term. The heterogeneity, or 
individual effect is Z;a, where Zi contains a constant term and a set of individual or 
group specific variables which may be observed or unobserved. 
If Zi is observed for all individuals, then ordinary least squares provides consistent and 
efficient estimates of the slope vector f3. This specification is called the total equation, 
and the least squares estimator of this specification is referred to as the total estimator or 
the pooled or ordinary least squares estimator. It ignores the grouped nature of the data 
with repeated observations on each individual. It corresponds to what would be specified 
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and estimated with cross sectional data analysis except that each individual may 
contribute with more than one observation. 
If Zj includes unobservable variables which are correlated with Xib then the least squares 
estimator of f3 is biased and inconsistent as a result of omitted variable problem. 
Therefore, unobserved variables need to be taken into account as is in within fixed effects 
equation 2 below, where at is a group specific constant term. Since this equation can be 
estimated with the least squares estimator it is referred to as the within, fixed effects or 
sometimes the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator6• In order to avoid the· 
dummy variable trap, or perfect multicollinearity, the restriction given in (3) needs to be 
imposed. 
N 
"a -0 L.J 1-
(2) 
(3) 
If the number of cross sections is large, instead of including a large number of dummies 
(n-I), LSDV parameters can be obtained by estimating a transformed version of this 
model. Since averaging equation 2 over time gives equation 4 and averaging across all 
observations gives equation 5, below, the OLS estimation of deviations from group 
means (6) will provide the correct parameJer estimates7• 
Y-· =1I+X:p+a.+e. I. r I. I I. 
P. = P + X.'.f3 + 8.. 
(Yi/ - y;)=(Xi/-X;.)'p+(ci/-e;,) 
6 The model can be expanded to include fixed time effects as below: 
Yt, =Jl+~,f3+CX; +r, +8;, where r, are time effects. 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
7 After obtaining estimates of f3 from regression 6, the estimates for p can be recovered from equation 
(5) and the estimates of a; from equation (4): jJ. = f. - /iX .. , al = r:. - jJ. - fixt. 
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The joint significance of the group effects could be tested by performing an F-test. The 
major advantage of the fixed effects procedure is that one can control for all unmeasured 
variables and get consistent estimates of f3 for variables that vary over time. The danger 
of omitted-variable bias is reduced. The main drawback of this procedure is that only the 
effects of variables Xjt that vary over time can be estimated. This is a major problem 
because in most applications the time constant variables are very important. In addition to 
this a large number of degrees of freedom are used up in estimating the effects of the 
individual-specific dummy variables. 
Another specification which takes into account the grouped nature of the data is the 
random effects equation (7), where Uj is an individual specific error term and is assumed 
to be independent of the observed variables Xjt and of6/1' 
(7) 
The main drawback of random-effects procedure is that one must assume that the 
unobserved time-constant variables captured by Uj are independent of the observable 
variables. This is a strong assumption and its violation leads to inconsistent estimates 
of f3. Its main advantage, on the other hand, is that one can estimate the effects of both 
time-constant and time-varying variables, and it uses information on all individuals and 
all variables on each individual, even those that are constant over time. 
As a first step of the feasible generalised least squares estimation, the estimates of the 
variance components need to be obtained8• By using these estimates an estimator for the 
8 Eviews provides three quadratic unbiased estimators from choices of Swampy-Arora, Wallace-Hussain 
and Wansbeek-Kapteyn. Briefly, the three QUE methods use the expected values from quadratic forms in 
one or more sets of first-stage estimated residuals to compute moment estimates of the component 
variances . The methods differ only in the specifications estimated in evaluating the residuals, and the 
resulting forms of the moment equations and estimators. The Swamy-Arora estimator of the component 
variances, cited most often in textbooks, uses residuals from the within (fixed effect) and between (means) 
regressions. In contrast, the Wansbeek and Kapteyn estimator uses only residuals from the fixed effect 
(within) estimator, while the WaIlace-Hussain estimator uses only OLS residuals. In general, the three 
should provide similar answers, especially in large samples. 
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composite residual covariance (L) is formed, and these are used in a weighted least 
squares procedure to form the feasible GLS estimates. The transformation of yi for GLS 
is given in (8)9. The same transformation is applied on Xi. 
a 
h 0=1- e 
,were ~ 2 2 
a e + Tau 
(8) 
Y,r - ey, 
If 0 equals one (0"& =0 or T ~ (0), then the fixed effect and random effects models 
would be indistinguishable. On the other hand if 0 equals zero, then generalised least 
squares is identical to ordinary least squares. 
Although the random effects estimator uses data more effectively than fixed effects 
estimator, it relies on the assumption that the unmeasured time-constant variables 
captured by Ui are independent of the observable (measured) time varying (Xit) or time 
constant (Zit) regressors. If this assumption is not true, then GLS estimators of slope 
coefficients become biased and inconsistent. Baltagi (2001) provides various asymptotic 
equivalent forms of Hausman specification test which is suitable for testing this 
assumption. 
b. Results of Regression Analysis: Full sample results 
The estimation results for model 1 (i.e. restricted model without integration effects) are 
provided in Table VII. 1 10. Pooled regression model (column 2) gives correctly signed, 
9 For unbalanced panel data group specific 0 i should be used: 0/ = 1- eT & ~eT; +7;0"; 
10 Table VII.1 reports robust coefficient covariances estimated using a cross section SUR panel corrected 
standard errors (PC SE) methodology, which is robust to cross equation (contemporaneous) correlation, as 
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significant coefficients for all variables, but the model shows signs of significant 
misspecification in terms of a very low Durbin-Watson statistic indicating first order 
serial correlation, and a significant White statistic confirming the existence of 
heteroscedastic variance structure. Both problems could be a result of omitted variables 
from the regression. 
Since pooled regression do not take the grouped nature of the data, a random effects 
model is estimated by generalised least squares (GLS) to make use of this additional 
information. Additionally, some time-constant variables such as distance and similarity 
dummy used in the previous chapter are included in the regression. As explained in 
section (3.a), random effects estimation method assumes individual effects to be 
independent of all other observed variables used in the regression and if this assumption 
does not hold the results are not reliable. The statistical software package used for the 
estimations in this chapter, Eviews 5.0, does not have a built in feature to calculate the 
Hausman misspecification statistic. In order to calculate an asymptotic equivalent of this 
statistic a variable addition test is performed on an artificial regression where the GLS 
residuals are regressed on X and X ,where X is a matrix of deviations from means and 
X is a matrix of regressors averaged over time. Hausman's test statistic can be obtained 
from this artificial regression by a Wald coefficient test on all additional variables. The 
test rejects the null hypothesis of random effects model being the appropriate choice of 
model at all levels of significance. The estimated values of error components also support 
this result, since nearly all of the variation (93%) in the disturbance term is explained by 
variation within the groups with only a small remainder explained by variation across 
groups. In addition to these, the model also shows signs of serial correlation with a low 
Durbin-Watson statistic. 
weIJ as different error variances in each cross section. The methodology (PCSE) is a variant of White 
robust covariances, in which residuals are replaced by moment estimators for the unconditional variances. 
Heteoscedasticity across time would probably be not relevant in this case, since the time series includes a 
relatively small number of observations.) 
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TABLE VII.lb 
Fixed versus Random Effects 
Dependent Variable LOG (AFFSALE) : 1985-1998 
Method Pooled effect Random effect Fixed effect 
GDPSUM 0.0006 (19.7)** 0.0007 (15.8)** 0.0005 (7.2)** 
PGDPSH 10.44 (8.8)** 9.85 (5.8)** 21.66 (3.6)** 
PGDPSH2 
-7.06(-8.5)** -7.04 (-4.6)** -17.87 (-3.0)** 
HCOMPsKL 
-0.8 (-3.7)** -0.41 (-1.2) -1.38 (-204)** 
HSKLRATIO 6.25 (5.2)** 2.94 (2.2)** 6043 (3.3)** 
PSKLRA TIO*HGDPSH 12.18 (4.9)** 10.57 (4.5)** 6.18 (2.2)** 
HTRADEC 
-0.02 (-0.6) 0.05 (2.5)** 0.05 (104) 
PTRADEC 0.06 (4.5)** -0.006 (-0.3) -0.005 (-0.2) 
SIMILAR 0.55 (1.9)* 
DISTANCE 
-0.0005 (-3.3)" 
DISTANCE2 3.24E-08 (2.0)** 
C 
-7.35 (-0.9) -7.88 (-1.5) -10.88 (-1.1) 
# observations 1006 1005 1006 
# cross sections 238 238 238 
F-statistic (cross section) 39(0.0000) 
F-statistic (time effect) 0.53 (0.9999) 
Wald stat (Hausman) 24.58 (0.0062) 
JP 0.4757 0.9583 0.9601 
Durbin Watson 0.17 1.38 1.93 
White 117 (0.0000) 29 (0.114) 261 (0.3764) 
Notes: 1. AFFSALE is the volume of real turnover in a host country. The first letters, P and H in the regressors denote 
parent, and host countries, respectively. All variable definitions are presented in Table VILLa. 2. All models are 
estimated using White cross section panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) and covariance (degrees of freedom 
corrected). The figures reported in parenthesis are t-statistics. (**) represent 5% significance level and (*) represent 
10% significance level. The figures reported in parentheses for Wald, F and White statistics are the probability values 
that the statistics exceed the observed value under the null-a small value leads to the rejection of null hypothesis. 
3. Fixed effect specifications include home and host country pairs. 
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Finally, the model is estimated by a fixed effects specification (column 3)11. All variables 
have correct signs and except trade cost variables they are significant at 5% significance 
level12• Moreover, the model shows no signs of serial correlation with a DW statistic 
close to 2 (DW=1.93) and the White test rejects the existence of any significant 
heteroscedasticity. Individual effects are also found to be jointly significant, while the 
joint significance of time effects is strongly rejected. The insignificance of time effects 
may be explained by a low time span and a large number of cross sections. In addition to 
this, the use of share variables may have an offsetting effect on the effects oftime. 
Table VII.2 reports the full sample estimation results of the models with integration 
variables. As expected EU membership of the host country provides a positive effect in 
total on the production and sales activities of multinational firms (column 2). The levels 
of other coefficients in the model do not seem to be affected by the inclusion of this 
dummy variable. The model does not show any significant serial correlation or 
heteroscedasticity. Trade cost variables are not included in this specification since 
integration variables also capture the same information (when included trade cost 
variables were insignificant). The next model in column 3 (Table VII.2) investigates the 
partitioned effects of integration through a single market effect (HSMP) and a monetary 
union or harmonised monetary policy effect (EXCV). When these variables are included 
the EU membership variable (HEU) only captures the long-term stability of host country 
and hence lower risks involved. The estimation results demonstrate that countries benefit 
from being in a regional common market agreement which eliminates (or lowers) trade 
11 The fixed country effects include home and host country pairs rather than separate home and host 
country dummies as used in Chapter 6. Therefore, for instance, UK affiliate turnover in Germany is treated 
as a separate country fixed effect to that ofUK affiliate turnover in France. In the previous chapter (Chapter 
6) they would be captured by PUK (parent UK) dummy together. Hence, the number of cross sections used 
in estimations of this chapter is higher than those of in Chapter 6. 
12 The model is estimated using HGDPSH*HCOMPSKL and only HCOMPSKL. The use of HCOMPSKL 
alone provided a slightly better fit due to higher similarity between the relative endowments of country 
pairs compared to the country pairs of Chapter 6. 
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Dependent Variable 
Method 
GDPSUM 
PGDPSH 
PGDPSH2 
HCOMPSKL 
HSKLRATIO 
PSKLRA TIO*HGDPSH 
HEU 
HSMP 
EXCV 
C 
# observations 
# cross sections 
JP 
Durbin Watson 
White 
TABLEVII.2 
Full Sample Regression Results 
LOG (AFFSALE) : 1985-1998 
Least Squares Dummy Variable Estimation (Fixed Effects) 
0.0005 (7.2)" 
21.06 (3.5)** 
-16.41 (-2.9)** 
-1.43 (-2.7)** 
6.58 (3.6)** 
5.99 (2.1)** 
-0.97 (-0.5) 
1009 
241 
0.9473 
1.93 
262 (0.3141) 
0.0005 (7.8)** 
20.15 (3.4)** 
-15.89 (-2.9)** 
-U5 (-2.0)** 
4.97 (2.8)** 
7.15 (2.6)** 
0.35 (4.8)** 
-0.88 (-0.5) 
1009 
241 
0.9482 
1.95 
269 (0.2338) 
0.0004 (8.2)** 
32.56 (3.4)** 
-25.22 (-3.8)** 
-0.29 (-0.6) 
2.08 (1.3) 
6.49 (2.8)** 
0.22 (2.4)** 
0.22 (2.9)** 
-0.18 (-5.6)** 
-3.47 (-1.1) 
997 
240 
0.9523 
2.07 
247 (0.6117) 
Notes: 1. AFFSALE is the volume ofreat turnover in a host country. The first letters, P and H in the regressors denote 
parent, and host countries, respectively. All variable definitions are presented in TableVII.la. 2. All models are 
estimated using White cross section panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) and covariance (degrees of freedom 
corrected). The figures reported in parenthesis are t-statistics. (**) represent 5% significance level and (*) represent 
10% significance level. The figures reported in parentheses for F and White statistics are the probability values that the 
statistics exceed the observed value under the null-a small value leads to the rejection of null hypothesis. 3. Fixed 
effect specifications include home and host country pairs. 
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costs. A larger market potential (i.e. common market) seems to be an important decision 
factor for multinationals. The HEU variable still captures some significant positive 
effects, indicating countries, on the overall, benefit from the long-term commitment to 
macroeconomic stability, development and regional integration. 
Although in the literature there is no consensus on the potential effects of exchange rate 
volatility (here used as a proxy for potential effects of exchange rate risk in general, and 
the effects of harmonised monetary policy and Currency Union between EU home-host 
country pairs), in this specification, higher exchange rate volatility has a significant 
negative impact on multinational production. This finding may be as a result of exchange 
volatility being associated with expectations of macroeconomic instability in the host 
country or an indication of dissimilarity between countries. Another possibility which 
may reduce investment by multinationals at higher exchange rate volatility may be their 
reliance on imported inputs from home country or exports of final product to home 
country. After the inclusion of integration variables, home and host country market sizes 
(GDPSUM, PGDPSHARE), similarity between countries (PGDPSHARE2) and 
agglomeration of production continue to be significant factors on the location decisions 
of multinationals. Relative endowments, on the other hand, although correctly signed do 
not seem to have a major importance. The multinational firms investing in Europe seem 
to be influenced from market-seeking motives rather than efficiency-seeking motives. 
Yet, the MNFs originating from countries with high economies of scale, also choose 
locating in close proximity to other competitors and suppliers to benefit from strong 
supply linkages, innovatory capabilities, a good infrastructure and/or a pool of skilled 
labour. 
c. Results of Split Sample Regression Analysis: Central versus Peripheral 
In order to examine whether multinationals find different characteristics attractive in 
central and peripheral countries the data set is divided into two groups of countries as 
central countries (Le. Belgo-Lux Economic Region, the Netherlands, Germany, the UK, 
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TABLE VII.3 
Central versus Peripheral European Countries 
Dependent Variable LOG (AFFSALE) 
Method Least Squares Dummy Variable Estimation (Fixed Effects) 
Sample Central (1985-98) Peripheral (1985-98) Central (1990-98) Peripheral (1990-98) 
GDPSUM 0.0002 (2.0) ** 0.0005 (8.4) ** 0.0003 (2.4) ** 0.0005 (6.5) ** 
PGDPSH 36.57 (2.8) ** 17.55 (0.97) 43.46 (3.3) ** 18.42 (1.0) 
PGDPSH2 -21.50 (-1.8) * -18.55 (-1.4) -35.46 (-3.3) ** -20.31 (-1.6) * 
HCOMPsKL -0.45 (-0.8) -0.33 (-0.5) 0.33 (0.5) -0.04 (-0.05) 
HSKLRATIO 2.32 (0.58) 2.51 (1.3) -2.44 (-0.5) 2.59 (1.0) 
PSKLRA TlO*HGDPSH 5.05 (1.2) -3.11 (-0.4) 8.58 (1.3) -11.60 (-1.3) 
HEU 0.02 (0.1) 0.51 (4.8) ** 0.07 (0.4) 0.45 (4.1) ** 
HSMP 0.50 (2.9) ** -0.03 (-0.3) 0.35 (2.2) ** 0.11 (0.9) 
EXCV -0.17 (-2.9) ** -0.14 (-1.5) -0.23 (-1.3) -0.98 (-3.6)** 
C -3.88 (-1.3) 3.11 (0.5) -3.25 (-0.9) 
# observations 502 495 457 464 
# cross sections 122 118 122 118 
R2 0.9619 0.9313 0.9672 .,0.9329 
Durbin Watson 1.82 2.29 2.00 2.34 
Notes: 1. AFFSALE is the volume of real turnover in a host country. The first letters, P and H in the regressors denote 
parent, and host countries, respectively. All variable definitions are presented in Table VILl.a 2. All models are 
estimated using White cross section panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) and covariance (degrees of freedom corrected). 
The figures reported in parenthesis are t-statistics. (**) represent 5% significance level and (*) represent 10% significance 
level. 3. Fixed effect specifications include home and host country pairs. 
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France and Italy) and peripheral countries (Le. Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Greece 
and other European countries). 
Estimations for both country groups provide the same signs for size and relative 
endowment coefficients (Table VII.3). Total market size seems to be the most important 
determinant for both country groups indicating the similarity in the investment tendencies 
of multinationals. In addition to total market size (GDPSUM), relative size of parent 
country (PGDPSHARE) , and size similarity (PGDPSHARE2) are also statistically 
significant factors for multinationals investing in central European countries. This means 
a large parent and a similarly sized host country are important determinants for FDI 
activity. For peripheral countries, on the other hand, similarity with the parent country 
and higher levels of skilled are not statistically significant at 5%. An interesting result is 
that for central European countries the effect of integration is completely captured by the 
single market effect (HSMP), and the coefficient is also much larger than the whole 
sample one. As a result of having an already large host market and less distance to other 
. large markets (other central European countries), central countries reap the benefits of 
common market in terms of foreign investment. The coefficient of the same variable is 
negative and insignificant at 5% level for peripheral countries. On the other hand, 
membership to EU provides a positive effect on multinational activity for peripheral 
countries. Peripheral countries seem to benefit from a commitment to political and 
macroeconomic stability and integration with other ED countries. For central countries, 
on the contrary, membership to ED has also positive but a statistically insignificant 
effect. The reason for this could be their already existing dependability on commitment to 
stability and economic development given their past performance. Hence, membership to 
EU does not seem to bring additional attraction to multinational investors through 
reduced long term risks. In fact the potential positive effects of macroeconomic and 
political stability are probably already captured by a larger host market size. In addition 
to these, exchange rate volatility has a negative sign for both country groups, but 
statistically significant only for the central European countries data set. 
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To sum up, the results indicate that the Single Market programme has only benefited 
market oriented large countries, rather than small peripheral countries. This result may be 
an indication of the fact that multinational firms do not yet see Europe as a completely 
integrated area to start seeking for efficiency gains from locational advantages. On the 
contrary, peripheral countries benefit from increased credibility through membership to 
the EU. These results support the hypothesis that integration between North-North 
countries may have different effects on inward multinational investment than North-
South integration agreements. 
Another issue to investigate is how regional integration affects different determinants of 
FDI over time. Theoretical hypothesis expect for an increase in the importance given to 
factor based differences as a result of integration. Since SMP has started in 1986 and the 
data set used does not include years before 1985, it is not possible to divide the data set 
into pre-SMP and post SMP sets. Therefore, the 1990-1998 time period is used to test if 
any changes through time have occurred on the determinants of multinational activity in 
central and peripheral countries. This period covers the time when most policy changes 
have already taken place, and locational adjustments for production may be expected. 
Nevertheless, the factors affecting multinational production are more or less the same as 
in full time span versions of central and peripheral country models, and there does not 
seem to be a shift in the importance given to factor based differences. Rather, similarity 
in country sizes seems to have gained importance for peripheral countries. This may be 
due the increased growth in the market sizes of these countries during 1990-98, which 
makes them more attractive for market oriented MNFs. 
d. Results of Split Sample Regression Analysis: EU-EU versus EU-NEU 
According to multinational production theories, integration among regions is expected to 
have different effects on the investments ofintra-EU and extra-EU multinational firms. In 
order examine the affiliate patterns of intra-EU and extra-EU based multinational 
companies, the data set is split into two. The first group involves affiliate sales of EU 
countries in other EU countries (EU-EU). The second group covers affiliate sales of non-
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TABLE VII.4 
EU versus Non-EU Multinationals in European Union 
Dependent Variable LOG (AFFSALE) 
Method Least Squares Dummy Variable Estimation (Fixed Effects) 
Sample EU-EU (1985-98) EU-NEU (1985-98) EU-EU (1990-98) EU-NEU (1990-98) 
GDPSUM 0.0009 (2.7) ** 0.0004 (5.4) ** 0.0007 (1.7) * 0.0004 (4.9) ** 
PGDPSH 4.60 (0.7) 57.27 (3.78) ** 4.78 (0.7) 58.32 (3.7) ** 
PGDPSH2 -8.52 (-1.5) -39.44 (-3.9) ** -8.58 (-1.6) * -44.14 (-4.5) ** 
HCOMPSKL -0.71 (-1.7) * 0.23 (0.3) -1.02 (-1.8) * -0.06(-0.09) 
HSKLRATIO 2.24 (0.9) -0.9 (-0.5) 4.43 (1.6) * 0.36 (0.2) 
PSKLRA TIO*HGDPSH 1.92 (0.6) 8.6 (2.7) ** -0.84 (-0.18) 6.06 (1.3) 
HSMP 0.25 (1.5) 0.35 (2.5) ** 
EXCV -0.15 (-2.3) ** -0.13 (-2.7) ** 0.93 (0.85) -0.18 (-1.0) 
C 5.7 (3.2) ** -10.48 (-2.2) ** 6.22 (2.9) ** -8.09 (-1.5) 
# observations 393 354 372 316 
# cross sections 100 85 100 84 
R2 0.9707 0.9683 0.9717 0.9707 
Durbin Watson 1.76 1.82 1.81 2.04 
Notes: 1. AFFSALE is the volume of real turnover in a host country. The first letters, P and H in the regressors denote 
parent, and host countries, respectively. All variable definitions are presented in Table VII.1.a. 2. All models are 
estimated using White cross section Panel corrected standard errors and covariance (degrees of freedom corrected). The 
figures reported in parenthesis are t-statistics. (**) represent 5% significance level and (*) represent 10% significance 
level. 3. Fixed effect specifications include home and host country pairs. 
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EU countries in EU member countries (EU-NEU). The factors affecting EU countries to 
produce in other EU countries are mainly total market considerations (GDPSUM, (+)) 
and comparative advantage in labour (HCOMPSKL, (-)). All variables have the expected 
signs (column 2). 
The NEU countries, on the other hand, prefer larger total market (GDPSUM, (+)), a large 
parent country and a similarly sized but slightly smaller host country (PGDPSHARE, (+) 
and PGDPSHARE2, (-)). MNFs originating from non-EU member countries with higher 
technology intensities also show a preference of choosing locations with strong supply 
linkages (i.e. clusters of manufacturing sector firms). To sum up, the results indicate 
significant differences in the factors determining the location decisions of MNFs 
originating from EU or non-EU member countries. While non-EU multinationals choose 
their EU investment locations mainly based on market considerations, EU multinationals 
invest in other EU multinationals not only due to market size but also due to comparative 
advantage in labour. This supports the hypothesis that within the integrated region there 
may be a reallocation of production resources reflecting more closely the patterns of 
comparative advantages. Being in the Single Market Program has a positive and 
significant effect for attracting non-EU multinational investment, and a positive, but 
insignificant, effect on EU multinationals investing in other EU countries. Exchange rate 
volatility has negative and significant effect for both EU and non-EU countries investing 
in the EU region. 
The potential effects of regional integration on different determinants of FDI over time 
are examined by performing the same tests on the samples with 1990-98 time span. For 
EU multinationals investing in other EU countries relative endowments seem to have 
become more important. The coefficient for HCOMP (comparative advantage of host 
country in skilled labour) is higher in absolute value and has a higher t-statistic. 
Moreover, the variable HSKLRATIO (abundance of host country skilled labour) is now 
significant at 10% level, and the total market effect (GDPSUAf) has a lower coefficient 
and at-statistic. Non-EU countries, on the other hand, continue to choose their locations 
mainly according to market considerations. Another interesting result is that exchange 
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rate volatility is insignificant for both country groups during 1990-98. For EU 
multinationals, this variable has even changed its sign to positive indicating that lower 
exchange rate volatility will reduce the locations attractiveness for these investors. 
Considering the fact that exchange rate volatility has dropped over time for most country 
pairs (especially for EU member pairs), very low levels of exchange rate volatility is 
expected to have an insignificant effect on attracting multinationals. The results are 
compatible with the non-monotonic results of CGE simulations that a change in trade 
costs may not have the same effect for initially high or low trade costs. The results for the 
coefficients of EXCV variable may be interpreted to draw results for the potential 
consequences of the Currency Union where all exchange rate volatility is eliminated. 
According to the results of EU-EU estimation, the formation of Currency Union may 
have a negative but an insignificantly small level of effect on the production of 
multinationals. 
4. A Sectoral Perspective on the Location Determinants of Multinational 
Production and the Effects of Regional Integration 
Most empirical studies on multinational production or investments use aggregate 
manufacturing data due to lack of detailed data at the sectoral level. However, this may 
have led to overlooking some potential differences between investment patterns of sub-
sectors of manufacturing. Each sub-sector produces at different levels of technology 
intensities, with different plant versus firm level of scale economies. The results in 
Chapter 5 illustrated that sectoral characteristics have a significant impact on the type of 
dominant firms. Higher total economies of scale support MNF activity in a sector. In 
sectors with higher plant versus firm-level scale economies and low trade costs, finding a 
cheaper production location is the main objective for the MNFs. On the other hand, 
sectors with high firm-level scale economies support horizontally integrated MNFs. 
These firms are mainly attracted by a large host market similar to home country, and 
higher transaction costs, which may be due to factors such as high shipment costs, tariffs, 
dissimilarities in tastes and culture, or exchange rate risk. Hence, multinationals may 
show different investment patterns depending on the characteristics of the sector. It is 
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important to observe the detenninants for the location decision of multinationals at the 
sectoral level to detennine policies to attract multinationals in sectors which would bring 
the most benefit in the long tenn. 
Although OEeD provides data by sector, this data set is not detailed at the host and home 
country pair level. Therefore only USA affiliate data obtained from the USA Bureau of 
Economic Analysis {BEA)I3 is used for the analyses. Statistics on U.S. multinational 
companies (MNFs) produced by the BEA provide a comprehensive and integrated data 
set for empirical analysis ofMNFs and of the effects ofMNFs on the economies of home 
and host countries. BEA produces balance of payments and direct investment position 
data as well as financial and operating data of affiliates. The balance of payments and 
direct investment position data focus solely on the value of transactions between U.S. 
parents and their foreign affiliates and the cumulative value of parents' investments in 
their affiliates. The financial and operating data, in contrast, provide a wide variety of 
indicators of the overall domestic and foreign operations of U.S. MNFs, irrespective of 
the degree of intra-MNF funding. Both types of data are collected in mandatory surveys 
conducted regularly by BEA {annual sample surveys and benchmark surveys (or 
censuses) currently conducted every 5 years). In the sample surveys, reports are not 
required for small affiliates, in order to reduce the reporting burden on the U.S. 
companies that must file. Instead, BEA estimates the data for these affiliates by 
extrapolating forward their data from the most recent benchmark survey on the basis of 
the movement of the sample data. Thus, coverage of the U.S.-MNF universe is complete 
in non-benchmark, as well as benchmark periods. 
Sales by majority-owned non-bank foreign affiliates {MOFA)14 in 22 European countries 
in selected sectors (total manufacturing and four sub-manufacturing sectors15) are used as 
13 The USA Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) is an agency ofthe Department of Commerce, and along 
with the Census Bureau and STAT-USA is a part of the Department's Economics and Statistics 
Administration. The web-link for the BEA is : www.bea.gov 
14 MOFA's are foreign affiliates in which the combined ownership of all U.S. parents exceeds 50 percent. 
15 The sub-sectors used in estimations are food and kindred products (FOOD), primary and fabricated 
metals (METAL), transportation equipment (TRANSPORT) and other manufacturing (OTHERM) sectors. 
The food sector is composed of grain mill and bakery products and beverages, the primary and fabricated 
metals sector is composed of primary metal industries, ferrous and nonferrous, the transportation 
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the dependent variables. The panel data covers the 1985-2000 period for all countries 
except Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia where only 1999-2000 data are 
reported. In addition to this other manufacturing sector only covers 1985-1998 period. 
There is also sectoral missing data due to suppressions to avoid disclosure individual 
companies' data. Despite these missing data USA affiliate sales in Europe data has a 
much longer average time span than the manufacturing data set employed in the previous 
sections of this chapter. 
Since only one parent country is involved, slight changes are applied on the choice of 
exogenous variables without loosing the theoretical background derived in the CGE 
simulations. Instead of PGDPSH and PGDPSH2, a size difference (SIZEDIFF) variable 
is used. This variable is calculated as the squared difference of the GDP shares of parent 
(USA) and host countries. A negative coefficient is expected to show the preference of 
US MNFs towards a large host country. In order to capture the motives for vertical 
multinationals, which are mostly attracted to large host countries with cheap labour, 
HGDPSH*HCOMPSKL variable is used. Since a large host market (HGDPSH) is expected 
to have a positive effect, while comparative advantage in skilled labour is expected to 
have a negative effect, the overall impact of the interactive variable is expected to be 
negative. A new variable, STMANUF (or SFOOD, SMETAL etc.), is included to capture 
the agglomeration effects of intra-sector linkages (this variable is labelled as intra-sector 
in Table VII.5). This variable is calculated as the share of total manufacturing (or the sub-
sector being estimated) of host country in total European production. A higher share 
indicates the presence of stronger supply linkages in the country for that sector. The EU 
integration variables, HSMP and HEU, are defined the same as before, separating the 
potential effects of a common market (Le. a larger market potential for the US MNFs) 
and long-term credibility benefits of EU membership on US multinational firms. The 
effect of exchange risk on MNF decisions is measured by the EXCV variable. 
equipment sector is composed of motor vehicles and equipment, the other manufacturing sector is 
composed of tobacco products, textile products, lumber, wood, furniture and fixtures, paper and allied 
products, printing and publishing, rubber products ,miscellaneous plastic products, glass products, stone, 
clay and other non-metallic mineral products, instruments and related products. 
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The preliminary least squares estimations showed signs of misspecification despite the 
inclusion of host country dummy variables. The Durbin-Watson test statistic was very 
low in all cases pointing to the existence of serious first order autocorrelation. 
Consequently, the models are re-estimated using 'Period SUR' weights16 to adjust for 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the model. For some sectors the problem of 
serial correlation continued despite weighted estimation. Therefore, lagged forms of the 
exogenous variables are also added in these models to capture the dynamic nature of the 
data causing serial correlation. Although an attempt to apply a dynamic panel estimation 
technique was made, the results were not satisfactory due to the unbalanced and non-
contagious nature of the observations and by the limited number of time observations due 
to suppressed data in most sub-sectors. Table VII.5 provides the estimation results for 
location determinants of US multinationals in Europe for selected sectors. The use of 
'Period SUR' weights and lagged exogenous variables, where required, removed the 
autocorrelation problem in all cases. 
All coefficient estimates for total manufacturing sector have the expected signs (column 
2). The US multinationals increase their activities in European countries as the total 
income of home and host countries becomes larger and size difference between the pair 
gets smaller. The results for these two coefficients support the hypothesis that market size 
is an important factor for US multinationals. Relative factor costs and skilled labour 
abundance, on the other hand, are insignificant. Many previous empirical studies have 
found evidence of US FDI being market-oriented rather than resource-seeking. These 
findings also support US MNFs being market oriented rather than resource seeking in the 
total manufacturing sector. Integration in Europe also encourages further multinational 
production through the presence of a larger market (HSMP, (+)) and commitment to 
macroeconomic stability and integration (HEU,(+)). Different to the previous results in 
this chapter, exchange rate volatility shows a significant positive effect. This may be due 
to horizontally integrated production structure of US multinationals investing in Europe. 
16 Using Period SUR weights adjusts for period heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the residuals. 
This class of covariance structures allows for arbitrary period serial correlation and period 
heteroscedasticity between residuals for a given cross section, but restricts residuals in different cross 
sections to be uncorrelated. Additionally, cross section specific effects in the model are handled through 
fixed effects method. 
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Dependent Variable 
Method 
Sector 
GDPSUM 
SIZEDIFF 
HGDPSH*HCOMPSKL 
HSKLRATIO 
INTRA-SECTOR 
INTRA-SECTOR -1 
HEU 
HSMP 
EXCV 
C 
# observations 
F-statistic (cross section) 
R2 
Durbin Watson (initial) 
Durbin Watson weighted 
White 
TABLEVIL5 
Regression Results by Sector 
TMANUF 
0.0004 (16.5)** 
-4.77 (-3.2)** 
-4.18 (-1.5) 
0.66 (1.6) 
2.33 (2.6)** 
0.22 (5.4)** 
0.29 (12.8)** 
0.02 (2.0)** 
8.95 (7.4)** 
287 
11239 (0.0000) 
0.96 
0.35 
1.90 
15 (0.3449) 
FOOD 
0.0005 (6.9)** 
-22.8 (-5.4)** 
0.82 (0.0) 
0.44 (0.2) 
-2.06 (-0.5) 
-0.001 (-0.0) 
0.47 (3.7)** 
-0.05 (-0.9) 
21.3 (5.3)** 
230 
107 (0.0000) 
0.84 
0.20 
1.84 
12 (0.5910) 
LOG (AFFSALE) 
METAL 
0.0005 (5.1)** 
-6.05 (-1.3) 
13.38 (1.8)* 
-2.78 (-1.0) 
1.92 (2.3)** 
0.14 (0.9) 
-0.18 (-1.9)* 
-0.17 (-3.1)** 
7.30 (1.9)* 
200 
112 (0.0000) 
0.90 
0.43 
2.00 
16 (0.3133) 
TRANSPORT OTHERM 
0.0002 (1.5) 0.0004 (9.4)** 
-6.32 (-1.4) -20.99 (-6.4)** 
-27.52 (-3.3)** -11.05 (-3.8)** 
1.72 (0.5) 4.04 (1.94)* 
10.12 (3.6)** -3.45 (-4.9)** 
7.54 (3.7)** -1.36 (-2.1)** 
-0.18 (-0.11) 0.Q3 (0.6) 
0.40 (4.0)** 0.13 (3.0)** 
-0.05 (-0.8) 0.005 (1.2) 
8.79 (2.0)** 19.84 (7.2)** 
136 129 
3459 (0.0000) 1129 (0.0000) 
0.79 0.90 
0.Q7 0.14 
1.90 2.02 
5.7 (0.9909) 16 (0.4442) 
Notes: 1. AFFSALE is the volume of real turnover in a host country. The first letters, P and H in the regressors denote 
parent, and host countries, respectively. All variable definitions are presented in Table VII. 1. a. 2. All models are estimated 
using Period SUR weights and White Period SUR panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) and covariance (degrees of 
freedom corrected). The figures reported in parenthesis are t-statistics. (**) represent 5% significance level and (*) represent 
10% significance level.. The figures reported in parentheses for F and White statistics are the probability values that the 
statistics exceed the observed value under the null-a value smaller than 0.05 leads to the rejection of null hypothesis. The 
rejection of null hypothesis for F test indicates the joint significance of cross sections. The rejection of null hypothesis for 
White test indicates the presence ofheteroscedasdicity. 3. Fixed effect specifications include host countries. 
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Uncertainty in exchange rates forms part of transaction cost, and US firms prefer to 
eliminate this cost by producing abroad. In addition to these, agglomeration effects from 
intra industry linkages, measured here by the share of the intra-sector in Europe, have a 
positive and a statistically significant effect, indicating that US MNFs prefer locations 
with strong supply linkages. 
Sub-sectors illustrate slight differences in the importance given to each locational 
determinant. The demand in food sector is shaped by regional factors such as tastes and 
cultures. Therefore, proximity to consumers is an important consideration for producers. 
Hence, the motives are towards a more horizontally integrated production structure for 
MNFs. The sector is also characterised by large dispersion rather than concentration. 
These characteristics are also reflected in the activities of US MNF in Europe (column 3). 
A large host market (GDPSUM, (+)) with a similar market size to the parent county 
(SIZEDIFF, (-)) is preferred, while cost factors and agglomeration benefits are not 
primary factors. Membership to the Single Market Programme also plays a vital role 
(HSMP, (+)) for MNFs in search for a larger market potential with similar characteristics. 
Metal sector, on the other hand, relies heavily on raw materials (column 4). Although the 
regression is based on two factors of production, unskilled and skilled labour, the 
agglomeration variable captures the tendency of metal sector firms locating together in 
certain locations. The exchange risk also affects the location decision of US MNFs in the 
metal sector adversely, mainly due to the costs involved in importing inputs and 
exporting output. The US MNFs in transport sector are mainly affected by cost 
considerations (column 5). These firms prefer locations with large market, cheap labour 
(HGDPSH*HCOMPSKL) and strong supply linkages (STRANSPORT and 
STRANSPORTt_I). Proximity to firms operating in the same sector is of great significance. 
This agglomeration effect is in line with the CGE results, as transportation sector is 
characterised by high technology intensity. The market target of transport sector US 
MNFs is the Single Market free trade zone (HSMP, (+)) rather than individual host 
countries or the US market. As opposed to transport sector, other manufacturing sector is 
mainly characterised by low total scale economies (column 6). For the US MNFs in this 
sector, the market potentials of parent and host countries (GDPSUM, (+), SIZEDIFF, (-)) 
221 
are important, as well as relative cost of unskilled labour in the host economy. In addition 
tolarge host market with cheap labour (HGDPSH*HCOMPSKL, (-)), the locations chosen 
are expected to have sufficient skilled labour (HSKLRATIO, (+)). The removal of trade 
barriers has made countries in the Single Market programme (HSMP, (+)) more desirable 
to US MNFs. An interesting result of the regression for other manufacturing sector is that 
the agglomeration variable has a significant negative coefficient. This result is compatible 
with the characteristics of the sector, as the sector has low technology intensity, intensive 
competition and hence is not likely to benefit from clusters. The negative coefficient of 
the agglomeration variable signifies the competition effect within the sector which leads 
to a dispersed structure. 
5. Conclusions 
This chapter provides empirical evidence on four issues. First, there is evidence that the 
country origin of parent firm has an impact on the choice of affiliate location within an 
integrated region. While non-EU originated multinationals choose their EU investment 
locations mainly based on market considerations, EU originated multinationals invest in 
other EU countries not only due to their market potential, but also due to their 
comparative advantage in labour. More importantly, as integration deepens factor cost 
differentials and abundance of host country skilled labour gains further importance, while 
host country market effect starts loosing its importance. This evidence supports the 
hypothesis that within an integrated region there may be a re-distribution of FOI 
reflecting more closely the patterns of comparative advantages. 
Second, these results support the hypothesis that integration agreements between 
developed countries may have different effects on inward multinational investment than 
those of between developed and developing countries. The European regional integration 
seems to have resulted in central countries reaping the benefits of common market policy 
in terms of foreign direct investment. On the other hand, peripheral countries seem to 
attract inward investment as a result of their commitment to political and macroeconomic 
stability and integration with other EU countries. 
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Third, exchange rate volatility has a negative and significant effect for MNFs originating 
both from EU and non-EU countries and investing in the EU region. The interesting part 
of the result is that this variable looses its significance as EU integration deepens by time. 
This finding may be interpreted as a currency union policy will have insignificant effect 
on the attractiveness of a host economy for multinational production. Hence, the benefits 
a host country may gain from a regional integration is limited to an enlarged market 
potential through common market policies and reduced long-term macroeconomic risk as 
a result of an international commitment. 
Fourth, the chapter also provides evidence on sectoral differences for the factors 
motivating multinational production. Multinational firms operating in sectors with high 
technology (or capital) intensity or in sectors which are highly dependent on specific 
natural resources tend to find locations with industrial clusters attractive. On the contrary, 
multinationals in sectors with low technology (or capital intensity) tend to show a 
dispersed structure. 
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VIn. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has sought to contribute to the development of a theoretical model which 
captures the main firm, sector and location characteristics of multinational firm activity 
that also fits well with empirical observations. For this purpose, the knowledge capital 
model (Markusen and Venables, 1995, 1996) is extended by intra and inter-industry 
supply linkages to allow multinational firms to be attracted to a country to exploit the 
agglomeration externalities created by pooling of national or other multinational firms. 
The computational general equilibrium (CGE) simulation results replicate various 
stylized characteristics of multinational production such as their compatibility with 
technology or capital intensive sectors and that that higher firm level scale economies 
tend to encourage horizontal multinational production while higher plant level scale 
economies promote vertical multinational production. Similar income and relative 
endowments yield higher total affiliate production at higher trade costs attracting 
horizontal multinational firms with tariff-jumping motives. Multinational firms prefer 
countries with higher market potential, cheap labour but with sufficient skilled-labour. In 
addition to these, affiliate production is attracted to locations where intermediate inputs 
are cheaper, as long as competition for factors of production by all sectors do not make 
the location disadvantageous. Locating close to intermediate sectors may result in 
agglomeration economies in high technology sectors at low trade costs and hence further 
attraction of firms into the country. The findings on the effects of supply linkages are 
important, since MNFs in some sectors show an increasing tendency for locating in close 
proximity to clusters of related firms. The findings are also not confined to only 
manufacturing sectors with intermediate input demand. More and more MNFs choose to 
contract their whole production systems, or headquarter activities such as call centres and 
concentrating on their core activities. Consequently, having a strong supplier network 
within the country is becoming an important factor for attracting multinationals into the 
country. 
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The propositions derived from the CGE simulations on the market size, relative factor 
costs, trade costs and agglomeration economies are tested empirically for the 
manufacturing sector using a large bilateral country data set constructed to represent a 
range of developed and developing home and host country partners. The estimation 
results indicate the market potential of the home and host countries, availability of cheap 
factors of production and skilled labour in the host country encourage multinational 
investment. Similarities between countries in their income levels, tastes and cultures are 
also important factors. Additionally, in the technologically intensive sectors, 
agglomeration tendencies of firms tend to make that country more attractive to potential 
new investors. A sector level analysis of US MNFs investing in Europe complements 
these empirical results by revealing the differences among location choices of affiliates 
from various manufacturing sub-sectors. The empirical findings are supportive of the 
propositions suggested. 
The empirical analyses are also expanded to investigate the determinants of location 
decisions of MNFs in Europe and the impact of the European integration policies on 
multinational production. The propositions obtained from the findings of CGE 
simulations are combined with three components of integration (i.e. membership to EU, 
the Single Market Programme and currency union) to test the effects of each stage of 
integration on multinational production in different country groups. There is empirical 
evidence that the country origin of parent firm has an impact on the choice of affiliate 
location within an integrated region. While non-EU originated multinationals choose 
their EU investment locations mainly based on market considerations, EU originated 
multinationals invest in other EU countries not only due to their market potential, but also 
due to their comparative advantage in labour. More importantly, as integration deepens 
factor cost differentials and abundance of host country skilled labour gains further 
importance, while host country market effect starts loosing its importance. This evidence 
supports the hypothesis that within an integrated region there may be a re-distribution of 
FDI reflecting more closely the patterns of comparative advantages. Besides, the 
European regional integration seems to have resulted in central countries reaping the 
benefits of common market policy in terms of foreign direct investment. On the other 
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hand, peripheral countries seem to attract inward investment as a result of their 
commitment to political and macroeconomic stability and integration with other EU 
countries. Empirical evidence also suggests that currency union policy will have 
insignificant effect on the attractiveness of a host economy for multinational production. 
Hence, the benefits a host country may gain from a regional integration is limited to an 
enlarged market potential through common market policies and reduced long-term 
macroeconomic risk as a result of an internationally binding commitment. 
To sum up, neither the market-related factors, nor the cost differentials alone are 
adequate to explain all multinational activity. Rather they should be taken into 
consideration jointly with various other factors to determine the overall comparative 
advantage of the host country, such as technology level in the country, agglomeration 
economies, political stability and sound macroeconomic structure, openness towards 
foreign investment, adequate skilled work force, good infrastructure, institutional 
efficiency and reliability. On the theoretical front, there is scope for extending the 
knowledge capital model to allow for other sources of agglomeration economies through 
skilled and unskilled-labour mobility between countries or technological spillovers which 
reduce the cost of subsequent innovations in a region. On the empirical front, there is 
further need in the literature for studies combining theoretical analysis with empirical 
estimation. As more detailed data becomes available to researchers which enables 
distinguishing the activities of vertically and horizontally integrated MNFs, better 
specifications can be obtained. 
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APPENDIX: GAMS Model 
The GAMS software package makes it relatively easy to transfer mathematical 
specifications of CGE models into executable computer programs. This appendix gives 
the code for the model in Chapter IV and simulations in Chapter V. After the main 
characteristics of GAMS language and software are briefly explained, the code is 
developed and explained in stages. The model consists of 50 variables, so that it can also 
be run in a student version of GAMS 1• 
1. A Brief Note on GAMS Syntax 
In GAMS terminology, the indices are called 'SETS', given (exogenous) data are called 
'PARAMETERS', decision variables are called 'VARIABLES' and constraints and the 
objective function are called 'EQUATIONS'. Every declaration of a set, parameter, 
variable or equation has a logical name followed by an optional description field. 
A variable in GAMS identifies a quantity that can be manipulated in the solution of an 
optimization problem or a system of simultaneous equations. Variable bounds are set by 
the user either explicitly or through default values associated with variable type such as 
POSITIVE VARIABLE (this means that variables listed thereafter are non-negative) or 
FREE VARIABLE (this means that variable value can range from minus to plus infinity). 
Variables have attributes that can be used in specifying a fixed value (-.fx) or lower (-.10) 
and upper bounds (-.up). Unassigned upper bounds are set at plus infinity, and non-
initiated lower bounds at minus infinity. Variable attributes also include solution (activity 
or current value) and marginal levels (-.1 and -.m, respectively) obtained after the 
execution of a solve statement. These attributes are reset to a new value when a model 
J A free student version can be dOWnloaded from the GAMS website: http://www.gams.com. The site also 
includes documentation on user guides and solver manuals. 
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containing the variable is solved. Variables may be used in direct assignments referenced 
with their suffixes. 
An equation in GAMS identifies a relationship in the model to be optimized or solved 
which is one of the constraints that must be satisfied in choosing the solution levels for 
the variables. Equations are declared the same way as sets, parameters and variables, then 
are specified using a double period ( .. ) command. The main difference between equations 
and direct assignments (with = sign) are that while equations are only executed when the 
model they belong is solved, direct assignments are executed as they appear. 
A grouping of equations that constitute a mathematical program is called a MODEL. In a 
mixed complementary problem a model identifies the equations present in the model and 
their complementary relationships with the problem variables. A number of attributes of 
models may be accessed by the user in the form of numerical values. These include 
attributes that contain information about the results of a solver performed (Le. model 
solution status, solver termination status, number of infeasibilities in the solution etc.), 
attributes that tell a solver or GAMS to use of certain features (Le. name of the solver, use 
of solver options file, using user defined internal scaling factors etc.) and attributes that 
pass information to the solver or GAMS giving various setting that are also subject to 
option statement settings (Le. iteration limit, limit on number of variables and equations 
in output, maximum time available to solve, amount of memory allocated etc.) 
A semicolon is used to tell GAMS end of a command is reached. In principle all lines 
should end with a semicolon except when you declare a list of parameters, variables or 
equations. Then this list is regarded as a single block and should end with a semicolon. 
Comment lines are either enclosed by a $ONTEXT - $ONFFTEXT command pair or 
denoted by an asterisk in the first column. 
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2. About the Model 
The codes below assign the title of the model and provide some comment lines on the 
main purpose of the model. 
$TITLE Oligopolistic CGE Model with MNCs-noindustrylinkbenchmark 
$ONTEXT 
Purpose: This model calibrates parameters of an economy with the 
following characteristics: 
- Two countries with open economies, no government, no savings and 
investment 
- Two commodities (X; l? used for consumption by households 
- Two commodities (X;Z) used as intermediate inputsfor production of X 
- One household with Cobb-Douglas utility function in each country 
- Two factors of production: skilled labor and unskilled labor 
- Skilled and unskilled labour are mobile between sectors, but immobile 
between countries and are exogenously fIXed 
- Sector Y is a perfectly competitive industry producing a homogenous 
product under CRTS using both factors of production. Sector Y incurs no 
trade costs for export sales. Price of Y is used as a numeraire. 
- Sector Z is a perfectly competitive industry producing a homogenous 
product under CRTS using only skilled labour. Sector Z incurs transport 
costs for export sales. 
- Sector X is a Cournot oligopoly producing a homogenous product 
under IRTS using bothfactors of production and intermediate 
products, X and Z Hence there are intra-industry and inter-industry 
supply linkages. Sector X has both firm level and plant level scale 
economies. Sector X incurs transport costs for export sales. 
- In sector X domestic and/or multinational firms can operate due to 
fragmentation of production stages. Domesticfirms supply theforeign 
country via exports. Horizontal multinationals make local production 
in both countries. Vertical multinationals produce in the foreign 
country, and export to the home country. 
- Technology transfer is costly. 
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(in values) 
- The cost of a second plant is small compared to the cost of 
establishing a new local firm. 
- MNCs incur some fued cost in the host country. 
Social Accounting Matrix 
-rows represent receipts, columns represent payments 
(equal income, endowment and prices between countries, only hor-MNCs exist) 
Activities Commodity m. Factor m. Fixed c. HHD 
XMII XMIJ XMJJ XMJl YI Y J ZII ZIJ VJ VI XI Xl YSI YSJ ZI V SI SJ Ll LJ FCHI FCHJ Cl CJ TOT 
XM11 
XMIJ 
XMJJ 
XMJl 
Yl 
YJ 
Zl1 
ZIJ 
VJ 
VI 
XDl 0 
XDJ 
YDl 
YDJ 
ZI 0 
V 
SI 10 
SJ 
Ll 30 
LJ 
mkl 10 
mkJ 
Cl 
CJ 
TOT 50 
o 
50 
50 
50 
50 
100 
100 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 0 
0 
0 0 
10 10 0 0 
10 10 10 0 0 
30 90 
30 30 90 
10 
10 10 
46 
50 50 50 100100 0 0 0 o 100100100100 0 0 46 
fu:ed costs of initially inactive firm types: 
XDI XDJ XVI XVJ 
SI 12 9 4 
SJ 12 4 9 
LI 2 2 
LJ 2 2 
OFFTEXT 
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12 
4 
2 
2 
154 
46 154 
46 154154 20 
50 
50 
50 
50 
100 
100 
o 
o 
o 
o 
100 100 
100100 
100 100 
100100 
o 
o 
4 46 
12 46 
2 154 
2 154 
20 
20 
200 
200 
20200200 
3. Declaration and Initialization: Benchmark equilibrium 
SAM benchmark values are initiated to calculate the parameter (exogenous) values. 
Initial values of variables are indicated with Z added to their names. 
PARAMETERS 
P SKLIZ initial price of skilled labor in i 
PSKLlZ initial price of skilled labor in j 
PLIZ initial price of lab or in i 
PUZ initial price of lab or inj 
PYZ initial price of output Y in i 
PZIZ initial price of output Z in i 
PZlZ initial price of output Z in j 
YIZ initial total quantity ofY supplied in i 
YJZ initial total quantity ofY supplied inj 
ZIIZ initial total quantity ofZ produced and supplied in i 
ZIJZ initial total quantity ofZ exported to j 
111 
111 
111 
111 
111 
ZlJZ initial total quantity ofZproduced and supplied inj 
ZlIZ initial total quantity ofZ exported to i 
CYIZ initial consumption ofY in i (in values) 
CYJZ initial consumption ofYinj 
CXlZ initial consumption of X in i 
CXJZ initial consumption ofXinj 
MIZ Household income in i 
MJZ Household income inj 
YABSIZ initial total demand (absorption)for Yin i (in values) 
YABSJZ initial total demand for Y in j 
XABSIZ initial total demand for X in i 
XABSJZ initial total demand for X in j 
ZABSIZ initial total demand for Z in i 
ZABSJZ initial total demand for Z in j 
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101 
101 
11001 
11001 
101 
101 
101 
101 
11001 
11001 
11001 
11001 
12001 
12001 
11001 
11001 
11001 
11001 
10/ 
101 
SSKLI initial supply of skilled labor in i 
SSKU initial supply of skilled labor in j 
SLI initial supply of unskilled labor in i 
SLJ initial supply of unskilled labor in j 
SKLYIZ initial SKL requirement ofY firms HQed in i 
SKLXHIIZ initial SKL req. ofh-Xfirms HQed in i obtainedfrom i 
SKLXHIJZ initial SKL req. ofh-Xfirms hq.ed in i obtainedfromj 
SKLZIIZ initial SKL req. ofZfirms HQed in i 
SKLYJZ SKL requirement ofYfirms HQed in j 
SKLXHJJZ initial SKL req. ofh-Xfirms HQed inj obtainedfromj 
SKLXHJIZ initial SKL req.ofh-Xfrims HQed inj obtainedfrom i 
SKLZJJZ initial SKL req. ofZfirms HQed inj 
initial L req. Y firms HQ in i 
initial L req. h-Xfirms HQed in i obtained in i 
LYIZ 
LXHIIZ 
LXHIJZ 
LYJZ 
LXHJJZ 
LXHJIZ 
initial L req. h-Xfirms HQed in I obtained inj 
initial L req of Y firms HQ in j 
NHIZ 
NHJZ 
initial L req. ofh-Xfirms HQed inj obtained inj 
initial L req. ofh-Xfirms HQed inj obtained in i 
initial number ofh-type firms based in i 
initial number ofh-typefirms based inj 
/46/ 
/46/ 
/154/ 
/154/ 
/10/ 
/22/ 
/14/ 
/0/ 
/10/ 
/22/ 
/14/ 
/0/ 
/90/ 
/32/ 
/32/ 
/90/ 
/32/ 
/32/ 
/2.5/ 
/2.5/ 
FSKLXDII fixed SKL req. of d-Xfirm HQed in i incurred in i /4.8/ 
FSKLXDIJ fIXed SKL req. of d-xfirm HQed in I obtained inj /0/ 
FSKLXDJJ fIXed SKL req. ofd-Xfirm HQed inj obtained inj /4.8/ 
FSKLXDJI fIXed SKL req. of d-Xfirm HQed inj obtained in I /0/ 
FSKLXHII fIXed SKL req. ofh-Xfirm HQed in I obtained in I /4.8/ 
FSKLXHIJ fIXed SKL req. ofh-Xfirm HQed in I obtained inj /1.6/ 
FSKLXHJJ fIXed SKL req. ofh-Xfirm HQed inj obtained inj /4.8/ 
FSKLXHJI fIXed SKL req. ofh-Xfirm HQed inj obtained in I /1.6/ 
FSKLXVII fixed SKL req. of v-x firm HQed in I obtained in i /3.6/ 
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FSKLXVIJ flXed SKL req.ofv-Xfirm HQed in I obtained inj /1.6/ 
FSKLXVJJ flXed SKL req. of v-x firm HQed inj obtained inj /3.6/ 
FSKLXVJI fixed SKL req. of v-x firm HQed inj obtained in I //.6/ 
G flXed unskilled labor requirement ofXfirm /0.8/ 
Ix 
tz 
unit of L req. to ship one unit of X 
unit ofL req. to ship one unit ofZ 
sigmaFX elasticity of substitution for sector X 
*parameters to be derived from initial database 
MKXHIIZ initial markup rate ofh-Xfirm HQed in i selling in i 
MKXHIJZ initial markup rate ofh-Xfirm HQed in i selling inj 
MKXHJJZ initial markup rate ofh-Xfirm HQed inj selling inj 
MKXHJIZ initial markup rate ofh-Xfirm HQed inj selling in i 
PXIZ initial price of output X in i 
P XJZ initial price of output X in j 
XHIIZ initial Q of X prod. by one h-firm based in i selling in i 
XHIJZ initial Q. of X prod. by one h-firm based in i selling in j 
XHJJZ initial Q of X prod. by one h-firm based in j selling in j 
XHJIZ initial Q. of X prod. by one h-firm based in j selling in i 
Ax scale parameter for sector X 
Ay scale parameter for sector Y 
Az scale parameter for sector Z 
betaFXS CES share parameter for sector X 
betaFXL CES share parameter for sector X 
betaFY Cobb-Douglas share parameter for sector Y 
xbsz initial units of SKL required to prod one unit of X 
xblz initial units of L required to prod one unit of X 
gammax share of X as an intermediate product in final product 
gammaz share ofZ as an intermediate product in final product 
gammava share of value added in final product 
alphaH Cobb-Douglas share parameter for HHds 
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*Computation of parameters and coefficients for calibration using SAM: 
MKXHIIZ = l/(NHIZ+NHJZ) ,. 
MKXHIJZ = l/(NHIZ+NHJZ) ,. 
MKXHJJZ = l/(NHIZ+NHJZ) ,. 
MKXHJIZ = l/(NHIZ+NHJZ) ,. 
*Marginal costs (or marginal revenues) should be equal in both sectors in general 
* equilibrium. For sector Y: PY=MC=l, so that for sector X: 
* MR =MC =1, PX(l-mk)=l) 
PXIZ = l/(J-MKXHIIZ) ,. 
PXlZ = l/(J-MKXHJJZ) ,. 
*total supply and demand of products in country i 
XHIIZ = 50/(NHIZ*PXIZ) ,. 
XHIJZ = 50/(NHIZ*PXJZ),. 
XHJJZ = 50/(NHJZ*PXJZ) ,. 
XHJIZ = 50/(NHJZ*PXIZ) .. 
*parameters of production functions: 
* Value added = A *(beta*(S**ro )+(l-beta)*(L **ro»**v/ro, where 
* v is one due to CRTS. Minimizing the standard cost function ofVA wrt a given 
* level of output gives the standard first order condition as: 
* PSIPL=(betal(l-beta)*(SIL )**ro-l. 
* I/(l-ro) equals to the elasticity of substitution (sigma) 
* Cobb-Douglas prod. func.(sector Y)has unit elasticity of substitution (ro=O) 
* Sector Z uses only S (Z=A *S) 
betaFY = SKLYIZ*PSKLI7J(SKLYIZ*PSKLIZ + LYIZ*PLIZ) 
betaFXS = (PSKLIZ*((SKLXHIIZ-12)**(J/sigmaFX)))/ 
(PSKLIZ*((SKLXHIIZ-12) **(J/sigmaFX)) 
+ PLIZ*((LXHIIZ-2)**(1/sigmaFX))) 
betaFXL =(l-betaFXS) 
ay = YI7J((SKLYIZ**betaFy)*(LYIZ**(J-betaFy))) 
ax = (40)/((betaFXS*((SKLXHIIZ-12)**((sigmaFX-l)/ 
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sigmaFX)) + (betaFXL) *((LXHIIZ-2) **((sigmaFX-1)/ 
sigmaFX))) **(sigmaFXI(sigmaFX-1))) 
xblz = (((betaFXL)**sigmaFX) * (PLIZ**(-sigmaFX)))/ 
(ax *( (betaFXS**sigmaFX) *(P SKLIZ* *(1 -sigmaFX)) + 
((betaFXL)**sigmaFX) *(PLIZ**(1-sigmaFX))) ** 
(sigmaFXI(sigmaFX-1))) 
xbsz = (betaFXS**sigmaFX * PSKLIZ**(-sigmaFX))/ 
(ax*(betaFXS**sigmaFX*PSKLIZ**(1-sigmaFX) + 
(betaFXL) **sigmaFX*PLIZ**(1-sigmaFX)) ** 
(sigmaFXI(sigmaFX-1))) 
gammax = O/(NHI*XHII) 
gammava = 1/(NHI*XHII) 
gammaz = O/(NHI*XHII) 
Az = I 
*parameters of consumer function 
alphaH = CXI'ZJMIZ 
4. Declaration of Model Variables and Equations (50 variables) 
Auxiliary variables (or intermediate variables) are used to increase the clarity of the 
model. They are defined as free variables. Since the price of sector Y equals one, this 
variable can be replaced in equation specifications by one to keep the number of variables 
to be solved at fifty. 
POSITIVE VARIABLES 
PSKLI,PSKLJ,PLI,PLJ, 
* PY (equals to 1), 
PZI,PZl,ZII,ZIJ,ZlJ,ZlI 
PXI,PXJ,XDII,XDIJ, YI, YJ, 
XHII,XHIJ,XVII,XVIJ,XDJJ,XDJI,XHJJ,XHJI,XVJJ,XVJI, 
NDI, NDI, NHI,NHJ,NVI, NVJ,MI,MJ 
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FREE VARIABLES 
MKXDII,MKXDIJ,MKXHII,MKXHIJ,MKXVII,MKXVIJ 
MKXDJJ,MKXDJI,MKXHJJ,MKXHJI,MKXVJJ,MKXVJI 
bsi, bli, bsj, blj 
EQUATIONS 
*Firms: input demands and output supply functions 
EQXBLI, EQXBSI, EQXBLJ, EQXBSJ 
EQXDII, EQXDIJ, EQXHII, EQXHIJ,EQXVII,EQXVIJ 
EQXDJJ,EQXDJI,EQXHJJ,EQXHJI, EQXVJJ, EQXVJI 
EQMKXDII, EQMKXDIJ,EQMKXHII,EQMKXHIJ, 
EQMKXVII,EQMKXVIJ,EQMKXDJJ,EQMKXDJI, 
EQMKXHJJ,EQMKXHJI, EQMKXVJJ, EQMKXVJI 
* Income balance 
EQCONEXPI, EQCONEXPJ 
EQPROFITYI, EQPROFITYJ, 
EQP ROFITZII,EQPROFITZIJ, EQPROFITZJJ,EQP ROFITZlI, 
EQFCXDI, EQFCXHI, EQFCXVI, EQFCXDJ, EQFCXHJ, EQFCXVJ 
* Market Clearing: demand=supply 
EQSKLBALI, EQLBALI, EQSKLBALJ, EQLBALJ 
* EQYBAL (to be paired with PY if it were used in variables) 
EQZBALI,EQZBALl,EQXBALI,EQXBALJ 
5. Specification of model equations (50 equations) 
Positive variables are associated with inequalities, while free variables are associated 
with equalities. The bounds on the variables determine the relationship satisfied by the 
function. If a variable is fixed in a GAMS model, the paired equation is completely 
dropped from the model. 
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EQXBLl.. 
EQXBSI.. 
EQXBU. 
EQXBSJ.. 
EQXDIl.. 
EQXDIJ.. 
EQXHIl.. 
EQXHIJ.. 
EQXVIl.. 
EQXVIJ.. 
EQXDJJ.. 
bli =E= (betaFXL**sigmaFX * PLI** 
(-sigmaFX))/(ax*(betaFXS**sigmaFX* 
PSKLI**(l-sigmaFX) + (betaFXL)**sigmaFX 
*PLI**(1-sigmaFX))**(sigmaFXI(sigmaFX-l))) .. 
bsi =E= (betaFXS**sigmaFX * PSKLI** 
(-sigmaFX))/(ax*(betaFXS**sigmaFX* 
PSKLI**(l-sigmaFX) + (betaFXL)**sigmaFX*PLI** 
(l-sigmaFX))**(sigmaFXI(sigmaFX-I))) .. 
blj =E=(betaFXL**sigmaFX * PU** 
(-sigmaFX))/(ax*(betaFXS**sigmaFX * 
PSKLJ**(I-sigmaFX) + (betaFXL)**sigmaFX 
*PU**(1-sigmaFX))**(sigmaFXI(sigmaFX-I))) .. 
bsj =E= (betaFXS**sigmaFX * PSKU** 
(-sigmaFX))/(ax*(betaFXS**sigmaFX* 
PSKLJ**(l-sigmaFX) + (betaFXL)**sigmaFX*PU** 
(J-sigmaFX))**(sigmaFXI(sigmaFX-I))) .. 
P LI*bli+ PSKLI*bsi) *gammava+ PZI*gammaz 
+ PXI*gammax=G= PXI*(I-MKXDII*gammava) 
(P LI*bli+ PSKLI*bsi) *gammava+ P LI*tx+ PZI*gammaz 
+PXI*gammax =G= PX.l*(1-MKXDIJ*gammava) .. 
(p LI*bli+ PSKLI*bsi) *gammava+PZI*gammaz 
+PXI*gammax =G= PXI*(1-MKXHII*gammava) 
(P LJ*blj+PSKLJ*bsj) *gammava+ PZl*gammaz 
+PXJ*gammax =G= PXJ*(1-MKXHIJ*gammava) 
(PLJ*blj+PSKLJ*bsj) *gammava+ P U*tx+ PZl*gammaz 
+PXJ*gammax =G= PXI*(1-MKXVII*gammava) .. 
(PLJ*blj+PSKLJ*bsj)*gammava+PZl*gammaz 
+PXJ*gammax =G= PXJ*(1-MKXVIJ*gammava) , 
(PLJ*blj+PSKLJ*bsj)*gammava+PZl*gammaz 
+PXJ*gammax =G= PXJ*(1-MKXDJJ*gammava) 
EQXDJI. (PLJ*blj+PSKLJ*bsj)*gammava+PU*tx+PZl*gammaz 
+PXJ*gammax =G= PXI*(J-MKXDJI*gammava) .. 
EQXHJJ.. (P LJ*blj+ PSKLJ*bsj) *gammava+ PZl*gammaz 
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+PXJ*gammax =G= PXJ*(J-MKXHJJ*gammava) 
EQXHJl. (PLI*bli+PSKLI*bsi)*gammava+PZI*gammaz 
+PXI*gammax =G= PXI*(1-MKXHJI*gammava) , 
EQXVJJ.. (P LI*bli+ PSKLI*bsi) *gammava+ PLI*tx+ PZI*gammaz 
+PXI*gammax =G= PXJ*(J-MKXVJJ*gammava) ; 
EQXVJ1. (PLI*bli+PSKLI*bsi)*gammava+PZI*gammaz 
+PXI*gammax =G= PXI*(1-MKXVJI*gammava) 
EQMKXDI1. MKXDII*(alphaH* MI+ PXI*gammax*((NDI*XDII 
+NHI*XHII+NHJ*XHJI+NVJ*XVJI) + (NDI*XDIJ 
+NVJ*XVJJ))) =E= PXI*XDII , 
EQMKXDIJ.. MKXDIJ*(aiphaH*MJ+PXJ*gammax*((NDJ*XDJJ 
+NHJ*XHJJ+NHI*XHIJ+NVI*XVIJ ) + (NDJ*XDJI 
+NVI*XVII))) =E= PXJ*XDIJ , 
EQMKXHI1. MKXHII*(aiphaH*MI+PXI*gammax*((NDI*XDII 
+NHI*XHII+NHJ*XHJI+NVJ*XVJI) + (NDI*XDIJ 
+NVJ*XVJJ))) =E= PXI*XHII 
EQMKXHIJ.. MKXHIJ*(aiphaH*MJ+PXJ*gammax*((NDJ*XDJJ 
+NHJ*XHJJ+NHI*XHIJ+NVI*XVIJ ) + (NDJ*XDJI 
+NVI*XVII))) =E= PXJ*XHIJ 
EQMKXVII. MKXVII*(aiphaH*MI+PXI*gammax*((NDI*XDII 
+NHI*XHII+NHJ*XHJI+NVJ*XVJI) + (NDI*XDIJ 
+NVJ*XVJJ))) =E= PXI*XVII 
EQMKXVIJ.. MKXVIJ*(aiphaH*MJ+PXJ*gammax*((NDJ*XDJJ 
+NHJ*XHJJ+NHI*XHIJ+NVI*XVIJ )+(NDJ*XDJI 
+NVI*XVII))) =E= PXJ*XVIJ 
EQMKXDJJ.. MKXDJJ*(aiphaH*MJ+ P XJ*gammax*((NDJ*XDJJ 
+NHJ*XHJJ+NHI*XHIJ+NVI*XVIJ ) + (NDJ*XDJI 
+NVI*XVII))) =E= PXJ*XDJJ 
EQMKXDJ1. MKXDJI*(aiphaH*MI+PXI*gammax*((NDI*XDII 
+NHI*XHII+NHJ*XHJI+NVJ*XVJI) + (NDI*XDIJ 
+NVJ*XVJJ))) =E= PXI*XDJI 
EQMKXHJJ.. MKXHJJ*(aiphaH*MJ+PXJ*gammax*((NDJ*XDJJ 
+NHJ*XHJJ+NHI*XHIJ+NVI*XVIJ ) + (NDJ*XDJI 
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+NVI*XVII))) =E= PXJ*XHJJ 
EQMKXHJL. MKXHJI*(alphaH*MI+PXI*gammax*((NDI*XDII 
+NHI*XHII+NHJ*XHJI+NVJ*XVJI)+ (NDI*XDIJ 
+NVJ*XVJJ))) =E= PXI*XHJI 
EQMKXVJJ.. MKXVJJ*(alphaH*MJ+PXJ*gammax*((NDJ*XDJJ 
+NHJ*XHJJ+NHI*XHIJ+NVI*XVIJ ) + (NDJ*XDJI 
+NVI*XVII))) =E= PXJ*XVJJ , 
EQMKXVJL. MKXVJI*(alphaH*MI+PXI*gammax*((NDI*XDII 
+NHI*XHII+NHJ*XHJI+NVJ*XVJI) + (NDI*XDIJ 
+NVJ*XVJJ))) =E= PXI*XVJI , 
* Income balance 
EQCONEXPL. MI =G= PLI*SLI + PSKLI*SSKLI 
EQCONEXP J.. MJ =G= PLJ*SLJ + PSKLJ*SSKLJ 
EQFCXDL. 
EQFCXHL. 
EQFCXVL. 
PLI*G + PSKLI*FSKLXDII =G= PXI*MKXDII 
*gammava*XDII + PXJ*MKXDIJ*gammava*XDIJ , 
PLI*G + PSKLI*FSKLXHII + PLJ*G + SKLJ*FSKLXHIJ 
=G= PXI*MKXHII*gammava*XHII + PXJ 
*MKXHIJ*gammava*XHIJ 
PLJ*G + PSKLJ*FSKLXVIJ + PSKLI*FSKLXVII 
=G=PXI*MKXVII*gammava*XVII + PXJ 
* MKXVIJ*gammava*XVIJ , 
EQFCXDJ.. PLJ*G + PSKLJ*FSKLXDJJ =G= PXJ*MKXDJJ 
·*gammava*XDJJ+ PXI*MKXDJI*gammava*XDJI; 
EQFCXHJ.. PLJ*G + PSKLJ*FSKLXHJJ + PLI*G +SKLI*FSKLXHJI 
EQFCXVJ.. 
=G= PXJ*MKXHJJ*gammava*XHJJ + PXI 
* MKXHJI*gammava*XHJI 
PLI*G + PSKLI*FSKLXVJI + PSKLJ*FSKLXVJJ 
=G=PXJ* MKXVJJ*gammava*XVJJ + PXI 
* MKXVJI *gammava*XVJI 
EQPROFITYL. PLI*((YIlay) *((PSKLIIP LI) **betaFY) *((1-betaFY) 
ibetaFY) * *betaFY)+PSKLI*((yIlay) *((P LIIPSKLI) 
**(1-betaFY))*(betaFYI(J-betaFY))**(1-betaFY)) 
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=G=PYZ*YI , 
EQPROF1TYJ.. PLl*((YJlay)*((PSKUIPLJ)**betaFY)*((l-betaFY) 
ibetaFy)**betaFy)+PSKU*((yJlay)*((PLlIPSKU) 
* * (l-betaFY)) *(betaFYI(l-betaFY)) **(l-betaFY)) 
=G=PYZ*YJ 
EQPROF1TZ1l. PSKL1*(llaz) *ZI1 =G= PZ1*ZII 
EQROF1TZ1J.. PSKL1*(llaz) *Z1J + PL1*tz*ZIJ =G= PZJ*ZIJ , 
EQPROF1TZJJ.. PSKLl*(llaz)*ZJJ=G= PZJ*ZJJ+PZ1*ZJ1 
EQPROF1TZll. PSKU*(llaz)*ZJ1 + PLl*tz*ZJ1=G=PZI*ZJ1 
* Market Clearing 
EQSKLBALl. SSKL1 =G= ((Y1lay)*((PLIIPSKL1)**(l-betaFY)) 
*(betaFYI(l-betaFY)) * *(l-betaFY)) + (ND1*(FSKLXDII 
+gammava*bsi*(XD11+XD1J))+NH1*(FSKLXHII 
+gammava*bsi*XH1I)+NHJ*(FSKLXHJ1+gammava 
*bsi*XHJI)+ NVI*FSKLXVII + NVJ*(FSKLXVJ1 
+gammava*bsi*(XVJ1+ XVJJ))) + ((llaz) *(Z11+ Z1J)); 
EQSKLBALJ.. SSKU =G= ((YJlay) *((PLlIPSKLJ) **(l-betaFY)) 
*(betaFYI(l-betaFY)) * *(l-betaFY)) + (NDJ*(FSKLXDJJ 
+gammava*bsj*(XDJJ+ XDJ1))+NHJ*(FSKLXHJJ 
+gammava *bsj*XHJJ) +NH1*(FSKLXH1J+gammava 
*bsj*XH1J)+ NVJ*FSKLXVJJ + NV1*(FSKLXVIJ 
+gammava*bsj*(XV1J+ XV/I))) + ((llaz) *(ZJJ+ ZJI)); 
EQLBALl. SLl =G= ((Y1lay)*((PSKL1IPLl)**betaFY)*((l-betaFY) 
IbetaFY) * *betaFY) + (ND1*(G+gammava* 
bli*(XD11+XD1J) +tx *XD1J) +NH1*(G+gammava *bli* 
XH1I)+NHJ*(G+gammava*bli*XHJI)+ NVJ 
*(G+gammava*bli*(XVJ1+XVJJ)+tx*XVJJ)+(tz*ZIJ)) ; 
EQLBALJ.. SLl =G= ((YJlay) *((PSKLlIPLJ) **betaFY) *((l-betaFY) 
IbetaFY) **betaFY) + (NDJ*(G+gammava * 
blj*(XDJJ+ XDJI) +tx *XDJI) + NHJ*(G+gammava*blj* 
XHJJ)+ NH1*(G+gammava*blj*XH1J)+NV1 
*(G+gammava*blj*(XV1J+ XVJJ)+tx*XV1I)+(tz*ZJI)) ; 
240 
6. Model 
* EQYBAL.. YI + YJ =G= ((MI*(J-alphaH))+(MJ*(1-alphaH)))IPY ; 
EQZBALI.. ZII+ZJI =G= gammaz*((NDI*XDII+NHI*XHII+NHJ 
*XHJI+NVJ*XVJI)+(NDI*XDIJ+NVJ*XVJJ)) ; 
EQZBALJ.. ZJJ+ZIJ =G= gammaz*((NDJ*XDJJ+NHJ*XHJJ+NHI 
*XHIJ+NVI*XVIJ )+(NDJ*XDJI+NVI*XVII)) ; 
EQXBALl. (NDI*XDII+NHI*XHII+NHJ*XHJI+NVJ*XVJI) 
+(NDJ*XDJI+NVI*XVII) =G= ((MI*alphaH)IPXI) 
+gammax*((NDI*XDII+NHI*XHII+NHJ*XHJI 
+NVJ*XVJI) + (NDI*XDIJ+NVJ*XVJJ)); 
EQXBALJ.. (NDJ*XDJJ+NHJ*XHJJ+NHI*XHIJ+NVI*XVIJ) 
+(NDI*XDIJ+NVJ*XVJJ) =G= ((MJ*alphaH)IPXJ) 
+gammax*((NDJ*XDJJ+NHJ*XHJJ+NHI*XHIJ 
+NVI*XVIJ )+(NDJ*XDJI+NVI*XVII)); 
* Closure o/the model 
* PY.FX = 1; (to keep the number o/variables at 50 this equation is not used.) 
Economic equilibrium problems are solved as mixed complemantarity problems. In these 
problems there are exactly as many variables as there are equations and each variable 
must be specified as being complementary with one and only one equation. The name of 
the equation is followed by a period (.) and the name of the associated complementary 
variable. 
Model linkage! EQXBLIBLI, EQXBSIBSI, EQXBLJ.BU,EQXBSJ.BSJ, 
EQXDIIXDII, EQXDIJ.XDIJ, EQXHIIXHII, EQXHIJ.XHIJ, 
EQXVI1XVII,EQXVIJ.XVIJ, EQXDJJ.XDJJ, EQXDJIXDJI, 
EQXHJJ.XHJJ, EQXHJIXHJI, EQXVJJ.XVJJ, EQXVJIXVJI, 
EQMKXDIIMKXDII, EQMKXDIJ.MKXDIJ, 
EQMKXHIlMKXHII, EQMKXHIJ.MKXHIJ, 
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* 
EQMKXVILMKXVII, EQMKXVIJ.MKXVIJ, 
EQMKXDJJ.MKXDJJ, EQMKXDJLMKXDJI, 
EQMKXHJJ.MKXHJJ, EQMKXHJLMKXHJI, 
EQMKXVJJ.MKXVJJ, EQMKXVJLMKXVJI, 
EQCONEXPLMI, EQCONEXP J.MJ, EQPROFITYLYI, 
EQPROFITYJ.YJ,EQPROFITZILZII,EQPROFITZIJ.ZIJ, 
EQP ROFl1ZJJ.ZlJ,EQP ROFl1ZJLZlI,EQFCXDLNDI, 
EQFCXHLNHI, EQFCXVLNVI, EQFCXDJ.NDJ, 
EQFCXHJ.NHJ, EQFCXVJ.NV,EQSKLBALLPSKLI, 
EQSKLBALJ.PSKLJ, EQLBALLPLI, EQLBALJ.PU, 
EQZBALLPZI,EQZBALJ.PZl,EQXBALLPXI, EQXBAU.PXJ 
EQYBAL.PY 
/; 
7. Boundaries and initial levels for endogenous variables 
Before a model is solved, it is necessary to initialize all choice variables and all relevant 
bounds. 
PSKLLLO = 0.0001; 
PSKLJ.LO = 0.0001; 
PLLLO = 0.0001; 
PLJ.LO= 0.0001; 
PXI.LO=0.0001; 
PXJ.LO=0.0001 ; 
* PZLLO = 0.0001; 
* PZJ.LO = 0.0001; 
XDILLO = 0.001; 
XDIJ.LO = 0.001; 
XHILLO = 0.001; 
XH1J.LO = 0.001; 
XVILLO = 0.001; 
XVIJ.LO = 0.001; 
XDJJ.LO = 0.001; 
XDJLLO = 0.001; 
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XHJJ.LO = 0.001; 
XHJLLO = 0.001; 
XVJJ.LO = 0.001; 
XVJI.LO = 0.001; 
bsi.lo= 0.0001; 
bli.lo = 0.0001; 
bsj.lo = 0.0001; 
b/j.lo = 0.0001; 
YI.LO = 0.0001 ; 
YJ.LO = 0.0001 ; 
ZII.LO =0.0001 ; 
ZIJ.LO =0.0001 ; 
ZJJ.LO =0.0001 ; 
ZJI.LO =0.0001 ; 
PSKLI.L = PSKLIZ; 
PSKLJ.L = PSKLJZ; 
PLI.L = PLIZ; 
PLJ.L =PUZ; 
PXI.L = PXIZ; 
PXJ.L = PXJZ; 
PZI.L = PZIZ; 
PZJ.L = PZJZ; 
YI.L = YIZ; 
YJ.L = YJZ; 
ZIIL = ZIIZ; 
ZJJ.L = ZJJZ; 
XHII.L = XHJJZ; 
XHIJ.L =XHJIZ; 
XHJJ.L = XHJJZ; 
XHJI.L = XHJIZ; 
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bILL =:: xblz ; 
bsi.L =:: xbsz ; 
blj.L =:: xblz ; 
bsj.L = xbsz ; 
MIL=MIZ; 
MJ.L =MJZ; 
NHIL =NHIZ; 
NHJ.L =:: NHJZ; 
MKXHIlL = MKXHJJZ; 
MKXHIJ.L = MKXHJIZ; 
MKXHJJ.L = MKXHJJZ; 
MKXHJIL = MKXHJIZ .. 
8. Adding options 
option mcp = path 
*This provides the name of the solver to solve the Mep model. 
linkage.iterlim = 50000 
*This option provides a new upper limit on the number of iterations. 
linkage.limrow = 0 
*This option limits the number of equations in output. 
linkage.limcol = 0 
*This option limits the number of variables in output. 
9. Solving the model to check for the replication of the benchmark case 
solve linkage using mcp; 
display 
PSKLIL,PSKL.J.L, PLIL, PLJ.L, PXI.L, PXJ.L, MIL,MJ.L, 
YIL, Y J.L,XDIlL,XDIJ.L,XHIlL, XHIJ.L,XVIIL,XVIJ.L, 
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XDJJ.L,xDJIL,XHJJ.L, XHJIL,XVJJ.L,XVJIL, NDIL,NDJ.L, 
NHIL, NHJ.L, NVIL, NVJ.L, bU.L, bsi.L, blj.L, bsj.L, MKXHIlL, 
MKXHIJ.L,MKXHJJ.L, MKXHJIL, alphaH, betaFY, betaFXS, betaFXL, 
ay, ax, az, xbsz, xblz, gammax,gammaz, gammava 
There are three control steps for writing a correct model. The first step involves the initial 
check of the model done by GAMS itself. Before the problems encountered in this step 
are resolved, GAMS will not proceed to solve the model. The second step is solving the 
model for the replication of the benchmark case. Third step is checking whether price 
homogeneity assumption is realized in the model. 
GAMS contains many aids for checking a model. During the initial check of the program 
GAMS provides various information about the program. The first is the echo print of the 
program, which provides explanations of errors detected. The second is the 'equation 
listing', which shows the variables that appear in each constraint, and what individual 
coefficients and right-hand side value evaluate after the data manipulations have been 
done. GAMS also generate a 'column listing', which sorts coefficients by column rather 
than row. It is possible to limit the output in these listings by using options commands. 
The final information generated while a model is being prepared is the 'statistics' which 
provide details on the size and non-linearity of the model and the time spent on 
generation the model. The next part of the output contains details about the solution 
process including resource usage, iteration count, number of evaluation errors (these 
errors result due to numerical problems like division by zero), the solver status (the state 
of the program such as normal completion, iteration interrupt, resource interrupt, 
evaluation error limit etc) and model status (the state of the solution such as optimal, 
locally optimal, infeasible etc.). As soon as an error is detected, processing will be 
stopped, and hence a model will be never solved after an error has been detected. The 
only remedy is to fix the error and repeat the run. 
There are three main types of errors; compilation errors, execution errors, model 
generation errors. Most of the compilation errors will be caused by simple mistakes 
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(forgetting to declare an identifier, domain errors such as putting indices in the wrong 
order, leaving out a necessary semicolon, misspelling a label etc.). The explanatory error 
message text provides help to diagnose the problem and correct it. Execution errors are 
generally caused by illegal arithmetic operations such as division by zero or taking the 
log of a negative number. The execution of a solve statement can trigger additional errors 
which report on problems encountered during transformation of the model into a format 
required by the solver. Problems are most often caused by illegal or inconsistent bounds. 
When the model is free from compilation and execution errors, the results should be 
checked that whether they replicate the benchmark values or not. This will prevent 
producing a model that does not represent the assumptions. The final consistency check is 
to test the price homogeneity of the model. For this test the price in the numeraire sector 
is fixed at two instead of one, and initial values of all prices are doubled. The model 
provided above passes the price homogeneity test, hence in equilibrium all prices are 
doubled and real variables (output etc) are unchanged. 
10. Index sets and parameters for simulations 
This section defines the index sets and parameters that will be needed to store the 
simulation results. 
$TITLE INDUSTRYLINK TABLES 
SETS 
stat statistics /modelstat, solvestat/ 
RTJ Tablel-Number offirms in sector X 
/ NDI,NDJ,NHI,NHJ,NVI,NVJ / 
RT2 Tab/e2-Total Value of Production by country 
/ PXI, PXJ, TQXI, TQXJ, AFFQXI, AFFQXJ, AFFQXHI, 
AFFQXVI,AFFQXHJ,AFFQXVJ / 
RT3 Tab/e3-Total Quantity produced by country andfirm type 
/ QDEMXI, QDEMXJ, QQXI, QQXJ, QQXAFFI, QQXAFFJ / 
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PARAMETER 
QXDII quantity produced by XDII 
QXDIJ quantity produced by XDIJ 
QXHII quantity produced by XlIII 
QXHIJ quantity produced by XlIIJ 
QXVII quantity produced by XVII 
QXVIJ quantity produced by XVIJ 
QXDJJ quantity produced by XDJJ 
QXDJI quantity produced by XDJI 
QXHJJ quantity produced by XlIJJ 
QXHJI quantity produced by XlIJI 
QXV JJ quantity produced by XVJJ 
QXVJI quantity produced by XVJI 
QDEMXI total quantity of X demanded in i 
QDEMXJ total quantity of X demanded inj 
QQXI total quantity produced in country i 
QQXJ total quantity produced in country j 
QQXAFFI total quantity produced by affiliates in country i 
QQXAFFJ total quantity produced by affiliates in country j 
TQXI total value of X produced in i 
TQXJ total value of X produced in j 
AFFQXI total value of X produced by affiliates in i 
AFFQXJ total value of X produced by affiliates in j 
AFFQXHI total value of X produced by horizontal affiliates in i 
AFFQXVI total value of X produced by vertical affiliates in i 
AFFQXlIJ total value of X produced by horizontal affiliates in j 
AFFQXV J total value of X produced by vertical affiliates in j 
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$TITLE OLIGMNINTM Filling the TABLES 
QXDII = XDILL *NDLL 
QXDIJ = XDIJ.L *NDLL 
QXHII = XHILL *NHLL 
QXHIJ = XHIJ.L *NHLL 
QXVII = XVILL *NVLL 
QXVIJ =XVIJ.L*NVLL 
QXDJJ = XDJJ.L *NDJ.L 
QXDJI = XDJLL *NDJ.L 
QXHJJ = XHJJ.L *NHJ.L 
QXHJI = XHJLL *NHJ.L 
QXVJJ = XVJJ.L *NVJ.L 
QXVJI =XVJLL*NVJ.L 
QQXI = QXDII + QXDIJ + QXHII + QXHJI + QXVJI + QXVJJ 
QQXJ = QXDJJ + QXDJI + QXHJJ + QXHIJ + QXVIJ + QXVII , 
QQXAFFI = QXHJI + QXVJI + QXVJJ , 
QQXAFFJ = QXHIJ + QXVIJ + QXVII 
QDEMXI = ((aiphaH*MLL)IPXI.L) + gammaX*QQXI 
QDEMXJ = ((alphaH*MJ.L)IPXJ.L) + gammaX*QQXJ 
TQXI = PXLL *QXDII + PXJ.L *QXDIJ + PXLL *QXHII + 
PXI.L *QXHJI + PXJ.L *QXVJJ + PXLL *QXVJI 
AFFQXI = PXI.L *QXHJI + PXJ.L *QXVJJ + PXLL *QXVJI 
AFFQXHI = PXI.L *QXHJI 
AFFQXVI = PXJ.L *QXVJJ + PXI.L *QXVJI 
TQXJ = PXJ.L *QXDJJ + PXLL *QXDJI + PXJ.L *QXHJJ + 
PXJ.L *QXHIJ + PXI.L *QXVII + PXJ.L *QXVIJ 
AFFQXJ = PXJ.L *QXHIJ + PXI.L *QXVII + PXJ.L *QXVIJ 
AFFQXHJ = PXJ.L *QXHIJ 
AFFQXVJ = PXI.L*QXVII + PXJ.L*QXVIJ 
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11. Simulations and Reporting 
For a recursive dynamic simulation one could use the LOOP statement. It will execute 
the SOLVE command for every entry in the index set. Below, the results are stored for 
each entry of simulations. The variables C.L values) keep their value from one solution to 
the next assignment. 
$ TITLE General Equilibrium Simulations 
$ONTEXT 
Purpose: no industry linkages, high trade costs (tx=O.3) 
$OFFTEXT 
$INCLUDE NOINDUSTRYLINKBENCHMRKGMS 
$INCLUDE INDUSTRYLINKTABLES.GMS 
SETS 
box loop startingfrom left-top corner 
PARAMETERS 
sumstat(box,stat) 
Table 1 (box, rt1) Number offirms in sector X 
/1*361/ 
Table2(box,rt2) Total Value of Production by country 
Table3(box,rt3) Total Quantity produced by country andfirm type 
PARAMETER sklmu(box) share of world SKL endowment in country 1 
(1,38,39,76,77,1 14,1 15,152,153,190,191,228,229,266,267,304,305,342,343) 0.95 
(2,37,40,75,78, 113, 116,151,154,189,192,227,230,265,268,303,306,341,344) 0.90 
(3,36,41,74, 79,112,117,150,155,188,193,226,231,264,269,302,307,340, 345) 0.85 
(4,35,42, 73,80,111,118,149,156,187,194,225,232,263,270,301,308,339,346) 0.80 
(5,34,43, 72,81,110,119, 148,157,186,195,224,233,262,271,300,309,338,347) 0.75 
(6,33,44,71,82,109,120,147, 158,185, 196,223,234,261,272,299,310,337,348) 0.70 
(7,32,45,70,83,108,121,146,159,184,197,222,235,260,273,298,311,336,349) 0.65 
(8,31,46,69,84,107,122,145,160,183,198,221,236,259,274,297,312,335,350) 0.60 
(9,30,47,68,85,106,123,144,161,182,199,220,237,258,275, 296,313,334,351) 0.55 
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(10,29,48,67,86,105,124,143,162,181,200,219,238,257,276, 295,314,333,352) 0.50 
(1 1,28,49,66,87,104,125,142,163,180,201,218,239,256,277,294,315,332,353) 0.45 
(12,27,50,65,88,103,126,141,164,179,202,217,240,255,278, 293,316,331,354) 0.40 
(13,26,51,64,89,102,127,140,165,178,203,216,241,254,279,292,317,330,355) 0.35 
(14,25,52,63,90,101,128,139,166,177,204,215,242,253,280, 291,318,329,356) 0.30 
(15,24,53,62,91,100,129,138,167,176,205,214,243,252,281,290,319,328,357) 0.25 
(16,23,54,61,92,99,130,137,168,175,206,213,244,251,282,289,320,327,358) 0.20 
(17,22,55,60,93,98,131,136,169,174,207,212,245,250,283, 288,321,326,359) 0.15 
(18,21,56,59,94,97,132, 135, 170,173,208,211,246,249,284,287,322,325,360) 0.10 
(19,20,57,58,95,96,133,134,171, 172,209,210,247,248,285,286,323,324,361) 0.05 
/ ; 
PARAMETER lmu(box) share o/world SKL endowment in country 1 / 
(1*19) 0.05,(20*38) 0.10,(39*57) 0.15, (58*76) 0.20, (77*95) 0.25, 
(96*114) 0.30, (115*133) 0.35,(134*152) 0.40, (153*171) 0.45,(172*190) 0.50, 
(191*209) 0.55, (210*228) 0.60, (229*247) 0.65, (248*266) 0.70, (267*285) 
0.75, (286*304) 0.80, (305*323) 0.85, (324*342) 0.90, (343*361) 0.95 
/; 
loop ((box), 
SSKLI = 92*sklmu(box) , 
SSKU = 92*(1-sklmu(box)); 
SLI = 308*lmu(box) 
SLl = 308*(I-lmu(box)) 
solve linkage using mcp ,. 
$INCLUDE INDUSTRYLINKTABLEFILL.GMS 
* * Fill tables 
sumstat(box, 'modelstat~ = linkage.modelstat ,. 
sumstat(box, 'solves tat? = linkage.solvestat ,. 
table1(box, 'NDI') = NDIL ; 
table1 (box, 'NDJ~= NDJ.L ; 
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table 1 (box, 'NH/') = NHLL ; 
table1(box, 'NHJ') = NHJ.L ; 
tablel (box, 'NVI') = NVLL ; 
table1(box,'NVJ') = NVJ.L ; 
table2(box, 'TQXI'} = TQXI , 
table2(box, 'AFFQXI'} = AFFQXI 
table2(box, 'AFFQXHI'} = AFFQXHI ; 
table2(box, 'AFFQXVI'} = AFFQXVI ; 
table2(box, 'TQXJ'} = TQXJ ; 
table2(box, 'AFFQXHJ'} = AFFQXHJ ; 
table2(box, 'AFFQXVJ'} = AFFQXVJ ; 
table2(box, 'AFFQXJ'} = AFFQXJ 
table2(box, 'PXI') = PXI.L , 
table2(box, 'PXJ') =PXJ.L 
table3(box, 'QQXI'} =QQXI 
table3(box, 'QQXJ'} =QQXJ 
table3 (box, 'QQXAFFI,) =QQXAFFI 
table3 (box, 'QQXAFFJ') =QQXAFFJ 
table3(box, 'QDEMXI'} =QDEMXI 
table3(box, 'QDEMXJ') =QDEMXJ 
, 
, 
, 
* After the model is solvedfor the counter-Jactual equilibrium and all data are 
transferred to tables, the model returns to the benchmark case before the next 
simulation. 
SSKL/= 46; 
SSKLJ= 46; 
SLI = 154; 
SU =154; 
PSKLLL = 1 , 
PSKLJ.L = 1 
PLLL = 1 
PLJ.L = 1 , 
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PXLL = 1.25 ; 
PXJ.L = 1.25 ; 
YLL = 100 , 
YJ.L = 100 , 
XDlLL = 16 , 
XDIJ.L = 0.0001; 
XHlLL = 16 , 
XHIJ.L = 16 , 
XVlLL = 0.0001; 
XVIJ.L = 16 , 
XDJJ.L = 16 , 
XDJLL = 0.0001; 
XHJJ.L = 16 , 
XHJLL = 16 , 
XVJJ.L = 0.0001; 
XVJLL = 16 
NDLL =0 , 
NDJ.L = 0 , 
NHLL = 2.500 ,; 
NHJ.L = 2.500," 
NVLL =0 , 
NVJ.L = 0 , 
MLL =200, 
MJ.L =200, 
MKXDILL = 0.20 ; 
MKXDIJ.L = 0 ; 
MKXHILL = 0.20 ; 
MKXHIJ.L = 0.20 ," 
MKXVlLL = 0 ; 
MKXVIJ.L = 0.20 ," 
MKXDJJ.L = 0.20 ," 
MKXDJLL = 0 ; 
MKXHJJ.L = 0.20 ," 
MKXHJLL = 0.20 ," 
252 
MKXVJJ.L = 0 
MKXVJLL = 0.20 ; 
bsi.L = 0.250 ; 
bli.L = 0.750; 
bsj.L = 0.250; 
b/j.L = 0.750; 
solve linkage using mcp ; 
); 
DISPLAY sumstat, tablel, table2, table3 
12. Storing the results in Excel spreadsheets 
The procedure XLDUMP can be used export data from a GAMS program to a 
spreadsheet. It writes data and labels to a specified range overwriting what ever is there. 
The first command below, for example, tells GAMS to export the results in Table 1 to an 
excel spreadsheet named numberoffirmsnolinkage.xls. The data will be transferred to the 
sheet named 'hightrpcost' between columns a-g and rows 6-368. 
$LIBINCLUDE XLDUMP TABLE1 NUMBEROFFIRMSNOLINKAGE 
hightrpcost!a6:g368 
$LIBINCLUDE XLDUMP SUMSTAT NUMBEROFFIRMSNOLINKAGE 
hightrpcost!p56:s417 
$LIBINCLUDE XLDUMP TABLE2 AFFILIATEPRODNOLINKAGE 
hightrpcost!a6:k368 
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